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Abstract
Since 1970, women’s employment rates and average pay have increased in real terms
and relative to men’s. This thesis presents a statistical analysis of trends in women’s
and men’s work and pay across three British generations over the period 1972-2004.
This analysis uses longitudinal data from the 1946, 1958 and 1970 British Birth Cohort
Studies.
Contributing to the methodological literature, an analysis of the links between dif-
ferent theories of labour market discrimination and alternative measures of unequal pay
is presented. This includes a detailed examination of different approaches to treating
employment selectivity bias in the analysis of wages. On the basis of this work, two
measures of unequal pay are quantified using the cohort data.
The first analysis focuses on trends in women’s and men’s pay opportunities, taking
into account those estimated for the non-working population. The motivation is that low
pay opportunities may create work disincentives, particularly for women with children.
The results suggest that the cross-cohort increase in women’s relative pay opportunities
is understated in the pay trends for employees.
The second analysis looks at unequal pay for women and men with similar levels of
education and experience. The results suggest that unequal treatment has decreased
across the cohorts, but not disappeared. In the 1970 cohort, even women who had not
had children by the age of 34 were paid less, on average, than similarly qualified men.
Women who spent time out of work or who worked part-time after having children
experienced decreases in their pay relative to men and to other women.
The thesis concludes that gender inequality has reduced across three British gener-
ations, but that it persists for the youngest. The lasting shift toward more equal pay
since the introduction of the 1970 Equal Pay Act is evidence that legislation makes a
difference.
The work presented in this thesis is my own, other than work that is directly quoted
and attributed.
Word count (excluding bibliography): 76,550
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis is concerned with the questions of how unequal labour market opportunities
affect women’s and men’s relative pay over their working lives and with how inequalities
have changed across three British generations since the 1970s. For most people, what
they earn, relative to others, is a key marker of status in the workplace and reflects the
level of skill, responsibility and power involved in the job they do. More than three
decades since equal pay legislation was introduced in Britain, women are still likely to
earn less than men. The legal principle of equal pay for equal work applies to women
and men working for the same employers in the same types of jobs, but not to those
either working in different sectors or working in the same field at different levels of
seniority. Whilst women’s and men’s positive and different decisions about childcare,
occupation and hours of work may be part of the story, much evidence suggests that
unequal treatment persists, albeit in reduced and less direct forms than in the 1970s.
In the current UK labour market, there is evidence that a gender gap in pay emerges
over the first ten years in work after leaving full-time education (Manning and Swaffield,
2008). An unexplained gap in pay emerges even for women who work full-time contin-
uously and do not have children. This unexplained gap may arise in part from different
job choices and unobserved differences in ability and job commitment, but may also
stem from indirect discrimination, placing limits on women’s relative opportunities to
enter certain occupations, undertake professional training, take on responsibility at
work and get promotions. Decisions within couples about which parent should leave
their job or reduce their hours of work to look after children are not simply a matter
of choice, but are also financially constrained by which parent earns more. There is
evidence that motherhood has immediate and long-term negative effects on women’s
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hours of work and pay (Brewer and Paull, 2006). Time spent in part-time work also
has negative impacts on long-term job prospects and earnings (Connolly and Gregory,
2009). The negative impacts of having children and part-time working on pay are not
necessarily proportionate to the associated loss of productivity and relative experience.
The result may be distribution of work and pay amongst women and men later on in
life that is unequal and inefficient, with women ending up more likely to have jobs that
are worse paid and which under-use their skills.
Alongside evidence of persistent gender inequalities in the current UK labour mar-
ket, there is also strong evidence that gender inequality has decreased since the 1970s.
Women’s hourly wages have increased, in real terms and relative to men’s wages. The
implementation of equal pay and sex discrimination legislation in 1975 led to increases
in women’s relative average pay following decades of no change (Neuburger, 1984; Za-
balza and Tzannatos, 1985; Joshi et al., 1985; Manning, 1996). The introduction of the
statutory maternity leave in 1975 and extensions to maternity rights over the 1980s led
to an increase in rates of employment amongst mothers of young children (Gregg et al.,
2007).
The first of the substantive research questions addressed in this thesis is motivated
by this simultaneous increase in women’s relative pay and rates of employment. The ob-
served increase in relative pay may differ from trends in pay opportunities for the whole
population, since the proportion of women in work has simultaneously increased and,
with it, the relative characteristics of the female workforce have changed. Using data
from the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) for 1978 and 1998, Blundell et al. (2007)
analysed the effects of changes in the composition of the female and male workforce
on gender differentials. They found evidence that changes in the composition of the
workforce, induced by changes in employment participation, may conceal part of the
improvement in the labour market position of women since 1978. This thesis considers
the same question, focusing on trends across the three British birth cohorts over three
decades from 1972, before equal pay legislation came into force, to 2004.
The issue explored in the second part of this thesis is that the decrease in the
gender pay gap since the 1970s is not, on its own, evidence that the unequal treatment
of similarly skilled women and men has reduced. Part of the decrease in the pay gap
stems from women’s increased levels of education and labour market experience. The
exercise here is to quantify the effects of unequal labour market treatment on the pay of
women and men with similar levels of education and experience. It takes as its starting
point the substantial body of evidence for the cohorts (Joshi and Newell, 1989; Joshi
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and Paci, 1998; Makepeace et al., 1999; Joshi et al., 2007). In these studies, the effects
of unequal treatment on pay are quantified using estimates of gender differences in pay
not accounted for by gender differences in qualifications and labour market experience.
The key finding is of a cross-generational decrease in unequal treatment. Taking a
similar approach, the analysis in this thesis uses new survey data for the 1970 cohort at
age 34 (in 2004) to extend the picture for this cohort and also presents estimates based
on previously unused survey data from the 1946 cohort at age 43 (in 1989) to explore
trends for older workers.
In the same way that cross-generational comparisons of women’s labour market
position are complicated by simultaneous changes in employment participation and
pay, the picture of life-cycle pay opportunities is partially obscured by composition
effects, caused by the exit and return to work of different groups of women at different
ages. To assess changes in relative pay for the same groups of women and men with
age, the third piece of work in this thesis uses the longitudinal aspect of the cohort
datasets. The starting point for this investigation is the work on gender differences in
wage growth over the life-cycle draws on the work of Manning and Petrongolo (2008),
Brewer and Paull (2006) and Connolly and Gregory (2009). Using longitudinal evidence
from the British Household Panel Study (BHPS), Manning and Swaffield (2008) found
that a substantial pay gap emerges over the first ten years of women’s and men’s
working lives, including amongst women who have not had children and have worked
full-time continuously. Using data from the BHPS (1991-2003) and from the Family
and Children Study (1999-2003), Brewer and Paull (2006) found that having a baby
marked a sharp drop in women’s participation in paid work and the start of a ten-
year decline in their wages, relative to men’s. Using panel data from the New Earnings
Survey Panel Dataset (NESPD) for 1975-2001, Connolly and Gregory (2009) found that
women who switched to part-time jobs, combined with the effects of switching employer
and occupation, had permanently lower earnings trajectories. The analysis presented in
this thesis focuses on life-cycle wage growth between the ages of 23 and 42 for the 1958
cohort and between the ages of 26 and 34 for the 1970 cohort. This analysis is the first
to use the longitudinal earnings data from the cohorts to look at gender inequalities.
Although wage data usable for this purpose have only been collected at three ages from
these two cohorts, and compare unfavourably to the BHPS in this respect, the data go
back to 1981 (ten years before the BHPS started) and contain substantial, longitudinal
samples for the the two separate cohorts.
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1.1 Overview of thesis
The following sections of this chapter set out the policy and historical context, covering
the key empirical evidence.
Chapter 2 considers different theoretical approaches to the question of how to mea-
sure unequal pay. A comprehensive neo-classical approach to labour and household
economics defines unequal pay as a difference in pay between equally qualified and ex-
perienced women and men doing the same types of job. This view implies that decisions
about occupation, family care and hours of work are positive, rather than constrained,
choices. A number of less straightforward forms of unequal treatment are predicted
by other labour market theories. For example, if employers tend to promote men over
women to the higher-grade positions, this aspect of unequal treatment will be missed in
comparisons of women and men in the same jobs. Another aspect that would be missed
would be the lower pay of women in female-dominated sectors, where employers might
pay a low rate and offer little training, relying on the fact that many of their female
employees are limited in their job search by childcare arrangements. Taking the long
view, it may even be that women’s and men’s expectations and aspirations about work
and family life are shaped by unequal employment opportunities and that they adjust
their behaviour accordingly. Theoretical approaches to these issues vary in how much
emphasis they place on the role of individual choice and how far they view individual
choices as being constrained by an unequal distribution of power in the labour market.
The first part of the analysis presented in this thesis draws on the last and broadest
of these concepts, starting from the idea that decisions about employment, childcare and
education are interdependent and are shaped by unequal opportunities in the labour
market. The substantive question addressed is: how have women’s and men’s pay
opportunities changed over time, when the standard analysis of earnings is extended
to take into account the potential earnings of people not in work? The motivation for
this question is that, by looking only at the average pay of employees, we may get a
partial and distorted picture of opportunities. The distortion comes from the fact that
wages are only observed for those who decide to enter employment, whilst employment
decisions are in turn likely be affected by the potential wage i.e. the wage that an
individual could earn if they took a paid job. This interdependence is what makes the
distribution of pay opportunities, and not just pay, important and interesting.
Chapter 3 surveys the methodological literature, focusing on the different theoretical
models and assumptions that have been used to estimate unobserved potential wages
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for non-working individuals. Chapter 4 introduces the British Birth Cohort Studies,
including a detailed account of the work done to construct variables on hourly earnings,
employment experience and educational qualifications. It also provides information on
the representativeness of the studies, on data quality and on the statistical treatment
of these issues. Chapter 5 presents the results of an analysis using the cohort data.
The empirical analysis presented in chapter 5 uses an imputation method, similar
to methods used previously by Blau and Kahn (2006a) and Olivetti and Petrongolo
(2008). Missing potential hourly wages for non-working individuals are replaced with
the observed wages of otherwise-similar working individuals. Similar individuals are
identified as those born in the same year, of the same sex and of the same age, also
with a similar propensity-score (probability of being in work) based on their childhood
ability scores, social class and family backgrounds and child-bearing and employment
histories. The large and detailed files of information on members of the British Birth
Cohort Studies make these studies an ideal source of data for this statistical exercise.
Chapters 6 and 7 start from a narrower, more standard concept of unequal pay as a
difference in pay for equal productive characteristics. The methodological and empirical
difficulty here lies in selecting characteristics to measure individual productivity, which
we are not able to directly observe or quantify. It is standard in studies of this kind to
use proxy measures of educational attainment and employment experience. However,
measurement problems arise from the correlation between employment experience and
other, confounding and discriminatory, influences on pay. The empirical issues involved
in quantifying trends are also challenging, given that employment rates and distributions
of educational qualifications and pay in the population have changed, and have changed
differently for women and men.
In chapter 7, standard decomposition methods are used to quantify unequal treat-
ment across the three cohorts, adding new estimates to previous work done on these
cohorts (Joshi and Newell, 1987; Joshi and Paci, 1998; Makepeace et al., 1999; Joshi
et al., 2007). In addition, life-cycle pay trends are estimated for matched sub-samples
of women and men. The pay trajectories of sub-samples of women who have worked
full-time fairly continuously and of those who have not had children are also examined,
relative to those of men with similar qualifications and family backgrounds.
Chapter 8 draws together the empirical findings from the analyses carried out and
discusses the theoretical and methodological implications of these results. Likely trends
for current and future generations of women and men are considered, alongside the
possibilities for policy to shape these trends.
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1.2 Equal pay and sex discrimination legislation in Britain
The Equal Pay Act was introduced in Britain in 1970 and came into force on the 29th
December 1975. Its aim was to end sex discrimination in regard to pay and terms of
employment. It established an individual right to equal treatment in contracted terms
of employment for the same or equivalent work, covering jobs which were different to
those of the opposite sex, but had been judged to be similar, in terms of skill, effort
and responsibility, under a job evaluation scheme. The comparison of pay and terms
of employment was limited to women and men working for the same employer. The
Act gave individuals the right to make an application to an industrial tribunal if they
believed that they were not being treated equally. Provisions were made for the referral
of collective agreements and orders made by wages councils to the Central Arbitration
Committee.1 An amendment to the Equal Pay Act was introduced in 1983 to extend the
principle of equal pay to jobs of ‘equal value’. However, this amendment still required
a female employee making an equal pay claim to compare herself with a male employee
in the same establishment (or vice versa).2
The Sex Discrimination Act also came into force in 1975. The Act made it unlawful
for an employer to treat a woman less favourably than a man, on the ground of sex,
including in recruitment and in non-contractual benefits of employment, with the ex-
clusion of benefits relating to retirement or death. The Act also covered discrimination
against married versus single women and indirect discrimination, such as the inclusion
of employment requirements or conditions with which fewer women than men could
comply. The Equal Opportunities Commission was set up and charged with the du-
ties of working towards the elimination of discrimination and of promoting equality of
opportunity between men and women more generally.
The Employment Protection Act of 1975 introduced the first statutory paid ma-
ternity leave. This covered a Right of Reinstatement after a period of unpaid leave.
The right only extended to women who had worked full-time for the same employer
for at least two years or part-time for five years. Since its introduction, the qualifying
conditions for maternity leave have been reduced and the generosity of maternity pay
has been increased. The Right to Request Flexible Working was introduced in 2003. In
addition, parents of children aged under six (or of children with disabilities under eigh-
1Collective agreements and wage orders covered nearly two-thirds of the working population in the
early 1970s (Zabalza and Tzannatos, 1985, chap. 3).
2The Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations were introduced to comply with European Community
(EEC) laws. In 1982, the European Court of Justice ruled that Britain had failed to fulfil her obligations
under the Treaty of Rome with respect to the principle of ‘equal pay for work of equal value’.
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teen) were given right to apply to work flexibly and employers have a duty to consider
applications seriously.
European law led to a gradual extension of employment rights of part-time employees
over the 1990s. In 2000, the Part-Time Workers Regulations were introduced, covering
rates of pay and conditions of employment. Also affecting the low pay of many part-time
employees, as well as a smaller fraction of full-time employees, was the introduction of
a National Minimum Wage in April 1999.
A new Single Equality Act is expected to come into force from 2010. The Bill was
published in April 2009. The aim is to simplify the existing equalities legislation. There
are also new proposed measures, including introducing compulsory gender pay reports
in 2013 for a minority of employers and specific rights for carers and new mothers.
1.3 Trends in women’s and men’s earnings and employ-
ment
Since the introduction of the Equal Pay Act, women’s earnings have increased sub-
stantially, relative to men’s. Figure 1.1 illustrates the trends in women’s mean hourly
earnings relative to men’s for full-time employees. This reveals a sharp increase in
women’s relative pay around the time of the implementation of the Equal Pay Act.
Several studies have found evidence that the Equal Pay Act was directly responsible for
the increase in women’s average pay over this period, following decades of no change
(Neuburger, 1984; Zabalza and Tzannatos, 1985; Joshi et al., 1985; Manning, 1996).3
The legislation was not designed to raise the pay of women working in part-time jobs in
different sectors from men. Between 1975 and 2008, the mean hourly earnings of women
in part-time work increased, from 56 per cent to 63 per cent of those of men in full-time
work, but at a lower rate than those of women in full-time work (New Earnings Survey
1975, Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 2008).
The cross-generational increase in women’s relative earnings has been concentrated
amongst women in the twenties and thirties. Figure 1.2 shows ratios of women’s to
men’s median pay for a cross-section of full-time employees of different ages in 1975
and 2006. These snapshots of the labour market overstate the average pay of older
3Greenhalgh and Stewart (1985) found that women and men who in the labour market continuously
over the decade before equal pay legislation was introduced benefited from changes in the occupational
structure, but that the majority of married women entering the labour market filled low paid part-time
jobs.
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Figure 1.1: Women’s mean hourly earnings as a % of men’s in full-time work, 1970-
2007. Sources: New Earnings Survey 1970-2002, Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings
2003-2007, Office for National Statistics
female employees, since they exclude part-time employees, who comprise 40 per cent of
the female workforce and a larger fraction of older female employees.
Women’s and men’s rates of employment have converged since the 1970s (Figure
1.3). This is a feature of labour markets in most OECD countries (see Boeri et al.,
2005). In Britain, men’s rates of employment have steadily decreased, not fully re-
covering after sharp drops during the recessions of the early 1980s and early 1990s.
Increasing numbers of working-age men have become long-term economically inactive
(Disney and Webb, 1991; Faggio and Nickell, 2003). Rates of economic inactivity for
working-age men increased from around 5 per cent in 1971 to 16 per cent in 2008,
whilst unemployment rates increased from around 4 per cent to around 6 per cent, with
temporary increases to around 12 per cent during the recessions of the early 1980s and
1990s (ILO unemployment rates, Labour Force Survey).4 The increase in economic in-
activity has been concentrated amongst men without qualifications and with a chronic
health problem or disability (Faggio and Nickell, 2003) and has been greater in regions
4At the time of writing in August 2009, the unemployment rate is 7.8 per cent and projected to rise
as Britain enters a recession (Office for National Statistics).
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Figure 1.2: Women’s median hourly earnings as a % of men’s in full-time work at each
age, 1975 and 2006. Source: Office for National Statistics, 2008c, derived from Figure
5.10
with high previous rates of unemployment, particularly former industrial heartlands in
northern England, South Wales and central Scotland (Fothergill, 2001).
In contrast, women’s rates of employment have increased steadily, with a large
increase in the mid-1980s and temporary dips during the recessions before and after
this. The increase in women’s employment has been concentrated amongst women
in their twenties and thirties (see, for example Blundell et al., 2007, Figure 2). The
increase is composed of an increase, firstly, in the proportion of women who do not have
children, have fewer children or who have them later and secondly, in employment rates
amongst married and cohabiting mothers.
The average number of children born to each woman over the course of her life was
more than two for the generations born before 1958 and dropped below two for gener-
ations born afterwards (Office for National Statistics, 2008a, table 10.2). The decline
in births in the 1970s coincided with the increase in women’s potential earnings (Joshi
et al., 1985; Ermisch, 1979). Murphy (1993) argued that the diffusion of the oral con-
traceptive pill, substituting for less effective forms of contraception, was a contributory
factor, drawing attention to the fact that two ‘pill scares’ coincided with two periods
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Figure 1.3: Percentage of women and men in employment (women aged 16-59, men
aged 16-64). Source: Labour Force Survey, Office for National Statistics
in which the steady decrease in births was checked. The mean age of mothers at a first
(live) birth in England and Wales also increased from under twenty-four in 1971 to over
twenty-seven by 2006 (Office for National Statistics, 2008b, table 2.17).
The introduction of paid maternity leave in the Employment Protection Act 1975 has
been found to be a contributory factor to the increase in mothers’ employment rates.
Gregg et al. (2007) found that the introduction of maternity leave, and subsequent
policy changes to increase the generosity and reduce the qualifications for this leave,
contributed to the employment increase among mothers of young children between 1974
and 2000. The authors used repeated cross-sections of the General Household Survey
(GHS) to compare the employment patterns of married or cohabiting mothers with those
of married or cohabiting women without children across eight quasi-cohorts, finding
that relative increases amongst the former group (mothers) coincided with changes in
maternity leave legislation.
Another factor contributing to the increase in women’s relative earnings and em-
ployment has been the increase in their levels of education. Educational opportunities
increased for women and men born in the 1950s, with the introduction of comprehen-
sive education under the 1964-1970 Labour Government and the expansion of university
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places in the 1960s and 1970s.5 Across two of the British birth cohorts, born in 1946 and
1970 respectively, the proportion with no or very low qualifications when in their early
thirties fell from around half in 1978 to a fifth in 2000 for both women and men. Even
more striking, the proportion with degree-level qualifications or above increased from
just 10 per cent to 32 per cent for women, and from 21 per cent to 31 per cent for men
(Makepeace et al., 2003, table 2.1a). Rates of employment have been higher amongst
women with qualifications than amongst women without qualifications throughout the
post-war period in Britain. The aggregate increase in women’s employment rates is
associated with the increase in the proportion of women with qualifications (Gomulka
and Stern, 1990; Gutie´rrez-Dome`nech and Bell, 2004).
The 1980s and 1990s were also decades of increasing differences in the employment
rates of mothers with and without qualifications (Macran et al., 1996; Joshi, 2002).
Women and men with higher qualifications have also been increasingly likely to not
have children or have children later in life, compared to less-qualified women and men
(Joshi, 2002; Kneale and Joshi, 2008; Jenkins et al., 2008).
Differences in the hourly earnings of those with and without qualifications have
increased since the early 1980s, as has the dispersion of hourly earnings within educa-
tional groups (Machin, 2003; Hills, 2004; Blundell et al., 2007). Figure 1.4 shows the
steady increase in the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile hourly wage for men and
women over the period 1975-2000.6 The widening dispersion of earnings has also been a
feature of the United States labour market and there is a large literature documenting
and analysing this phenomenon in the UK (see Machin, 2003) and the US (for a review
of the literature, see Katz and Autor, 1999).
Related to the changes in the earnings structure in the UK has been a change in
the structure of jobs, with a decline in manufacturing and an increase in service sector
jobs. One aspect of this change has been the growth in low-paid and high-paid service
sector jobs, and a decrease in middle-level jobs, which is also a feature of the US labour
market (see Autor and Dorn, 2009). Goos and Manning (2007) analysed changes in the
distribution of jobs in Britain using data from the LFS and NES over the period 1975-
1999. Defining a job by occupation and industry codes and ranking jobs on the basis
of their median wage at the beginning of the period, they found rises in the proportion
of jobs at the top and bottom of the distribution and a decline in the middle. They
5The minimum school leaving age was raised to fifteen under the 1944 Education Act and to sixteen
in 1973, with preparations for this second change beginning in 1964.
6The check in this increase between 1990 and 1995 was associated with lower growth in the top (90th
percentile) wages during the recession of the early 1990s.
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Figure 1.4: Ratio of 90th to 10th percentile of hourly wage distribution for women and
men, 1975-2000. Source: Machin, 2003, from figures based on FES data in Table 12.2
also found that the shift in the structure of jobs accounted for a substantial fraction
of the rise in wage inequality, alongside increases in within-job and between-job wage
inequality.
Manning and Petrongolo (2008) also found that the widening gap between the av-
erage pay of women in full-time and part-time jobs since the mid-1970s was associated
both with the increasing occupational segregation of full-time and part-time jobs, com-
bined with the impact of increasing wage inequality on relative pay in low-paid part-time
occupations. Whilst women in full-time jobs have become more spread through the oc-
cupational structure, part-time jobs remain concentrated within low-paying sectors; in
2006, a third of female part-time employees were working in just one of only five occupa-
tional groups: sales assistants, cleaners, care assistants, general clerks and educational
assistants (Gregory and Connolly, 2008).
The introduction of the National Minimum Wage in April 1999 increased wages at
the bottom of the wage distribution and has disproportionately benefited women who
are more likely than men to be low paid. Machin et al. (2002) found that the minimum
wage had a widespread impact in the residential care home sector, in which a third of
workers were paid less than the incoming minimum rate. There is evidence of some
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narrowing of the gender pay gap at the bottom of the wage distribution (Robinson,
2003b). The impact of the minimum wage further up the wage distribution has been
negligible and the impact on the average gender pay gap has been modest (Dickens and
Manning, 2004; Robinson, 2003b).
The interdependence of earnings opportunities and employment participation fur-
ther complicates the picture of change. For men, the drop in relative wages for unskilled
work, alongside the weak incentives to come off incapacity benefit once on it, have been
suggested as causes of the long-term persistence in economic inactivity over periods of
economic growth and job creation (Faggio and Nickell, 2003; Disney and Webb, 1991).
The widening of the wage distribution has also altered the relative wage incentives and
costs associated with paid working for different groups of mothers. Gregg et al. (2007)
found that the increase in mothers’ employment rates since the 1970s was greatest
amongst highly-qualified mothers. Dividing the mothers into three groups based on
their predicted earnings, they found that mothers with the highest potential earnings
responded most to the change in maternity legislation in the early 1980s, whilst those
with middle earnings increased their rates of employment later, in the late 1980s and
1990s. Mothers in the lowest predicted earning third did not change their employment
behaviour. The authors speculated that this could be owing to an increase in childcare
costs, in line with the increase in real wages in the bottom third of the distribution.
The role that unequal treatment of women and men in work has played in these
changes is a matter upon which opinion is divided. One interpretation is that the
decrease in sex discrimination in pay has itself provided more recent generations of
women with stronger financial incentives to enter and remain in the workforce, with
cumulative positive impacts on their pay. Using the example of the 1970 Equal Pay Act,
Neuburger (1984) specifically disputed the ‘priced-out’ argument i.e. that requiring
employers to pay women more would mean that they employed fewer women. He
drew attention to evidence that women’s employment did not reduce in private-sector
industries in which women’s pay increased sharply relative to men’s. Manning (1996)
also presented the employment effects of the Equal Pay Act as a critical piece of evidence
in this debate, arguing that the evidence supported the idea that women were being
paid below their economic value before the Act and that this form of discrimination
was reduced. The empirical evidence on the employment effects of the UK National
Minimum Wage in 1999 is mixed. The numbers of low-paid workers employed overall
does not appear to have been affected (Stewart and Swaffield, 2004) and Connolly and
Gregory (2002) did not find evidence of an impact on women’s working hours. In
24
contrast, Stewart and Swaffield (2008) found a small negative impact on working hours
and Machin et al. (2002) also found evidence of a small negative impact in the care
home sector.
An alternative argument has been made that the widening dispersion of wages and
the increase in the availability of low-paid employment was in fact what enabled low-
skilled women to enter the workforce over this period in the UK and Europe. This
interpretation of the facts implies that women’s low productivity is primarily responsible
for their low pay and also that there is a necessary historical sequencing of changes,
with a decline in gender wage differentials coming only after a closing of the gender
employment gap (Boeri et al., 2005, p.2). The work presented in this thesis on the
measurement of unequal pay and on empirical trends in Britain is intended to contribute
to this debate.
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Chapter 2
Different theoretical perspectives
on unequal pay
This chapter addresses the central question of how we should define unequal pay of
women and men, and considers the theoretical bases for alternative definitions. The
legal definition of equal pay for equal work in the UK suggests that the basis for com-
parison should be women and men in the same jobs. However, if unequal treatment
in the labour market also takes the form of barriers to women and men entering the
same fields of work or to gaining promotions, we may legitimately be concerned with
a broader concept of unequal pay. Alternative views on what constitutes ‘unequal’,
rather than ‘justified’, differences in women’s and men’s pay reflect alternative views
about which family and employment decisions are positive, active choices and which
decisions are constrained or wholly determined by unequal treatment.
The theories discussed in this chapter are grouped under three headings, based on
the three alternative interpretations they provide of gender differences in pay. The first
part of the chapter surveys theories that emphasise the role of individual choice in nearly
all aspects of family and labour market behaviour. The idea that women choose their
jobs and design their working lives around raising children is the main explanation
for the gender pay gap offered by human capital theory (Becker, 1964; Mincer and
Polachek, 1974; Mincer and Ofek, 1982). A complementary argument is that women
opt for less demanding and more flexible jobs once they have children (Killingsworth,
1987). Rather than discrimination, it is productivity differences between women and
men, plus differences in non-financial job benefits, that are viewed as the primary
reasons for gender differences in pay.
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The second part of the chapter surveys a more diverse set of labour market theories,
which incorporate forms of discriminatory behaviour in the labour market, as well as
recognising the role of productivity in determining wages. Discriminatory behaviour
in recruitment and wage policies might arise from straightforward prejudice (Becker,
1957). Employers may also discriminate against individual women because they are
risk averse and suspect that women are more likely to leave their jobs to raise children
than men. This is one form of statistical discrimination, when information about the
group (women) is used as a cheap proxy for information about the individual (Phelps,
1972). Labour market discrimination may also stem from the fact that there are signif-
icant costs to finding and moving jobs for employees and that employers gain a certain
amount of market power as a consequence (Robinson, 1969; Stigler, 1961; Burdett and
Mortensen, 1998; Manning, 2003). In particular, employers may be able to pay their
female and part-time employees less, relying on the fact that women with children
are more likely to be constrained in their job mobility and location of work than men
(Manning, 1996; Manning, 2003; Booth et al., 2003).
The final part of the chapter discusses institutionalist and feminist economic theory,
which share a third, broader and more radical, view of unequal pay. Both theories
reject a clear distinction between productivity-related and discriminatory differences
in women’s and men’s pay (Sawyer, 1995; Humphries and Rubery, 1995). The role of
employers and institutions in organising work and training their workforce is viewed as
critical to the development of employees’ skills and productivity (Piore and Doeringer,
1971). For example, if employers select men, over women, for training and promotion
opportunities, they contribute both to differences in the productivity and the pay of
their male and female workforce. Pay itself may be used as a tool to improve and
motivate performance (Akerlof and Yellen, 1986), whilst training may be used as a
device to protect job status and exclude other workers (Sawyer, 1995). The flip side
of this is that employers in low-paying, often female-dominated, sectors may find it
profitable to pay low wages and to provide very little training, accepting the cost of this
strategy in the form lower workforce productivity and higher rates of turnover (Sawyer,
1995). Within these theoretical frameworks, there is more recognition of sociological
and psychological behaviour in shaping wage structures, through social networks and
discriminatory work cultures and through socialized differences in women’s and men’s
competitive behaviour (Babcock and Laschever, 2003).
The idea of circular, cumulative disadvantage (Myrdal, 1944) is of particular interest
and relevance to the historical and life-cycle analysis of unequal pay. This is the idea
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that individuals’ preferences, prejudices and actions adapt to, as well as shape, their
economic circumstances. The idea of adaptive social norms is also important in feminist
theory (Folbre, 1994). For example, the different aspirations that parents have for their
sons and daughters, the aspirations of young people themselves and decisions about
education and employment may be affected by discriminatory social norms. Gender
prejudice may in this way induce future gaps in education and employment, reinforcing
prejudiced views. Alternatively, a positive cycle of decreasing inequality may cause
outdated views to be challenged and reshaped.
2.1 Theories of non-discriminatory gender differences in
pay
Neo-classical labour market theory predicts that individuals are paid a wage that re-
flects their economic value to their employer i.e. their marginal product. Individuals
with equal skills should, it is argued, be paid the same competitive wage in a market
economy. Conversely, differences in wages between individuals and groups are viewed
as the outcomes of differences in their productivity. Under this view, differences in pay
between women and men have been traditionally attributed to the differences in their
productivity, arising from biological and social differences. The most fully developed
explanations, within the neo-classical tradition, come from human capital theory and
the concept of compensating differentials.
2.1.1 Human capital theory
The most comprehensive interpretation of how non-discriminatory differences in the pay
of women and men arise is provided by human capital theory. The term human capital
refers to the personal attributes and acquired skills that affect an individual’s efficiency
and performance in their job. Individuals develop their human capital through time
invested, over the course of their lives, in education, health, job training and experience.
The use of the term in the neo-classical economics literature dates back to the work of
Chicago School in the late 1950s and 1960s (see Mincer, 1958; Becker, 1964). Human
capital theory has been applied to the question of life-cycle earnings (Ben-Porath, 1967)
and to the specific analysis of women’s pay (Mincer and Polachek, 1974; Mincer and
Ofek, 1982). The human capital framework has also been extended to analyse the
gender division of work and effort within the household (Becker, 1985). Within this
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framework, women’s and men’s individual decisions about how to allocate and divide
up work between work and family life are viewed as rational and complementary.
The human capital model also provides the following account of how individuals’
wages change over the life-cycle (Becker, 1964; Ben-Porath, 1967; Mincer and Ofek,
1982). At younger ages, opportunities for direct financial returns to existing skills, in
the form of higher wages, may be foregone in favour of further education or on-the-job
training. In middle life, the financial gains from previous investments are realised in
the form of higher wages. At older ages, investment in training declines since there are
fewer years of life remaining in which to reap the future benefits of current investments.
Over the life-cycle, wages rise, level off and finally decline as the process of ageing affects
job efficiency, giving a concave life-cycle wage profile. Variation across individuals in
life-cycle patterns of wage growth reflects differences in life-cycle patterns of investment
in, and depreciation of, human capital. In more highly-skilled jobs and occupations, it
is argued, the investment period is longer at the start, the rewards are higher and the
depreciation rate is slower (Mincer, 1958).
Women’s life-time participation in paid work tends to be shorter and less continuous
than men’s. The majority of women take periods out of paid work to raise children,
although the length of time has been decreasing. Mincer and Polachek (1974) discuss
the implications this has for women’s patterns of human capital investments. First,
they argue that women will make fewer initial investments through training or other
learning activities in their work, since there are fewer anticipated years of employment
in which to reap the rewards of those investments. Second, they argue that women’s
life-time investment profiles will be different to men’s, since they are likely to have
several separate periods of employment, rather than one continuous period.1 Third,
they argue that women who do not marry or have children are likely to have similar,
but nevertheless lower, investment profiles than men. The argument here is that, at
younger ages, these women may have anticipated getting married or having children
and would have adjusted their investment behaviour accordingly.
Periods of absence from the labour market are argued to have a doubly-negative
impact on human capital. First, they represent a period of foregone investment. Sec-
ond, they lead to depreciation of existing human capital (Mincer and Polachek, 1974).
Depreciation here refers to the process whereby job skills are lost or become outdated
through non-use. The authors speculate further that depreciation rates are greatest
1They argue that a stronger expectation of prospective employment continuity once children reach
school-age will provide a resumed incentive for women to invest in job-related human capital.
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for on-the-job accumulated components of human capital, especially firm-specific skills.
This would mean that those jobs requiring the highest levels of training would be those
with the highest rates of depreciation. Polachek (1981) developed this aspect of the
theory, arguing that women are likely to choose jobs and occupations in which job skills
decrease at a lower rate when not continuously used.
Closely linked to theoretical work on human capital is the development of neo-
classical economic models of family behaviour (Becker, 1991). These models emphasise
the role of individual, rational choice in deciding upon the household division of labour.
Becker (1991) has argued that the large advantages to be gained from specialisation
within a family can mean that small initial biological or cultural differences between
women and men in childrearing skills could result in the more marked, existing gender
division of labour.
2.1.2 Compensating wage differentials
Considering the value of a job from the standpoint of employees, a further, complemen-
tary, explanation offered for women’s lower rates of pay is that women receive relatively
better non-wage benefits from their employers than men (Killingsworth, 1987). The
idea behind compensating wage differentials is that we should think of job attributes
as a whole, including wages, non-wage benefits and working conditions. From this per-
spective, wages vary across jobs, in part, to offset the non-pecuniary benefits and costs.
Women may be more likely than men to require flexibility from their employer with
respect to working hours, times of work and the location of work. In return for these
non-wage benefits, which impose costs on employers, women accept lower rates of pay.
2.2 Models that incorporate labour market discrimination
The starting point for theoretical and empirical work on discrimination is that there are
systematic differences in the pay of women and men not accounted for by differences
in their human capital. Pay discrimination is conventionally defined by economists as
a difference in rates of pay for individuals with the same productive characteristics
(human capital), based on a group characteristic generally treated as being beyond
individual control, such as gender or race. Theories of discrimination have to deal with
the problem of how equally-productive individuals might end up being paid a wage-rate
less or more than their economic value (marginal product). Three models of labour
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market discrimination are discussed in this part of the chapter.
Although the three theories incorporating labour market discrimination are grouped
together here, there are important distinctions between them. Becker (1957) pro-
posed a theory of discrimination based on the idea of discrimination as non-competitive
behaviour, associated with pre-existing social prejudice, in an otherwise competitive
labour market. In contrast, the two other theories included in this section focus upon
the economic powers and motives which employers have to discriminate between groups,
placing discriminatory behaviour within the broader context of an imperfectly compet-
itive labour market.2
2.2.1 The economic effects of discriminatory preferences
The role of social custom and convention in constraining the terms upon which women
participate in the labour market has a long history in economic thinking (see responses
to the Royal Commission on Equal Pay, 1946). However, social custom and convention
are viewed in quite a different way in different economic approaches to the labour mar-
ket. This section focuses on Becker’s theory of discrimination, in which the causes of
discriminatory ‘tastes’ are taken as given, determined outside the realm of economic be-
haviour, whilst the consequences of these discriminatory tastes in a competitive labour
market form the subject of economic analysis.3
In his book on labour market discrimination written in 1957, Becker stated his in-
tention of supplementing ‘the psychologists’ and sociologists’ analysis of causes with an
analysis of economic consequences’ (Becker, 1957, p.11). His starting point is that em-
ployers, employees and consumers have given preferences and prejudices for employing,
working with or buying from one group rather than another.4 He then models this ‘taste
for discrimination’ as the willingness to pay a certain amount to have contact with or
to avoid a particular group. The price which individuals are implicitly willing to pay
to transact (or avoid contact) with one group rather than another is a key concept in
Becker’s analysis, which he terms the ‘discrimination coefficient’. To measure the overall
effect of discrimination on wages, Becker defines the ‘market discrimination coefficient’
2This distinction is of empirical importance when it comes to quantifying discrimination, since it
affects the selection of individual characteristics that are taken to be reasonable measures of productivity,
and thus the size of the unexplained element of the gender pay gap that is attributed to discrimination.
This is discussed further in chapter 5.
3Alternative economic perspectives view the relationship between social norms and economic be-
haviour as dynamic and endogenous. These are considered in the final part of the chapter.
4Becker applies this model to race and religion, as well as gender.
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as the difference in average wage rate between the discriminated and non-discriminated
groups, divided by the average wage rate for the discriminated group.
Becker (1957) demonstrated how variation in discriminatory behaviour across differ-
ent employers could lead to segregation of discriminated and non-discriminated groups
into different employment sectors, as well as to wage differences. He analysed the ef-
fects of employer, employee and consumer discrimination separately and considered
their combined effects.
Becker’s model assumes full employment. Theoretical work building on Becker’s
model has shown how the method can be extended to the analysis of differences in un-
employment between discriminated and non-discriminated groups (Sowell, 1981). The
effects of the discriminatory wage rate on the labour supply of the discriminated group
implies that the market discrimination coefficient derived by Becker understates the full
extent of discrimination.5
Becker’s analysis suggests that competitive pressures should reduce and eventually
eliminate discrimination. Discriminatory employers are paying a price for their be-
haviour and should eventually either change their practices or be driven out of the
market by more profitable, non-discriminatory employers. Further, competition in cap-
ital markets should penalise the discriminatory behaviour of private monopolies. This
aspect of his work has attracted criticism. The fact that wage differences persist be-
tween different ethnic groups and between women and men in market economies, and
are not fully accounted for by differences in human capital investment is taken as evi-
dence of persistent discrimination (Lundahl and Wadensjo¨, 1984). Exploring this issue,
Akerlof (1980) has explained the tenacity of discriminatory behaviour by developing
the idea that there are economic penalties associating with breaking the rules.
A further criticism of Becker’s theory is that it does not question why people hold
prejudiced views (Lundahl and Wadensjo¨, 1984). Becker refers to the degree of contact
or non-contact between groups and the effect of this on tastes for discrimination, but
he views the origins of these tastes as mainly a question for psychology or sociology.
This contrasts strongly with feminist and institutional perspectives on discrimination,
in which social custom is viewed as not just a determinant of economic behaviour, but
as something which is shaped by economic circumstances and institutional structures.
5This is an important result, to which we will return.
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2.2.2 Risk aversion, stereotyping and discrimination
If an employer believes that women are generally less productive than men, based on
past experience or on stereotypes, then he or she may base their recruitment decisions
partly on an applicant’s sex, using this as a cheap proxy for missing information about
an individual applicant’s likely productivity and long-term job commitment (Phelps,
1972).6 Another scenario is that the variation in productivity may be greater amongst
women than amongst men. If employers are risk averse, they may discriminate against
women as the group with the most uncertain productivity.7 In practice, a common
reason given by employers for not employing or promoting women is that women are
more likely than men to leave jobs, permanently or temporarily, to raise children. Ruhm
(1998) includes a discussion of the economic effects of parental leave policies in a labour
market with asymmetric information.
2.2.3 Monopsonistic models of discrimination
The monopsony model of the labour markets starts from the idea that there are signif-
icant costs to individuals involved in finding a job and in moving job. This means that
the labour supply to an individual employer is not perfectly elastic. In other words,
workers will not normally leave their job in response to a small change in their pay
or hours of work (Manning, 2003). Also, people who are unemployed will not search
indefinitely and may accept a job that pays less than their potential economic value
to an employer. Unlike the competitive market model, employers are not price takers
and are assumed to have a degree of flexibility in wage-setting. Rather than a single,
equilibrium wage for employees of the same skill, the result of this is a distribution of
wages, reflecting different employers’ trade-offs between wage levels, workforce quality
and turnover.8
A dynamic job search model originated in the work of Robinson (1969) on monop-
6The role of information and uncertainty in the labour market has been developed in a more general
context by Spence (1974). He proposed a theory of signaling, in which potential employees use education
to send positive signals about their productivity to potential employers. Signaling is a deliberate
strategy; in contrast to information conveyed by group affiliation such as gender or race, over which
individuals have no control.
7The self-fulfilling and reinforcing aspects of this behaviour form the starting-point for more radical
theories of discrimination such as Gunnar Myrdal’s analysis of race discrimination in the United States
(Myrdal, 1944). This point is expanded in the final part of the chapter.
8Another theory based on labour market frictions, which predicts some similar outcomes, is insider-
outsider theory (see Lindbeck and Snower, 2001). Individuals in employment (insiders) enjoy more
favourable employment opportunities than unemployed individuals (outsiders) owing to the costs of
labour turnover to employers.
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sony and of Stigler (1961) on the importance of frictions related to the costs of search.
The dynamic behaviour of a labour market with frictions has been further developed
by Burdett (1978), Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and Manning (2003). From an
employee’s perspective, there will be a wage benefit from spending time and energy
searching for another job, either through obtaining outside offers as a means of increas-
ing their wages in an existing job, or through moving to a better-paid job.9 Manning
(2003) argues that job search models provide an alternative interpretation of the ob-
served experience-earnings profile (see chapter 6). Rather than being a function of
human capital investment, the increase in earnings with experience can be interpreted
as a function of the number of job offers received by a worker over the course of their
working lives, with the highest rates of job search, job mobility and wage growth likely
to occur at younger ages.
The monopsony/job search models provide an alternative explanation for sex dis-
crimination in the labour market. In a monopsonistic labour market, women may be
paid less than men, owing to family-related constraints upon their mobility between
jobs and to constraints on the time and distance they are able to commute to work (see
[chapter 7] Manning, 2003).10 Employers may also use gender or part-time status as a
way of identifying employees who are less likely to move job and who are more likely
to accept a lower wage in their current job (Booth et al., 2003).11 In contrast with the
human capital interpretation, the negative impact of caring responsibilities on pay is,
at least in part, through constraints on job mobility and bargaining power, rather than
through negative effects on productivity.
The implications of the search model for labour supply motivated the earliest work
on selectivity bias in wage comparisons (Gronau, 1974). Gronau (1974) pointed out
that the dispersion of wage offers, resulting from the combination of employees’ search
strategies and employers’ wage-setting and recruitment strategies, implied that the
observed wage distribution could represent just that part of an underlying wage offer
distribution. Wage offers considered too low to be acceptable would not be accepted or
observed. More generally, the analysis of unemployment becomes more complex when
the costs of job search and the resulting dispersion of wage offers are taken into account
(see Manning (2003), chapter 9). The important point here is that monopsonistic
9Investment in job search is distinct from human capital investment since it yields no improvements
in an individual’s productivity.
10Manning (2003) also shows how job moves less motivated by money would make a difference within
this framework. This is close to a compensating differentials interpretation of gender differentials.
11Manning (2003) points out that the lower elasticity of women’s, compared to men’s, supply to a
particular employer is distinct from their relatively higher elasticity to the labour market as a whole.
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models of discrimination predict the potential underemployment, as well as the potential
undervaluation, of women’s labour.
2.3 Institutional and feminist perspectives on unequal pay
Approaching the problem of unequal pay from a third and more radical starting point,
institutional and feminist perspectives share a sceptical view of the distinction between
productivity-related and discriminatory differences in pay. Institutional theory empha-
sises the role of employers in the organisation of training, work and pay, simultaneously
affecting the pay and the productivity of their workforce. From this perspective, gen-
der discrimination in labour markets is viewed as affecting the development of women’s
and men’s human capital, as well as its relative valuation. Feminist theories view pay
discrimination and inequality from the even broader perspective of how society divides
up and values different forms of paid and unpaid work. Both theories emphasise the
dynamic and cumulative dimensions of inequality and the feedback effects between eco-
nomic and social behaviour.
2.3.1 Institutional approaches to the labour market
Institutional perspectives contrast with the models of labour market discrimination
considered earlier on in the chapter. From an institutionalist point of view, gender
discrimination does not just involve women being paid less than men relative to their
economic value, but encompasses unequal access to employment, training and promo-
tion opportunities which in turn result in productivity differences, with cumulative
impacts on unequal pay.
Early debates on equal pay amongst economists and social reformers in Britain em-
phasised institutional and cultural influences on both productivity and pay. Presenting
his analysis of wage differences between women and men in the Economic Journal
in 1891, Sidney Webb concluded that social custom was a major factor holding back
women’s relative pay, and that an increase in the education and trade union membership
of women would improve their productivity as well as their pay:
Summarizing roughly these suggestions, it may be said that women’s infe-
riority of remuneration for equivalent work is, where it exists, the direct or
indirect result, to a very large extent, of their past subjection; and that, de-
pendent as it now mainly is upon the influence of custom and public opinion,
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it might be largely removed by education and combination among women
themselves. I am inclined to hope most from a gradual spread of trade
unions among women workers; and that even more in the direction of an
increase in the efficiency of labour which trade unionism so often promotes,
than in the improvement in its remuneration arising merely from collective
bargaining. (Webb, 1891, p.661)
In her submission to the Royal Commission on Equal Pay (1946), Barbara Wootton
similarly argued that pay discrimination should be viewed in a larger perspective than
the question of the relative efficiency and pay of women and men in the same jobs. She
thought that prejudice and convention would be weakened by the very fact of legally
enforcing equal pay for equal work, and that this represented a positive and necessary
first step toward an improvement in women’s position. She viewed social factors as
central in determining employment and wages:
I think we get nearest to the truth of the matter if we simply say that both
the relatively low level of women’s wages, and the relatively restricted scope
of their employment, are merely reflections of the general position of women
in contemporary society (Appendix IX, p.114).
A concept of circular, cumulative causation was proposed by the Swedish economist
Gunnar Myrdal in his analysis of race discrimination in the United States at a similar
time. In his book, An American Dilemma, written in 1944, he argued that prejudices
and discriminatory behaviour of white people, the resulting low standards of living and
health amongst black people, and their poorer ambitions and education were mutually
and negatively reinforcing. He did not limit himself to purely economic factors and he
argued that action on all fronts was necessary to tackle discrimination (Myrdal, 1944).12
The development of an institutional model of the labour market in the 1970s was
stimulated by perceived flaws with the human capital theory of training. The human
capital model assumes that workers will pay for skills which are transferable between
employers and will reap the rewards of these investments. In turn, employers will pay
for firm-specific training (Oi, 1962; Becker, 1964). Piore and Doeringer (1971) argued
that this analysis of training omitted the important influence of the training process
itself and the institutional environment in which training took place. From this starting
12Alva and Gunnar Myrdal also together wrote on the questions of population, gender equality and
social welfare, influencing the Swedish model, which has a strong emphasis on childcare.
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point, they developed their concept of an internal labour market. They argued that
on-the-job training contributed to a large proportion of the skills actually used in a
job and was also a prerequisite for the successful utilisation of formal education. They
further observed that the importance of specific training increased the costs of turnover
for an employer, particularly for highly-skilled jobs, and thus encouraged use of long-
term contracts in employment sectors requiring skilled employees. As a consequence
of this, Piore and Doeringer (1971) argued that, within internal labour markets, the
relationship between wages, training and productivity is indeterminate, writing:
Neither Becker nor Oi emphasised the startling implications for neoclassical
wage theory of the permanent employment relationship. As noted, when the
relationship is permanent, neither employers nor workers necessarily concern
themselves with the connection between wages and marginal productivity
at any point in time. These is instead a much more liberal, but nonetheless
competitive, constraint that relates labour costs, earnings and productiv-
ity streams over the employee’s entire work career within the enterprise.
As a result, there is a set of internal wage structures consistent with this
constraint (p.76).
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) present an interesting analysis of how policies which
compress wage structures, e.g. minimum wage policies, can actually stimulate firm in-
vestment in training. Within the empirical literature, a number of studies have focused
on gender discrimination within particular sectors and specialist job markets. For ex-
ample, studies for the UK have focused on differences in both promotion and pay within
academic science (Connolly and Long, 2007) and in economics (Blackaby et al., 2005).
Piore and Doeringer (1971) also developed the concept of a segmented or dual labour
market, identifying this as the consequence of the need to train and retain one part of
the workforce, whilst another part of the workforce remained in a secondary sector of
unprotected and less-skilled jobs paying the competitive, market-clearing rate.13 They
argued that it may be hard to escape the secondary sector once working in it, due
to lack of opportunities to develop primary sector skills. Sawyer (1995) has discussed
low pay in itself as a cause or contributory factor to low productivity, affecting the
health, strength and commitment of workers, the organisation of work and the amount
of training they receive. This is similar to Myrdal’s (1944) idea of circular disadvantage.
13In unprotected jobs, provided there is a sufficiently large pool of unskilled or disadvantaged workers,
employers may find it profitable to pay low or minimum rates and permit high levels of turnover.
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A final aspect of the institutionalist analysis is the emphasis upon the role of social
custom in shaping firms’ internal wage structures (Piore and Doeringer, 1971). A related
literature has looked at the role of economic incentives within firms, captured in the
idea of the efficiency wage (Akerlof and Yellen, 1986). In contrast to neo-classical wage
models in which wage-rates reflect productivity, the productivity of workers is also
viewed as a function of the wage paid. The efficiency wage model predicts that higher
wages will improve productivity by reducing turnover and/or inducing training or effort.
2.3.2 Feminist perspectives
Feminist perspectives view unequal actions and outcomes in the labour market, includ-
ing pay, as part of a wider unequal division of paid and unpaid work in society.
The distribution of work and costs involved in caring for children and other depen-
dants is viewed as critical. This is viewed as affecting the valuation of women’s market
work, not just the distribution of household work (Himmelweit, 1999). Certain occupa-
tions may be perceived to be non-skilled sectors simply because they involve types of
work mainly done by women. Grimshaw and Rubery (1995) note that certain sectors,
such as residential care, which display many features of secondary sector employment
such as low pay, high turnover and poor training, could easily be highly-skilled and
highly-valued. They argue that it is owing to the fact that care work is associated
with the free labour of women, rather than for any other reason that pay, training and
conditions are so poor.
Feminist economists also take seriously the idea that preferences are not exogenous
but are instead are adaptive to expectations, which in turn depend upon economic and
social opportunities. Social norms are viewed as particularly important in understand-
ing the persistence of gender inequalities in power and in understanding why caring
work is so poorly valued in society and why differences in women’s and men’s pay
persist. The neo-classical idea that behaviour is purely rational and self-interested is
rejected. The idea of an autonomous individual who can act, develop tastes and hold
preferences independently of his or her environment is also questioned. Folbre (1994)
argues that the distribution of assets, together with rules, norms and preferences give
power to certain social groups, including more power to men than to women. She collec-
tively terms these the ‘structures of constraint’, which she argues put boundaries upon
individual choice. Folbre (1994) also questions how individuals define their self-interest,
and suggests that sometimes loyalties may be divided and individual self-interest may
not be straightforward. Nussbaum (2001) has further explored the idea of adaptive
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preferences and the idea that people in poor or difficult circumstances, and particularly
women, will adapt their aspirations and expectations in line with their circumstances.
Babcock and Laschever (2003) have analysed the way that behavioural differences
between women and men in the workplace can lead to gender gaps in pay and pro-
motions. Their argument is that women are less likely than men to negotiate and ask
for what they want owing to powerful social forces in modern society which discourage
them from doing so (p.12). Similar to Nussbaum (2001), the adaptive behaviour of
women to constraining social norms is viewed as a social problem, on the basis that
‘fairness as a principle doesn’t work if applied only in response to demand; it must
be safe-guarded and promoted even when its beneficiaries don’t realise what they are
missing’ (Babcock and Laschever, 2003, p.55).
2.4 Conclusions
The theories reviewed in this chapter lend themselves to three alternative explanations
for gender differences in pay:
1. Differences in women’s and men’s parental responsibilities lead to differences in
employment choices, productivity and pay;
2. Gender discrimination in the labour market, as well as differences in productivity,
lead to differences in pay; and
3. Unequal treatment of women and men in work leads to gender differences both in
productivity and in pay.
The rest of the thesis focuses on two measures of unequal pay derived from the last
two of these perspectives, focusing on these in reverse order. Chapters 3 and 5 focus
on a broad societal measure of unequal pay implied by an institutionalist/feminist
perspective i.e. that unequal pay should be measured as the whole gender gap in pay
opportunities. Chapters 6 and 7 focus on a narrower measure of unequal pay implied
by labour market models that incorporate discrimination i.e. that unequal pay should
be measured as the difference in pay between equally-qualified women and men.
The next chapter focuses on the methodological problem of estimating pay opportu-
nities, when pay is only observed for individuals who are in employment. The motivation
for this is that employment decisions are themselves likely to be contingent on potential
earnings. As a consequence, unequal pay opportunities for women imply not just lower
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relative pay, but also lower rates of employment compared to men. For this reason, a
broad measure of unequal pay should take into account the pay opportunities of those
not in work.
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Chapter 3
Methodological literature I:
Measuring pay opportunities
This chapter examines the problem of estimating pay opportunities, taking into account
the potential pay of non-employed individuals. The motivation for this is that what we
really want to know about is women’s and men’s underlying pay opportunities, not just
their pay contingent on employment decisions that are in turn affected by what they
can earn in work.1
A standard way to think about the difference between the average observed pay of
employees and the average underlying potential pay of a whole population or group is
as a problem of selectivity bias, since the difference is induced by non-random selection
into employment. Alternative statistical methods for dealing with selectivity bias are
reviewed in this chapter, forming the basis for the empirical analysis of cross and within-
cohort trends in pay opportunities presented in chapter 5.
This first part of this chapter sets out the problem of selectivity bias in wage compar-
isons formally and in more detail. The second part of the chapter reviews the different
statistical methods proposed in the literature for accounting for selectivity bias. The
third part discusses the existing empirical evidence on trends in women’s and men’s
relative pay opportunities for the UK, Europe and the US.
1In this chapter, I have used the term ‘potential wage’ to mean the wage that a non-employed
individual could earn if they entered work. In the economic literature, the terms ‘wage offer’ has also
been used.
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3.1 Selectivity bias in wage comparisons
A framework for thinking about the relationship between employment decisions and
potential wages includes three sets of factors.
• First, there are factors that affect the value placed on time at home that are not
related to the potential wage, such as the value placed on childcare and housework
and the amount of other sources of household income.2 These factors combine
to determine the ‘reservation wage’ i.e. the wage rate at which an individual is
willing to take up paid employment.
• Second, individual productive characteristics, such as education, determine the
value of time at work, affecting the potential wage, and also, possibly, the value
of time at home (the reservation wage).
• Third, structural factors, such as employer discrimination and job search intensity,
may differentially affect the value of the potential wage for different individuals
and groups.
The observed wage distribution can be thought of as one part of an underlying
wage-offer distribution for a given population or group. For employed individuals, the
potential wage is taken to be the wage that they are currently earning, though, from a
search-theoretic perspective, this could be seen as just one in a range of potential wages
that they could accept, depending upon their job search activity. For non-employed
individuals, the potential wage is defined as the wage (or one in a set of wages) that
they could earn if they entered paid work. The expected potential wage can be written
out as a weighted average of the expected potential wage for employees (observed) and
for non-employees (unobserved):
E(wo) = E(wo|s = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
observed
.P (s = 1) + E(wo|s = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
unobserved
.[1− P (s = 1)] (3.1)
where wo is the individual potential wage and s represents employment status (1
= employed, 0 = not employed). For the purposes of setting out general assumptions
and relationships, the conditional expectation E(.) is thought of here as the limiting
mean of an infinitely large, hypothetical, sample of individuals. From equation 3.1, it
2For the purposes of the analysis here, it is not necessary to distinguish between the objective value
of the work done in the household, the individual preference for this kind of work or the institutional
and financial constraints which shape the costs and benefits of alternative employment strategies.
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becomes clear that the size of the difference between the expected potential wage for the
whole population, E(wo), and the expected actual wage for employees, E(wo|s = 1), is
affected both by the expected employment rate, given by P (s = 1), and by the expected
wage offer for non-employees, E(wo|s = 0). The difference between E(wo|s = 1) and
E(wo) is the selectivity bias.
The employment rate can be thought of as being jointly determined by the wage-
offer distribution and the distribution of reservation wages (at which individuals will
accept work). Generally, it is assumed that
P (s = 1) >
1
2
⇐⇒ wo > w∗ (3.2)
where P (s = 1) is the probability of being in work, wo is the potential wage and w∗
is the reservation wage.
Concern about selectivity bias in wage comparisons, associated with employment
non-participation, was raised in the econometric literature more than thirty years ago
(Gronau, 1974; Heckman, 1977; Heckman, 1979). Gronau (1974) had in mind a monop-
sonistic/search model of the labour market, in which an individual faces a distribution
of wage offers, rather than a single, competitive rate for their labour. His concern was
that the observed wage distributions for groups characterised by partial employment
participation represented just the better, acceptable part of a broader underlying dis-
tribution of potential wages faced by the whole group, including the non-participants.
As a consequence of selectivity bias, he argued that wage comparisons across groups
with different rates of employment, such as women and men, gave a misleading picture of
group differences in underlying wage offers.3 This is illustrated in figure 3.1. The figure
shows the wage-offer distributions for women and men, simplified so that all women have
a fixed, common reservation wage, w∗f , and all men have a fixed, common reservation
wage, w∗m. Together with the wage-offer distribution, the reservation wage determines
the employment rate for each gender. The average potential wage for all women, wof ,
is substantially lower than the average wage for employed women, wf , owing to a
significant amount of non-employment induced by the relatively high position of the
female reservation wage (w∗f) in the wage-offer distribution. For men, the difference
between wom and wm is smaller, since the male reservation wage w∗m comes low down
in the male wage-offer distribution. As a consequence, the difference in the average
3At the time Gronau was writing, the US Census showed that around half of women were in paid
work, compared to 95 per cent of working-age men (Gronau, 1974, p.1127)
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observed wage for employed women and men, wm− wf , is smaller than the difference
in average potential wages, wom− wof .
Figure 3.1: Difference in stylised wage-offer distributions for women and men
Gronau (1974) also analysed the effects of a shift in the wage-offer distribution over
time. He pointed out that the effect of an improvement in potential wages would be an
increase in rates of employment participation and in average pay. He noted, though, that
the increase in average pay would lag behind the improvement in the average underlying
potential wage. This is illustrated in figure 3.2, which shows the effects of a shift in the
wage-offer distribution across two time periods, where the reservation wage, w∗ is fixed
at a potential wage below which individuals do not work. The problem is simplified
to one where everyone has the same reservation wage at both time periods. wo1 is
the average potential wage at time period 1 and w1 is the average observed wage. At
time period 2, the wage-offer distribution has shifted to the right, resulting in a smaller
fraction of rejected potential wages (the shaded area below w∗), representing a higher
employment rate. The increase in the average wage, w2−w1, is smaller than the increase
in the average potential wage, wo2− wo1. This scenario could be particularly relevant
when analysing cross-generational improvements in women’s relative pay opportunities,
given the simultaneous increase in their rates of employment.
Gronau also considered a third, more complicated example of the distorting effects
of employment selection on estimated age-wage profiles for women. This arises from
life-cycle changes in the value of women’s time at home (the reservation wage). He
discussed a specific scenario in which the effects of new mothers’ withdrawal from the
labour market would mask the decline in their potential wages:
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Figure 3.2: Change in stylised wage-offer distribution across two time periods
The existence of young children increases the demand for the wife’s time at
home and the price of her time and reduces her tendency to participate in
the labour force. Leaving the labour market may accelerate the depreciation
of the woman’s market-oriented skills and shift her wage-offer distribution
downward. However, the decline in her wage-offer distribution does not
necessarily result in a decline in the observed wage of working mothers.
If the increase in these women’s wage demands is sufficiently large, it will
offset the decline in potential wages and result in an increase in the observed
average wage (Gronau, 1974, p.1129).
Lewis (1974), and most subsequent applied work on selectivity biases in gender
wage comparisons (e.g. Bloom and Killingsworth, 1982; Zabalza and Arrufat, 1985),
approach selectivity bias in terms of unobserved individual differences between partic-
ipants and non-participants. This is quite different from Gronau’s search-based model
and is rooted in a neo-classical view of wage-setting in the labour market. In the
neo-classical model, an individual faces a single wage offer, not a range of potential
wages. From this perspective, two observably-identical individuals, one in employment
and one not in employment, necessarily differ either in the value of their time at home
(their reservation wage) or in their potential wage. The standard assumption is that
differences in the potential wage across individuals reflect differences in unobserved mar-
ket characteristics. An alternative possibility, which is discussed in chapter 6, is that
discriminatory treatment may differentially affect potential wages for different groups
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(Neuman and Oaxaca (2004)).
3.2 Alternative methods for estimating potential wages
Our aim is to estimate the expected potential wage for the whole population, including
non-employees, E(wo).4 However, we do not observe potential wages for non-employees.
The problem is one of making reasonable, informed estimates of potential wages for non-
employees. It is possible to do this if we are willing to analyse our observed data using
a number of additional modeling assumptions.
The statistical methods reviewed here draw on one of three assumptions in order to
estimate potential wages:
1. we assume that all the important determinants of the potential wage are con-
tained in the data i.e. E(wo|X, s = 1) = E(wo|X, s = 0) where X is a vector of
determinants;
2. we assume that partial information on the determinants of the potential wage are
contained in the data and are also willing to assume positive selection into work
i.e. E(wo|X, s = 1) > E(wo|X, s = 0); or
3. we assume that important determinants of the wage offer are missing from the
data, such that these also affect the employment decision (either directly or via
the potential wage) i.e. E(wo|X, s = 1) 6= E(wo|X, s = 0), but we have some
additional, independent information on the determinants of the reservation wage
(w∗).
The three selection models represented by these three alternative assumptions can
be characterised as selection on observables, positive selection and selection on unobserv-
ables. The three alternative selection models, and the associated methods for estimating
potential wages, are discussed in turn. Which assumption is used depends upon the
data available, as well as on the theoretical stance that is taken on the nature of the
relationship between employment, wages and other individual and work characteristics.
4Alternatively, we might want to estimate other moments of the wage-offer distribution.
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3.2.1 Assumption 1: selection on observables
The assumption of selection on observables is equivalent to the conditional indepen-
dence assumption. This states that, conditional on observed characteristics in X, the
systematic difference in the expected wage-offer for employees and non-employees (the
selection bias) disappears. This can be written:
E(wo|X, s = 0) = E(wo|X, s = 1) = E(wo|X) (3.3)
or
{wo0, wo1} ⊥⊥ s|X (3.4)
where wo0 is the potential wage if not in work (s = 0) and w
o
1 is the potential wage
if in work (s = 1).
Using the conditional independence assumption, the complete-case data for em-
ployees can be reweighted to directly estimate E(wo) =
∫
wof(wo|X, s = 1)g(X)dX.
Alternatively, missing potential wage data for non-employees can be replaced with wage
data from employees who have the same characteristics, using equation 3.3.
Several studies have used simple re-weighting approaches to analyse trends in em-
ployment and earnings (e.g. Smith and Welch, 1986; Welch, 1990; Juhn, 1992). For
example, Welch (1990) used data from the US Current Population Survey (CPS), which
interviewed individuals at two points a year apart over the period 1977/78-1983/84. He
divided the sample into four groups based on their employment status at both surveys.
He assumed that the average potential wage for non-participants who had been out of
work at both surveys would be equal to the observed wage of participants who had been
out of work at only one of the two surveys and reweighted the data on this basis. Juhn
(1992) also implicitly assigned non-workers the wages of workers in groups with the
same levels of education and employment experience, reweighting the observed wage
sample to reflect the distribution of these groups in the whole population.
DiNardo et al. (1996) proposed a semi-parametric re-weighting estimator which as-
signs a different weight to each individual complete-case cell, rather than using groups.
Another form of re-weighting estimator uses the propensity-score (here, the conditional
probability of missingness) to match complete to incomplete cases and re-weight the
complete-case data accordingly. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) have shown that con-
ditioning on the propensity score is sufficient to remove bias arising from selection on
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observables, so equation 3.3 can be re-written as:
E(wo|p, s = 0) = E(wo|p, s = 1) = E(wo|p) (3.5)
where p = P (s = 1|X).
Another approach has been to directly replace (impute) missing potential wages for
non-employees with values drawn from the observed distribution of wages for employees
with similar characteristics in X. This approach has come out of statistical work on
methods to handle bias arising from missing data in surveys (see Rubin, 1976; Rubin,
1987; Little and Rubin, 2002) and out of methods developed by Government statistics
agencies to handle missing items of data in large-scale government surveys (for example,
see Sande, 1982; Skinner et al., 2002; Durrant, 2006). For each missing item of data,
an attempt is made to find a donor record without missing data, most similar to the
survey record with the missing item (according to some measure of distance on a set
of observed characteristics) and to use the observed value to fill in the missing item.
Nearest-neighbour matching, predictive mean matching and hot deck imputation based
on imputation classes are some of the methods developed for identifying a ‘match’ for
a record with a missing item of data. An example of an application of predictive mean
matching to impute low pay in the Labour Force Survey can be found in Skinner et al.
(2002) and Dickens and Manning (2004). Here, individuals with missing hourly wages
have these replaced with values borrowed from individuals who have observed wages
and who have the same predicted wage rate. Predicted rates are obtained from a linear
regression of log wages on a set of observed characteristics.
Multiple imputation methods have been developed to introduce uncertainty (vari-
ance) into imputed datasets, designed to reflect the uncertainty associated with the
imputation model used to fill in missing items. Instead of replacing a missing item of
data with a single observed value, it is replaced with several values. This creates sev-
eral imputed datasets from which the between-imputation variance can be calculated
and factored into statistical analyses. Multiple values are obtained either by adding a
random term to each predicted value, drawn from some specified distribution, or by
drawing several values randomly from within an imputation class (see Rubin, 1987).
The goodness of conditional independence assumption depends critically on the
variables in X that are conditioned upon. Hirsch and Schumacher (2004) have drawn
attention to downward bias in estimates of wage differences between groups, when group
status is not itself used in the imputation model as an attribute to match cases with
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missing wage data to donor cases.5
In the case of potential wages and employment decisions, there are also a number
of theoretical reasons to question the conditional independence assumption.
• First, within neo-classical wage theory, unobservable factors such as individual
motivation, which affect productivity, are viewed as important. These factors are
likely to differ systematically across working and non-working populations (e.g.
see Lewis, 1974 or Bloom and Killingsworth, 1982).
• Second, job search theories of the labour market imply that individuals with the
same characteristics face a distribution of potential wages, rather than a single
offer. As a consequence, the offers faced by those out of work, who are also likely
to have invested less time in job search, are likely to feature in the lower, rejected
part of the potential wage distribution (e.g. see Gronau, 1974).
• Third, institutional models of the labour market suggest the employers’ strategies
may vary, such that higher wages and longer-term employment contracts go hand-
in-hand (e.g. see Sawyer, 1995).
All of these theoretical models predict unobserved differences in potential wages of
working and non-working populations, although the interpretations of these differences
are quite different.
3.2.2 Assumption 2: positive selection
An alternative assumption is that the potential wages of non-employees are systemati-
cally lower than those of employees with similar characteristics, so
E(wo|X, s = 0) < E(wo|X, s = 1) (3.6)
Given equation 3.2, this implies that cov(wo, w∗|X) ≤ 0. In other words, positive
selection into employment is induced by a potential wage is higher for some given set
of characteristics in X, not because the reservation wage is systematically higher.
Blau and Beller (1992) employed this assumption to analyse wage and employment
trends by race and gender in the US over the 1980s and 1990s. Using CPS data,
5This is demonstrated by analysing wage differences by union membership using partially imputed
earnings data from the US CPS, which does not include union membership in the imputation model.
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they experimented with imputing missing potential wages for non-employees that were
different fractions (less than or equal to one) of those of employees with the same
predicted wage, based on their education and employment experience. Analysing wage
differentials using cross-sectional data from the UK Family Expenditure Survey (FES)
for the period 1978-1998, Blundell et al. (2007) used the weaker assumption of positive
selection into employment at the median i.e. for some X, the median potential wage
for workers is higher than that for non-workers. Their X though included only gender,
age, educational attainment and year, not employment experience.
Blundell et al. (2007) discussed the potential problems with the assumption of pos-
itive selection into employment, identifying three scenarios in which the potential wage
might be positively partially correlated with the reservation wage i.e. cov(wo, w∗|X) >
0.
• Firstly, individuals with higher earning power may also have more assets which
could lead to some negative, rather than positive, selection effects i.e. those with
higher earning power are able to not work. This may be particularly true for older
individuals nearing retirement ages.
• Secondly, women with high earning power may be more likely to partner men
with high earning power, again leading to women with higher potential earnings
being able to not work.
• Thirdly, for older groups, highly-educated women are more likely to have young
children, since they are more likely to have had their children later, and conse-
quently are less likely to be in paid work.
Blundell et al. (2007) argued that their own, weaker, assumption of positive selection at
the median is less likely to be undermined by these sources of negative selection than the
stronger assumption of positive selection across the whole potential wage distribution.
They also examined longitudinal data from the British Household Panel Study for the
period 1991-2001 and found some indirect evidence to support their assumption. They
regressed log wages for each panel on age and education and systematically compared
the residuals (actual minus predicted wage) for continuously-employed vs intermittent
workers and found that the residuals were systematically lower for intermittent workers.
Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) have argued that selectivity bias amongst women in
the US was negative in the 1970s i.e. non-employed women had higher potential wages
than employed women with similar levels of education, and only became positive in
the mid 1980s. This finding is based, though, on a model that relies on an assumption
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that is arguably at least as strong as the assumption of positive selection itself. This is
discussed in the next section.
3.2.3 Assumption 3: selection on unobservables
A final set of models for correcting selection bias allow for the possibility that there are
systematic unobserved differences in the potential wages of observably-similar employed
and non-employed populations:
E(wo|X, s = 0) 6= E(wo|X, s = 1) (3.7)
Heckman’s two-equation model
Heckman’s two-equation selection model (Heckman, 1976; Heckman, 1979) is the stan-
dard method for dealing with ‘selection on unobservables’. Gronau (1974) proposed a
similar approach. The essence of this approach is to characterise the selectivity problem
as one where the employment decision is affected by unobservable factors, which are also
related to the potential wage. As a consequence, the expected value of the error term in
the wage function for employees may be non-zero i.e. it is not just random ‘noise’. The
method aims to model and directly control for the correlation between the error term in
the observed wage function and the error term in the employment function. The error
term in the employment function is measured as the difference between some indicator
of actual employment status and the predicted probability of being in employment. A
function of this is then included in the wage function, to test for a partial correlation
(indicating selectivity bias) and to control for this.
Using the general notation employed so far, the broad approach can be written as
follows. The problem is reframed as
E(wo|X,U, s = 0) = E(wo|X,U, s = 1) = E(wo|X,U) (3.8)
where unobserved factors that affect both the potential wage and the employment
decision can be represented by an index U . The employment function is then
P (s = 1) = F (X,U,Z) (3.9)
where F (.) is some function and Z is a vector of variables which affect the em-
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ployment decision but not the potential wage (holding fixed X and U). We do not
observe U . However, some measure of U can be inferred from the difference in actual
employment status (which is affected by U) and the predicted probability of being in
employment conditional on X and Z (which does not include U):
W (s∗ − pˆ) = V (U) (3.10)
where s∗ is an indicator of actual employment status (based on some transformation
of s) , pˆ = P (s = 1|X,Z) and W (.) and V (.) are unspecified functions. Equation 3.10
can be substituted back into equation 3.8, giving:
E(wo|X,W (s∗ − pˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
V (U)
, s = 0) = E(wo|X,W (s∗ − pˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
V (U)
, s = 1) (3.11)
Three important things should be noted about this approach.
1. In this model, pˆ plays a very different role to p in the matching model (equation
3.5). In the matching model, the propensity score p stands in for X. In this
model, the difference between s∗ and pˆ is exploited to proxy for U . Heckman and
Navarro-Lozano (2004) have drawn attention to the confusion that has arisen over
the role of the propensity score in selection, matching and instrumental variable
methods. They provide a good summary of the different role of the propensity
score in the different models and the different assumptions which justify its use
in each context.
2. Within the employed sample, the variation in V (U) comes solely from the variation
in pˆ, since actual employment status is fixed (s = 1). If there are no excludable
variables in the model (Z), the variation in pˆ = P (s = 1|X) is just the variation
in some function of X. In this case, the inference that the variation in pˆ really
does represent variation in V (U) is based on rather shaky foundations (see Vella,
1998 and Puhani, 2000 for a review of studies that have simulated data to test
this).
3. For the non-employed sample, V (U) is inferred from actual employment status
s = 0, in combination with predicted employment probabilities pˆ. Thus employees
and non-employees who share the same pˆ are assumed to be more different with
respect to V (U) than they are similar. For example, imagine one person who
is in work, despite having small children and poor access to free childcare (and
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therefore a low predicted probability of being in work), compared to another
who is in a similar position, but who is not in work. V (U) is a measure of the
difference between them, designed to capture the effects of unobserved factors,
such as greater motivation, having a better employer etc...
Heckman’s original two-equation model relies on parametric (distributional) as-
sumptions about the form of the selection bias and the structure of the error terms
i.e. joint normality, separability and additivity. This structural model is written out
in full at the end of this chapter. This type of model has been developed into a more
general set of ‘control function’ methods, which rely less heavily on parametric assump-
tions but rely more strongly on exclusion restrictions (for good descriptions of these,
see Heckman and Navarro-Lozano, 2004; Blundell et al., 2005).6
The main problem with Heckman type/control function methods is that it is hard in
practice to find variables that determine the probability of work, but not the potential
wage i.e. to find reasonable exclusion restrictions. Commonly used variables include
one or more of the following: the income, education and/or age of a spouse or partner;
household wealth; non-wage household income; housing tenure; and number and ages
of children (for examples of studies using these, see Gronau, 1974; Zabalza and Arrufat,
1985; Dolton and Makepeace, 1987a; Ermisch and Wright, 1993; Joshi and Paci, 1998).
For each of these variables, it is likely in most situations that they affect the decision
whether or not to work quite strongly. What is open to debate is whether or not these
variables are also directly partially correlated with the potential wage. The problems
discussed already in this chapter in relation to the assumption of positive selectivity
bias above also cast doubt on using household income, spouse’s income or children as
excludable variables.
Other less common exclusion restrictions have also been used in the literature, in-
cluding individual attitudes to work and family (e.g. Albrecht et al., 2004) and holding
a loan or mortgage on a property (Dolton et al., 2009). In the first of these, the use
of attitudinal data also draws on a strong and debatable theoretical stance in which
attitudes and preferences are taken as given (exogenous) rather than adaptive to cir-
cumstance (endogenous). In the second, the idea is that taking out a loan or mortgage
is likely to put pressure on individuals to work. One practical objection to this exclusion
restriction is that institutional arrangements in some European countries (the focus of
6In the parametric specification, the model is identified even if there is no exclusion restriction i.e.
X = Z. In practice though, the results are sensitive to small mis-specifications in the model without
an exclusion restriction (see Manski, 1989; Vella, 1998; Puhani, 2000.
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the analysis) may require that individuals have a certain level of earnings before they
are eligible for a loan or mortgage.
More credible and less theoretically-driven exclusion restrictions are those which
draw on institutional arrangements or changes, such as out-of-work benefits entitlement,
used by Blundell et al. (2007), which is discussed in the last part of this chapter.
Angrist and Krueger (2001) have drawn attention to the problems with using in-
struments that are correlated with the omitted variables and the same problems apply
to excluding variables that are, in fact, correlated with the error term in the wage func-
tion. Further, Angrist and Krueger (2001) have pointed out that the bias in estimates
from mis-specified models using instrumental variables can be much greater than the
bias in estimates using ordinary least squares models, which rely on the assumption of
selection on observables.
Other methods to account for unobserved selection
An alternative approach to characterising selectivity bias was proposed by Manski
(1989). He pointed out that, although it is not possible to obtain selection-corrected
point estimates without some additional identifying assumptions, it is possible to esti-
mate upper and lower bounds on quantiles of the distribution. The underlying potential
wage distribution - part observed and part missing - can in this way be characterised
by its upper and lower limits on particular quantiles. The proportion of missing data
arising from non-participation and the maximum and minimum values within which
the missing potential wage data are constrained to lie determine the size of the bounds.
A limitation of this approach is that, where a substantial proportion of the data are
missing, precise estimates cannot be obtained. Manski suggested that additional as-
sumptions, including exclusion restrictions, could be introduced to tighten the bounds.
Finally, the availability of longitudinal data on employment and wages for the same
individuals over time makes more direct and simple methods possible. Imputing poten-
tial wages for non-employed individuals using data on their wages recorded in previous
or subsequent waves of the panel (when they were employed) has the advantage that
fixed individual unobserved, as well as observed, selectivity biases are taken into account
in the imputed wage. Interestingly, Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) got similar results
when they imputed potential wages for a group of non-workers using information on
their past wages and when they imputed these for the same group using the wages of
observably-similar employees. The authors argued that, in this context, the evidence
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provides support for the assumption of selection on observables. A limitation of using
past wages to impute missing current wages is that only fixed, individual sources of
unobserved selectivity bias are accounted for. Changing or structural (vs. individual)
sources of bias are not accounted for. For example, the past wages of a woman who has
since had children may not be a good estimate of her current potential wage.
3.3 Existing estimates of gender gaps in pay opportunities
This last part of the chapter focuses on just four studies, each of which analyses the
effects of selectivity bias in gender wage comparisons, induced by employment selection.
Blundell et al. (2007) have analysed trends for the UK since 1975. Blau and Kahn
(2006a) and Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) looked at trends for the US since the
1970s. Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) examined differences across OECD countries.
The purpose here is twofold: first, to summarise the set of results that provide a context
for the analysis presented in the following chapter; and second, to draw attention to
the sensitivity of estimates to the method used.
Blundell et al. (2007) looked at trends in gender differentials in potential pay for
Britain, using cross-sectional data from the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) com-
paring the periods 1978 and 1998. To analyse trends in gender differentials, they split
the sample into four age-education groups: 25-year-olds with A-levels or lower qual-
ifications; 25-year-olds with higher qualifications; 40-year-olds with A-levels or lower
qualifications; and 40-year-olds with higher qualifications. They estimated bounds on
wage distributions (see above, proposed by Manski, 1989), including exclusion restric-
tions to tighten these. In the first instance, using bounds without restrictions, they
found that the bound estimated on the change in the gender differential in median po-
tential wages between 1978 and 1998 was not informative. The low proportion of women
in employment in the 1978 sample made this bound too wide to be able to get a pre-
cise estimate of change. Only by way of imposing restrictions on the model of positive
selection into employment and partial exclusion restrictions (related to changes in the
out-of-work benefits system) did the authors find evidence that the gender differential
in potential pay had decreased for the 25-year-old less-qualified group, although not for
the other groups. Further, using these restrictions, their results suggest that the gen-
der differential in potential pay for this group has decreased more than the pay trends
for employees would suggest. In other words, employment selection effects appear to
conceal part of the improvement in women’s earnings opportunities.
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Blundell et al. (2007) used a partial exclusion restriction to estimate informative
bounds on trends in gender differentials. They assumed that out-of-work benefits en-
titlement, holding fixed household composition, affects the employment decision (via
the reservation wage) but is only weakly and positively correlated with an individual’s
potential wage. This is referred to as the monotonicity restriction in the paper. This
variable was constructed using the Institute for Fiscal Studies tax and benefit model and
was used previously in Blundell et al., 2003. The variation in this out-of-work benefits
is not linked to variation in household composition, which is held fixed, but comes from
variation in housing benefit entitlement, linked to local and individual housing costs.
The authors rejected this variable as a full instrument, but argued that it is likely to
be only weakly and positively correlated with the potential wage, whereas it will have
much stronger direct effects on the employment decision. On this basis, it is regarded
as suitable for a partial exclusion restriction. 7
For the United States, Blau and Kahn (2006a) used longitudinal data from the
Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the years 1979, 1989 and 1998. They were
concerned with the question of whether changes in women’s labour force participation
had contributed to the slowing convergence in women’s and men’s average pay in the
1990s. They used an imputation approach to estimate potential wages for non-employed
individuals. They exploited the longitudinal aspect of the dataset, replacing missing
potential wages for individuals out of employment with the wage observed within a
four-year window when that individual was last or next in employment. For individuals
who had not been in paid work over this four-year period, the missing potential wage
was placed above or below the median based on their level of education and employment
experience. They found that trends for full-time employees overstated the convergence
in women’s and men’s pay opportunities in the 1980s and slightly understated the
convergence in the 1990s. Note though that this refers to the change in the raw,
unadjusted pay gaps (reproduced below from table 3 of Blau and Kahn (2006b)), not
to trends in adjusted gaps which the authors focus on.
Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) also analysed changes in gender gaps in pay op-
portunities for the United States between 1975-79 and 1995-99. Their results are not
directly comparable to those of Blau and Kahn (2006a), discussed above, since the re-
sults in Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) are trends for full-timers, net of demographic
7The authors identify one source of a weak positive correlation induced by individuals with higher
potential earnings living in better, more expensive housing. A second source which they do not consider
is the possible correlation between wages and housing costs within local areas, below the regional level.
However, this second effect may well be weak, since the evidence is that there is a bigger gap between
wages and rents at the bottom of the market in high cost areas.
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characteristics, not the unadjusted trends. Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) used cross-
sectional data from the Current Population Study for two time periods, 1975-79 and
1995-99. The authors used Heckman’s two-step structural model for estimating selec-
tivity bias, treating the presence of young children (aged five or under) in the household
as exogenous in the labour supply equation and as excludable from the wage equation.
The other variables included in the wage model are educational qualifications, potential
employment experience, marital status and location of residence. They found that the
sign on the selection term was large and negative for the 1975-79 sample, but large and
positive for the 1995-99 sample. The authors interpreted these partial correlations as
indications of unobserved selectivity bias; negative in the earlier sample and positive in
the later sample. In other words, the predicted potential wages of non-working mothers
in the 1975-79 sample were actually higher than the wages of otherwise-similar working
mothers in the sample. The authors concluded that there has been no improvement in
women’s potential wages, relative to men’s offers for fixed demographic characteristics,
but that the increase in the relative wages of employed women is wholly attributable
to women’s changing patterns of labour market participation.
A problem with the model which Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) use is that it
relies heavily on the assumption that motherhood is not partially correlated with the
wage offer, holding other characteristics. The idea behind this is that the partial cor-
relation between the selection term (which is itself correlated with motherhood) and
the potential wage arises from non-random selection of mothers with young children
into employment. However, there are two ways in which this partial correlation might
arise if this assumption were wrong. First, a positive partial correlation (found for the
later 1997-99 sample) might arise from selectivity bias associated with both the timing
of motherhood. This requires some further explanation. The employment and wage
models used by Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) include three potential experience cat-
egories (5-14 years, 15-24 years and 25-34 years). In effect, controls for age are included
in the model. If there is positive selection into late motherhood and if older mothers
return to work more quickly, we would get a positive sign on the selection term in the
wage equation (discussed earlier in the chapter and by Blundell et al. (2007)). In formal
terms, the selection term is directly correlated with the error term in the wage equation.
Second, a negative partial correlation (found for the earlier 1977-79 sample) may
arise from the direct negative effects of motherhood upon women’s wages, particularly
when employment experience is imperfectly accounted for. Corresponding closely to
the sample period for which Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) found a negative sign on
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the selection term, Waldfogel (1998) found evidence to suggest that motherhood had
direct negative impacts on women’s wages in the United States, taking into account
their qualifications, employment experience, age (fixed at thirty), marital status and
ethnicity. She used data from the 1980 survey of the National Longitudinal Studies of
Young Women (NLS-YW) and Young Men (NLS-YM). If this is the explanation for
the negative partial correlation between the selection term and wage, then the higher
potential wages predicted for non-working mothers, compared to working mothers, in
the 1975-79 sample, are poor predictions and cast doubt on the interpretation given by
Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008).
Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) took a similar approach to that of Blau and Kahn
(2006a) to estimate gender gaps in potential wages across fourteen OECD countries.
Using data from the PSID and the European Community Household Panel Survey
(ECHPS) in the period 1994-2001, they were able to place the missing wages of non-
participants either side of the median on the basis of their most recently observed actual
wage (when employed). For individuals who had not been in employment over the whole
period, their potential wage (relative to the median) was estimated on the basis of their
observed characteristics. They found that gender gaps in median potential wages were
higher than gender gaps in median wages of employees in all countries, suggesting
positive selection into employment. They found that the effects of including potential
wages for non-employed individuals was small in countries with high rates of female
employment - the UK, the US and most central and northern EU countries - but was
substantial in southern Europe, where female rates of employment are much lower.
3.4 Discussion
This chapter has demonstrated the strong theoretical motivation for trying to model
and take into account the bias in gender wage comparisons that arises from non-random
selection into employment. In particular, the potential biases arising from interde-
pendent changes in women’s employment patterns and potential earnings have been
demonstrated in different contexts.
The different approaches and statistical models for taking into account selectivity
bias have been critically analysed and have been discussed in detail in relation to four
studies of trends in women’s and men’s potential earnings.
On the basis of this review, the strategy used to analyse the cohort data is based on
an imputation methodology. The working assumption is that of ‘selection on observ-
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ables’. This is not based on a strong theoretical stance about the absence of selection
on unobservables, but rather on the combined consideration of the nature of the data
available in the cohort studies and the problems with trying to account for unobserved
selection using mis-specified control function models. The data contain a large amount
of detailed information on individuals, but no administrative data that would lend it-
self to credible exclusion restrictions, such as information on local childcare provision.8
Further, the evidence suggests that methods using mis-specified exclusion restrictions
to account for unobserved selection bias may give estimates that are more biased than
those from methods which do not attempt to account for unobserved selection bias at
all (see discussion in chapter and Angrist and Krueger (2001)). Instead of trying to
model and account for unobserved selection bias, some indirect evidence of unobserved
selection bias is sought in the data and the implications for the estimated trends are
considered.
Appendix 3: Heckman’s structural two-equation model
In Heckman’s structural two-equation model, the potential wage equation is written as:
ln(wo) = X ′β1 + u (3.12)
where ln(wo) is the natural log of the potential wage, X is a vector of observed
wage-related characteristics, β1 is a vector of partial linear correlations and u is an
individual residual term. For the whole sample, the limiting distribution of error terms
is assumed to be asymptotically normally distribution with mean zero and constant
variance (E(u) = 0, var(u) = σ). The expected value of the potential wage is E(wo) =
X ′β.
The selection equation is written:
s∗ = X ′β2 + Z ′β3 + v (3.13)
where s∗ ≥ 0 if an individual is in paid work (s = 1) and s∗ < 0 if an individual is not
in paid work (s = 0). X is a vector of characteristics also included in the wage model
and Z is a vector of variables excluded from the wage equation, which are assumed to
influence the employment decision, but not the potential wage.
8There is project to link and develop methods for analysing linked longitudinal and administrative
datasets, see http://www.ncrm.ac.uk/about/organisation/Nodes/ADMIN/
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The observed wage equation is estimated just on the selected sample who are in
work:
E(ln(wo) | X, s∗ ≥ 0) = X ′β1 + E(u|s∗ ≥ 0). (3.14)
The expected error term in the observed wage equation can be re-written as:
E(u | s∗ ≥ 0) = E(u | X ′β2 + Z ′β3 + v ≥ 0) = E(u | v ≥ −X ′β2 − Z ′β3) (3.15)
The additional assumption in Heckman’s original two-equation model is that the
error term in the potential wage equation, u, and the error term in the selection equa-
tion, v, are jointly normally distributed, cov(u, v) ∼ N(0, σuv). Using this assumption,
the conditional expectation of the error term in the observed wage equation is:
E(u | v ≥ −X ′β2 − Z ′β3) = ρuvσuλ (3.16)
An estimate of an individual’s sample selection score, λ, is calculated from the selec-
tion equation as the ratio of the normal probability density function to the cumulative
density function: λ(.) = φ(.)1−Φ(.) evaluated at λ(−X ′β2 − Z ′β3). λ is included as an ad-
ditional regressor in the wage equation and the coefficient on λ is ρuvσu. Importantly,
the larger the participation probability is, the smaller is the sample selection score, λ.
From this, we estimate:
E(ln(wo) | X, s = 1) = Xβ1 + ρuvσuλ (3.17)
and can calculate E(ln(wo)|X) = E(wo | X, s = 1)− ρuvσuλ.
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Chapter 4
Data used from the British Birth
Cohort Studies
This chapter describes the data used from the three British Birth Cohorts to investigate
trends in the unequal pay of women and men. The three studies are continuing national
surveys of individuals born in single weeks of March 1946, March 1958 and April 1970.
This chapter considers what the three cohorts, taken together, can offer to the investi-
gation of this subject and some of the problems associated with using data from these
long-running longitudinal surveys. Section 4.1 includes a general introduction to the
studies and an overview of survey non-response and permanent loss of sample members
over time. It also discusses the main advantages and disadvantages of using the cohort
data for the present analysis. Section 4.2 describes the final datasets and derived vari-
ables used in the present analysis. It also describes the original variables used and the
work done to construct the datasets. Section 4.3 includes a detailed assessment of the
quality of the 1946 employment history data and of the combined effects of the survey
non-response and missing data on wage estimates. The statistical treatment of these
data quality issues is discussed.
4.1 Introduction to the three birth cohort studies
This section provides an overview of the study designs and changes in the studies and
samples over time. The 1946 birth cohort study is housed at the MRC Unit for Lifelong
Health and Ageing (see http://www.nshd.mrc.ac.uk). The 1958 and 1970 birth cohort
studies are housed at the Centre for Longitudinal Studies at the Institute of Education
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(see http://www.cls.ioe.ac.uk) and datasets are available to the research community
and can be accessed via the UK Data Archive (http://www.data-archive.ac.uk/). For a
profile of each study, see Wadsworth et al. (2006) on the 1946 birth cohort study, Power
and Elliott (2006) on the 1958 birth cohort study and Elliott and Shepherd (2006) on
the 1970 cohort study. For a comparison of findings from the three cohorts, see the
volume edited by Ferri et al. (2003).
4.1.1 Original survey designs and samples
Each of the birth cohort studies took as its original target sample all of the British
births in one week. The 1946 cohort study - the MRC National Survey of Health and
Development (NSHD) - started in March 1946 as a study of childbirth and maternity
services, motivated by a contemporary concern about falling birth rates (Joint Com-
mittee of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists and the Population
Investigation Committee, 1948).1 The original study was promoted by the Royal Col-
lege of Obstetricians and the Population Investigation Committee and was funded by
the Nuffield Foundation and the National Birthday Trust Fund. Interviews were con-
ducted by health visitors at home visits with all mothers who gave birth in England,
Scotland and Wales in the week 3-9 March 1946. Mothers of 13,687 babies were in-
terviewed, representing 82 per cent of the 16,695 births selected into the sample. A
follow-up study was carried out in 1948, which selected a smaller, stratified sample to
interview, owing to cost and technology constraints (Wadsworth, 1991). The resulting
5,362 two-year-olds has constituted the core target sample of the 1946 cohort, which
has been tracked ever since. Weights are provided with the datasets to account for the
stratification of the sample in 1948. A description of how the stratification weights are
used is included in the final section of this chapter.
The 1958 cohort study - the National Child Development Study (NCDS) - was
set up to investigate the social and obstetric factors associated with infant death and
abnormalities (Butler and Bonham, 1963). In common with the original survey of the
1946 birth cohort, the original Perinatal Mortality Study (PMS) was funded by the
National Birthday Trust Fund, with the administrative network of the National Health
Service used to contact mothers. The study included in its sample all babies born in
England, Scotland and Wales in the week 3-9 March 1958. Data were collected via
a questionnaire completed by the midwife in attendance at the delivery, based on a
interview with the mother, plus information extracted from medical records. Of 17,634
1As it turned out, this birth cohort was the beginning of a post-war baby boom.
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mothers selected for the sample, 17,416 (99 per cent) were successfully interviewed.
In addition, information was collected on more than 7,000 stillbirths throughout the
months of March, April and May 1958.
The 1970 cohort study - the 1970 British Cohort Study (BCS70) - was also designed
to investigate maternal social and biological characteristics in relation to infant health
and mortality and was set up to allow comparisons with the birth survey of the 1958
cohort (Butler et al., 1986). The original survey of the 1970 cohort (the British Births
Survey) was funded again by the National Birthday Trust Fund, along with the Royal
College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, the Department of Health and Social Secu-
rity and other private organisations. Data were collected via a questionnaire completed
by the midwife and via medical records. The original target sample included 17,287
babies born in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland in the week 5-11 April
1970, of whom 16,571 (96%) were successfully interviewed. Subsequently, those born in
Northern Ireland were not included in the study.
None of the three cohort studies follow samples that are representative of the adult
population (of the same age) living in Britain, since they exclude most non British-born
residents born in the sample weeks. Around 400 children living in Britain, but born
outside Britain during the sample week, were recruited into the 1958 cohort study at
age 7, 11 or 16. Around 300 children born outside Britain during the sample week
were recruited into the 1970 cohort study at age 5 or 10. No attempts were made in
adulthood to recruit new cohort members.
4.1.2 Longitudinal data collections
The first follow-up surveys of the 1946 birth cohort were carried out in 1948 and 1950 (at
ages two and four) to investigate the persistence of social class differences at birth in the
infant’s growth and development. The 1946 cohort study became the model for the 1958
and 1970 birth cohort studies. In the 1950s and 1960s, there was an increasing interest in
the research and policy community in linking children’s educational, physical and mental
development to their circumstances at birth. When the children of the 1958 cohort were
aged seven in 1964, funding for a follow-up survey was secured from the Department
of Education and Science to inform the investigations of the Plowden Committee on
primary education in Britain (Department of Education and Science, 1967).2 When
the 1970 cohort children were aged three, the study transferred to the University of
2At this point, the study moved to the National Children’s Bureau, where it remained until 1981.
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Bristol, where Neville Butler organised a follow-up survey in 1975. For a discussion of
the contributions of the original study directors - James Douglas, Neville Butler and
Mia Kellmer Pringle - to the development and continuation of the longitudinal studies,
see Bynner et al. (1998), Bynner and Goldstein (1998) and Ferri (1998).
Over time, changes in the funding and location of the studies, changes in research
interests and changes in the life-stage of cohort members have contributed to changes
in the types of data collected and the methods of data collection. For the 1946 cohort
study, data were collected at two or three-year intervals from mothers, teachers and
school medical officers in childhood and tests of general, mathematics and reading
ability were administered at school. In adulthood, data have been collected through
face-to-face interviews at ages 26, 36, 43 and 53 and via postal surveys at ages 20, 22,
23, 25 and 31 (Wadsworth et al., 2003). From birth to age 16, funding came from a
variety of sources. Since 1960, the Medical Research Council has been the main funder
and the primary focus of the study has been on health. At age sixty, cohort members
have been invited to have medical examinations in clinics. For a full summary of the
types of data collected and methods of data collection, see Wadsworth et al. (2006),
tables 2 and 3.
For the 1958 cohort study, data were obtained at ages 7, 11 and 16 via interviews
with mothers, medical records, questionnaires sent to school teachers, school medical
examinations and mathematics, reading and other tests. At age 16, questionnaires
completed by cohort members themselves. In adulthood, face-to-face interviews have
been carried out with cohort members at ages 23, 33, 42 and 50. A telephone survey was
carried out at age 46. For a full summary of the types of data collected and methods
of data collection, see Power and Elliott (2006), tables 1, 2 and 3. After leaving the
National Children’s Bureau, the Social Statistics Research Unit at City University took
over the study in 1991 and it moved again to the Centre for Longitudinal Studies at
the Institute of Education in 1999/2000.
For the 1970 cohort study, data were collected at ages 5, 10 and 16 from parents,
school teachers, medical officers and cohort members themselves. The Department of
Health at Bristol University ran the age 5 and 10 surveys. Parents of the cohort mem-
bers were interviewed by health visitors, questionnaires were sent to head and class
teachers, school medical officers carried out medical examinations on each child and
cohort members undertook mathematics and reading tests. The 1986 (age 16) survey
was carried out by the International Centre for Child Studies. Data were collected via
parental questionnaires, school class and head teacher questionnaires and medical ex-
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aminations. Cohort members completed questionnaires, kept short diaries on nutrition
and general activity and undertook some further tests. The 1996 follow-up (age 26)
was carried out by the Social Statistics Research Unit at City University (which also
then housed the 1958 cohort). A postal questionnaire was sent to cohort members for
whom a current address was available. Face-to-face interviews have been conducted
with cohort members at ages 30 and 34 and a telephone survey at age 38 (in 2008). For
a full summary of the types of data collected and methods of data collection, see Elliott
and Shepherd (2006), tables 1 and 2. Along with the 1958 cohort study, the 1970 cohort
study moved to the Centre for Longitudinal Studies (CLS) in 1999/2000, with inter-
viewing contracted out to different organisations. The Economic and Social Research
Council (ESRC) have been the main funder of the 1958 and 1970 cohort studies since
their move to CLS.
4.1.3 Overview of survey non-response and attrition
Cohort members are retraced for each survey and a birthday card is sent to all cohort
members each year, which requests notification of any changes of name or address.
Cohort members are also sent updates about research using the data they provide.
Fewer resources were available to maintain contact with the 1958 cohort before 1981
(age 23) and with 1970 cohort members before 1991 (age 21). For the follow-up surveys
prior to these dates, cohort members were newly traced for each survey through school
registers and NHS records.
Despite work to maintain the samples, a problem common to all longitudinal studies
- particularly to the long-running cohort studies - is that some individuals take part
intermittently and others do not remain in the study. From a research point of view, this
may lead to problems with statistical inference if either large numbers of participants
leave the study and/or if those who leave are systematically very different from those
who remain in the study.
The figures on non-response and attrition presented here refer only to the original
British-born longitudinal sample and do not include non British-born cohort members
recruited into the 1958 and 1970 cohorts in childhood. The figures shown here are taken
from Wadsworth et al. (2003) for the 1946 cohort and Plewis et al. (2004) for the 1958
and 1970 cohorts. The analyses of earnings presented in the thesis were carried out
using the full cross-sectional samples, including cohort members born outside Britain.3
3Between 240 and 280 non British-born cohort members remain in the 1958 cohort samples with
complete data and between 130 and 160 for the 1970 cohort samples.
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The main conclusions of analyses presented in this thesis were not found to be sensitive
to their inclusion.
Between 11 and 13 per cent of the original samples for the 1946 and 1958 cohort
studies were known to have died or emigrated by their early thirties. An estimated 6
per cent of the 1970 cohort had died or emigrated by age thirty in 2000. The lower
proportion of deaths in the 1970 cohort reflects slightly lower death rates in infancy.
However, mortality and permanent emigration in the 1970 cohort may be underesti-
mated, since some untraced members, who are counted in the target sample as refusals
or non-contacts, may fall into these categories. These figures are likely to be revised as
more information comes to light in future tracing exercises (Plewis et al., 2004).
Figure 4.1 shows the longitudinal response rates to surveys for the three cohorts.
These provide a useful indication of how the representativeness of the samples may
have deteriorated over time and how this varies across surveys and across cohorts.
The longitudinal reponse rate is defined as the percentage of the target samples who
participated in each survey, where the target sample excludes people who are known to
have either died or emigrated. In the case of the 1970 cohort, the target sample also
includes a small number of untraced cases of uncertain eligibility who are included in
the estimated permanent emigration category (see Plewis et al., 2004). Response rates
are not shown for the 2004 survey of the 1970 cohort (at age 34) since a substantial
fraction of untraced cases are of uncertain eligibility. These figures differ slightly from
cross-sectional response rates and from response rates based on the sample with whom
contact was actually attempted at a given survey. The target sample here includes
permanent refusals, whereas the sample with whom contact is attempted excludes this
group (e.g. see Wadsworth et al., 2003).
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Figure 4.1: Longitudinal response rates - % of target sample (exc. deaths and emi-
grants), by age and cohort
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A substantial proportion of cohort members who have not left the studies have par-
ticipated intermittently. For the 1958 cohort, 62.5 per cent of participants in the age
42 survey had also participated in all previous surveys (Hawkes and Plewis, 2006). Re-
sponse rates to postal and telephone surveys have been significantly lower than response
rates to home interviews. For the 1970 cohort, response rates were particularly low to
the postal survey sent out in 1996 (age 26), compared to subsequent interview-based
surveys. One reason for the low response rate to this survey was that, unlike at other
surveys, attempts to trace cohort members were discontinued once the questionnaire
had been sent out (Plewis et al., 2004). Non-response to the age 26 survey substan-
tially reduces the longitudinal samples used in the analysis for the 1970 cohort and is
discussed further in the last part of this chapter.
Cohort members who have left the studies tend to differ systematically from those
who have remained in the studies. A common finding is that there are significant sex
differences in response patterns, with an under-representation of men in the 1946 and
1958 cohort studies in adulthood ( Wadsworth et al. (2003), Hawkes and Plewis (2006)).
Hawkes and Plewis, 2006 found that men were more likely than women to drop out of
the 1958 cohort study after the age of 16.
There is also under-representation of individuals who experienced more childhood
disadvantage (see Wadsworth et al., 2003, Nathan, 1999, Hawkes and Plewis, 2006).
Wadsworth et al. (2003) analysed patterns of survey non-response and attrition from
the 1946 Cohort Study up to the 1999 survey (age 53). They found that individuals
who were shorter at age four, those who had experienced serious illnesses, bedwetting
or other problems in childhood and those who had experienced material and financial
disadvantage in childhood and adulthood were also more likely to have left the study.
Comparing the birth and fixed characteristics of individuals who have remained in
the 1958 cohort study to those of individuals who have dropped out up to age 42,
Hawkes and Plewis (2006) found that the likelihood of leaving the survey was greater
amongst those with lower birthweight (a proxy for social disadvantage), those born in
Wales. Looking at patterns of survey non-response by time-varying as well as fixed
characteristics, they also found that individuals with lower educational attainment, less
stable employment patterns and more disadvantaged family circumstances were more
likely to be lost from the study. Bynner et al. (1997) analysed loss from the 1970
cohort up to age 26 and found that those born to single or teenage mothers, those
with unemployed fathers and with low school achievements were more likely to have
left the study. There are no studies solely focused on patterns of attrition and survey
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non-response for the 1970 birth cohort up to age 30 or 34. Bynner and Parsons (2005)
compared parental social class and educational characteristics for the birth sample to
the 2004 sample; finding that individuals born to less advantaged families were slightly
more likely to have left the study by age 34. They also compared characteristics of
cohort members across the 2004 (age 34) and 2000 (age 30) samples, finding that the
profiles were similar, although those from less privileged backgrounds were slightly more
likely to have left the survey between these ages.
Despite some deterioration in the representativeness of the samples over time, both
Wadsworth et al. (2003) and Nathan (1999) have concluded that serious biases do not
arise from non-response for the full samples. Comparing means of key characteris-
tics for the weighted sample of the 1989 survey (age 43) to those for a sample from
the 1991 Census aged 40-44, Wadsworth et al. (2003) found evidence that the sam-
ple remained broadly nationally representative. They found that single, separated and
divorced women were slightly under-represented, compared to the Census sample, and
also that those in employment were slightly over-represented, although these differences
may be in part owing to the under-representation (in the original birth sampling frame)
of ethnic minorities. Nathan (1999) summarised the results from analyses of the effects
of attrition for the 1958 and 1970 birth cohort studies up to the 1991 (age 33) and
1996 (age 26) surveys, respectively. He concluded that, although cumulative attrition
was substantial, the evidence only suggested substantial biases with respect to certain
sub-groups.
Hawkes and Plewis (2006) analysed the timing of attrition and non-response. They
found that children with more educated mothers were more likely to be lost early on
in the study - the authors speculate that this may be because the children were at fee-
paying schools and were consequently harder to trace. Most of the loss came early on,
with the greatest drop coming between the ages of sixteen and twenty-three when there
was a change in respondent from the parent to the cohort member themselves. After
age 23, the likelihood of dropping out decreased and systematic observed differences
those who stayed in and dropped out after this age were found to be small.
4.1.4 Advantages and disadvantages of the studies for the analysis of
unequal pay
The three studies, taken together, offer important advantages in an analysis of trends in
the unequal pay of women and men in Britain since the 1970s. A first major advantage is
that they provide information on individual education, work and childbearing histories
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and family background characteristics, alongside information on adult earnings. Other
surveys, such as the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) or the General Household Survey
(GHS), do not contain the same level of detailed information on individual histories.
A second advantage is the comparability of the data collected in each of the studies,
which allows meaningful comparisons to be drawn across the cohorts at similar ages.
Again, pooled samples from the FES and/or GHS would not give as large a sample of
individuals all of the same age (see table 4.14). Further, the timing of the cohorts allows
the assessment of trends over a critical period, when equal pay and sex discrimination
legislation was first introduced in Britain.
A third advantage is that the studies provide information on earnings for cohort
members at several ages, covering a large part of the adult working lives of each cohort.
Although the studies do not collect annual earnings data, the longitudinal aspect of the
data offers some scope for analysing within-cohort trends and life-cycle wage dynamics.
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is a major source of longitudinal data on
earnings, collecting these data annually, and has been used to investigate gender wage
dynamics (Manning and Petrongolo, 2008; Brewer and Paull, 2006). The BHPS though
only goes back to 1991, limiting the possibility for investigating life-cycle trends for
older generations. It could also, again, only provide information either on much smaller
sample sizes or much more loosely defined cohorts than the birth cohort studies. The
New Earnings Panel Dataset (NESPD) does go back to 1975, and has been used to
study women’s wage dynamics (Connolly and Gregory, 2009), but does not contain the
same level of detail on employment histories and family circumstances.
Although the birth cohort studies offer critical advantages for the present analysis,
there are also drawbacks associated with using them.
• First, the datasets and metadata for the cohort studies are complex, and few de-
rived variables are provided with the datasets. Consequently, the task of creating
usable datasets is a large one.
• Second, as already outlined, considerable numbers of cohort members have left
the studies permanently or have responded intermittently to surveys over time.
The consequences are that samples have become less representative over time and
that substantial amounts of data are missing for some cohort members. This may
affect the external validity (generalisability) of the results and may also lead to
biases.
• Third, the multi-purpose aspect of the birth cohort studies comes with disadvan-
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tages as well as advantages, compared to a survey focused mainly on employment
or earnings. Across surveys (within cohorts), there have been changes in the
wording of questions, the level of detail to which earnings information has been
collected and the coding of the data. This is reviewed in the next section of the
chapter.
• Fourth, the 1946 cohort data are particularly work-intensive to use. Historically,
there has been less work done on documentation and much of the documentation
was paper-based when this PhD work was undertaken, making the datasets a
particular challenge to use. The employment history data in particular required
a substantial amount of work to make usable. Currently, a major project is un-
derway to fully document the datasets electronically and make them more widely
available to the research community.
4.2 Data processing and description of variables
A substantial amount of work for this thesis went into sourcing the appropriate vari-
ables and creating usable and comparable datasets for earnings, employment experience
and qualifications. This section describes the original variables used and the data pro-
cessing undertaken. It also describes the final datasets and derived variables used in
the analysis. Table 4.1 describes the surveys from which data have been used to con-
struct earnings and employment histories. The sample sizes shown are the numbers
who responded to the survey in question, not all of who responded to items on hours
and earnings.
4.2.1 Current employment and full-time/part-time status
At each survey, cohort members were asked to describe their current main activity,
either through a series of questions or through a single question accompanied by a list
of different possible states. Tables 4.15-4.17 in the appendix to this chapter show the
questions asked at each survey.
For each of the surveys, it is possible to derive two measures of part-time job status.
One measure is based on self-defined full-time or part-time status. A second measure
can be derived from reported basic weekly hours in a main job. The first measure has
the advantage that part-time work is not defined solely with reference to basic working
hours, but also takes into account the type of contract and the custom and practice of
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Table 4.1: Description of surveys from which earnings and employment data were used
Birth year Survey year(s) Age Survey method N (men) N (women)
1946 1972 26 interview 1,897 1,853
1946 1977 (1) 31 postal questionnaire 1,668 1,672
1946 1982 36 interview 1,650 1,657
1946 1989 43 interview 1,635 1,627
1958 1981/82 (2) 23 interview 6,268 6,271
1958 1991 33 interview 5,630 5,836
1958 1999/2000 (3) 41/42 interview 5,627 5,794
1970 1996 (4) 26 postal questionnaire 4,101 4,902
1970 1999/2000 (3) 29/30 interview 5,461 5,785
1970 2004/2005 (5) 34/35 interview 4,625 5,039
(1) Postal questionnaires were sent out in December 1977.
(2) Interviews were carried out between August 1981 and March 1982.
(3) Interviews were carried out between early November 1999 and March 2000.
(4) Questionnaires were sent out between April and July 1996.
(5) Interviews were carried out between February 2004 and June 2005.
the employer. For the 1958 and 1970 cohorts however, the self-report question was not
entirely subjective. It included a prompt, with full-time work being defined as working
30 hours or more a week and part-time work being defined as working less than 30
hours a week. Using reported basic weekly hours, the standard definition of part-time
hours in the UK is working less than 30 hours a week, excluding overtime. For teachers,
the basic cut-off for full-time work is 25 hours in the classroom, excluding marking and
preparation time.
Manning and Swaffield (2008) have found that the choice between the subjective
and the objective measure did not make much practical difference in their analysis
using Labour Force Survey data. Similarly, for the cohort data, figure 4.2 suggests a
high level of agreement between the measures. The level of agreement is slightly lower
for the 1946 cohort, to whom no definition of part-time work was given with the self-
report questions. Half of those who defined themselves as part-time workers, but who
were working full-time hours, were working exactly 30 hours a week. A similar level of
disagreement in the opposite direction. Of those who defined themselves as full-time
workers, but who were working less than 30 hours a week, nearly all were working 28
or 29 hours a week. There was a greater level of disagreement in measures for the small
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number of men defined as part-time workers on either measure than for women. The
self-report measure was used for the analysis presented in this thesis.
Figure 4.2: % of self-defined part-time employees working less than 30 hours a week (excluding
overtime), by cohort and survey
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4.2.2 Hourly earnings
Before-tax (gross) hourly earnings are used as the outcome measure in all of the anal-
yses carried out in this thesis. The rationale is that before-tax earnings give a better
indication of the financial value placed by employers on the work of their employees,
and of the relative value placed on the work of women and men. After-tax (net) earn-
ings are more sensitive to factors not related to the job, since they are directly affected
by tax structures and policies that take into account household income, marital and
parental status and hours of work. On the same grounds, income from self-employment
is not included in the present analysis of earnings. In practice, employers are likely to
respond to tax incentives when determining gross earnings, so these are also an imper-
fect measure of the rate at which the employer values an individual employee’s work
contribution, but arguably the least imperfect measure.
This section describes the original variables used and the algorithms applied to
calculate gross hourly earnings. An overview of response rates to questions on earnings
and hours of work is presented and signs of likely measurement error. A detailed
description is given of the work done to impute continuous values for the 1946 cohort
at age 43, using the banded earnings data from 1989 survey.
Questions on earnings and hours
At each of the adult surveys, cohort members have been asked for:
1. An estimate of their usual or most recent pay in their current job, using pay
slips where available. With the exception of the 1996 (age 26) survey of the 1970
cohort, questions have been asked on pay before deduction of income tax and
national insurance (gross) and on take-home (net) pay. Overtime pay is included
in these figures.
2. Information on how long a period that usual or most recent reported pay covers
i.e. a week, a calendar month, a year and so on.
3. Information about weekly hours of work; either a single question covering paid
overtime or more than one question separately covering basic and overtime hours.
The wording of questions, the amount of information collected and the interviewer
instructions have changed slightly across the surveys. Table 4.2 gives an overview of
the information used. Earnings data collected at several other surveys were not used
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.4 Table 4.18 in the appendix to this chapter shows the wording of questions asked at
each of the surveys.
Table 4.2: Information used from each survey to calculate gross hourly earnings
Cohort Survey (age) Information used
1946 1972 (26) Typical gross earnings. Period covered by gross earnings. Ba-
sic rate in job. Typical weekly hours, exc. o/t. Regular &
occasional o/t hours.
1946 1977 (31) Average gross weekly earnings. Usual weekly hours, inc. o/t.
1946 1989 (43) Banded estimate of average gross earnings (26 bands showing
equivalent weekly, monthly and annual amounts). Average
hours worked to earn reported pay. Average months worked
in year. Hours worked in last week, inc. o/t.
1958 1981 (23) Last gross pay. Usual gross pay. Pay period. Average weekly
hours, inc. o/t.
1958 1991 (33) Usual gross pay. Last gross pay. Corresponding pay periods.
Usual weekly hours, inc. o/t.
1958 2000 (42) Last gross pay. Pay period. Usual weekly hours, inc. o/t.
1970 1996 (26) Usual net pay. Pay period. Usual weekly hours, inc. o/t.
1970 2000 (30) Last gross pay. Pay period. Usual weekly hours, inc. o/t.
1970 2004 (34) Last gross pay. Pay period. Usual weekly hours, inc. o/t.
Calculation of hourly earnings
A measure of gross hourly earnings has been calculated in two stages.
1. Gross (before-tax) reported earnings are divided by the number of weeks contained
in the corresponding reported pay period to get a figure for gross weekly earnings.
e.g. For someone with an annual salary of £34,000, the corresponding weekly
estimate is £34,000 a year/52 weeks = £653.85 a week
2. Gross weekly earnings are divided by weekly hours, including paid overtime, but
excluding unpaid overtime, to obtain an estimate of gross hourly earnings. e.g.
For the same individual earning £653.85 a week and working a 38 hours week
(including overtime), the estimate of hourly earnings is £653.85 a week/38 hours
= £17.21 an hour.
4Earnings data were collected at ages 36 and 53 from the 1946 cohort but in banded net form for
the former. Data on hours collected via a telephone survey of the 1958 cohort in 2004 (age 46) had
unnacceptably high numbers of missing items owing to a problem with the telephone interview software.
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Self-employed individuals are counted as employed for purposes of comparing em-
ployment rates, but their earnings are treated as missing. For some of the analyses,
potential wages from employment (vs. self-employment) have been estimated for self-
employees.
Each measure of hourly earnings was adjusted to January 2000 prices using the long-
term indicator of prices of goods and services produced by Office for National Statistics.5
By adjusting earnings for price inflation, the wage trends that are analysed represent
real aggregate earnings growth (i.e. average growth in the earnings of employees relative
to average consumer prices), as well as changes in relative earnings by age, cohort and
gender.
Item non-response and measurement error for earnings and hours
Table 4.3 shows high response rates to questions on gross earnings and hours of work
amongst employees (excluding self-employed) at each survey. The response rates to
questions on earnings and hours were slightly lower for the 1977 postal survey of the
1946 cohorts. Response is understated in these figures, since a substantial fraction of
individuals who did not report before-tax (gross) earnings did report after-tax (net)
earnings.
Table 4.3: Response rates to questions on before-tax (gross) earnings and hours
Birth year Survey (age) Earnings
questions
Hours ques-
tion
Both N (1)
1946 1972 (26) 92.9 % 93.3 % 90.0 % 2,448
1946 1977 (31) 87.4 % 90.8 % 84.5 % 2,147
1946 1989 (43) 98.0 % 99.1 % 97.1 % 2,299
1958 1981 (23) 95.3 % 97.3 % 93.0 % 8,616
1958 1991 (33) 91.2 % 96.6 % 89.9 % 7,676
1958 2000 (42) 91.8 % 95.8 % 88.3 % 8,216
1970 1996 (26) 90.9 % 98.9 % 90.2 % 6,675
1970 2000 (30) 92.8 % 96.8 % 90.1 % 8,264
1970 2004 (34) 90.0 % 99.2 % 89.4 % 7,052
(1) This figure is the number of cohort members who responded to the survey in question and were
employed (excluding self-employed) at the time of the survey.
5Available at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/StatBase/TSDdownload1.asp.
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Likely reporting and coding error is inferred from gross wage values which are im-
plausibly high or low and/or which are strongly out of line with reported net earnings.
Table 4.4 gives information on the percentage of cases with very high (more than £500
an hour) and very low (less than 50p an hour) gross wage values in each survey and
those that are high (> £100) or low (<£2). Table 4.5 shows the percentage with im-
plausible gross-to-net hourly wage ratios (ratio is <0.4 or >4). These suggest a small
amount of measurement error. Its likely effects on wage estimates are assessed in the
final part of this chapter.
Table 4.4: Percentage with very high or low estimated hourly earnings (1)
Birth year Survey (age) >£500 >£100 <£2 <50p N (2)
1946 1972 (26) 0.0 % 0.0 % 1.4 % 0.0 % 2,202
1946 1977 (31) 0.0 % 0.0 % 1.0 % 0.0 % 1,814
1946 1989 (43) 0.0 % 0.1 % 2.1 % 0.1 % 2,233
1958 1981 (23) 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.8 % 0.0 % 8,012
1958 1991 (33) 0.1 % 0.8 % 0.6 % 0.1 % 6,901
1958 2000 (42) 0.2 % 0.9 % 2.2 % 0.5 % 7,241
1970 1996 (26) 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.7 % 0.1 % 6,020
1970 2000 (30) 0.1 % 0.6 % 2.4 % 0.5 % 7,439
1970 2004 (34) 0.1 % 0.7 % 1.0 % 0.1 % 6,307
(1) The percentages are calculated after adjusting to 2000 prices.
(2) This figure is the number of employees with an observed hourly wage.
Table 4.5: Percentage with odd gross-to-net hourly wage ratio, by survey (1)
Birth year Survey (age) Odd ratio (1) N (2)
1946 1972 (26) 0.0 % 2,137
1958 1981 (23) 0.1% 7,911
1958 1991 (33) 1.8% 6,825
1958 2000 (42) 3.6% 7,223
1970 2000 (30) 3.5% 7,422
1970 2004 (34) 1.5% 6,292
(1) An odd ratio is defined as one of ratio>4 or <0.4, in line with work by Alissa Goodman (see
Bynner et al., 2001). Ratios can only be calculated for surveys where information on both gross and
net earnings was collected.
(2) This figure is the number of employees with an observed gross and net hourly wage.
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To investigate the effects of potential measurement error on wage estimates, the
earnings data for the 1958 and 1970 cohorts collected in the 2000 survey were altered,
using a series of edits devised by Lorraine Dearden and Alissa Goodman at the Institute
for Fiscal Studies (see Bynner et al., 2001). Implausibly high or low values for recorded
gross earnings and those strongly out of line with reported net earnings were replaced
with more plausible values according to the suspected coding error. For example, where
the pay period reported for gross pay differed from the pay period reported for net pay,
and gross pay was implausibly high or low, the gross pay period was replaced with the
net pay period. However, statistical analyses based on these edited data were found
to give qualitatively similar results to those using the unedited datasets, once extreme
values were excluded. The analysis presented in the thesis are based on the unedited
earnings datasets, including only additional imputed values for cases where net earnings
were observed and gross earnings were missing (see below).
Imputation of incomplete wage data for the 1946 and 1970 cohort
A substantial amount of work was done to create a set of complete earnings data for
the 1946 cohort at age 43. As part of the 1989 survey, cohort members were asked
a single question about their earnings. They were presented with a card showing 25
intervals - 23 with specified upper and lower bounds and two open-ended intervals at
the bottom and top of the distribution. Intervals were divided into £1000 bands for
annual earnings, with equivalent monthly and weekly sums. The bottom and top bands
were open-ended, capturing earnings of less than £2,000 a year (£40 a week) and more
than £25,000 a year (£481 a week) respectively.
Table 4.6 shows the distribution of gross annual earnings across the 25 bands for
employees in the 1989 survey of the 1946 cohort (weighted and unweighted) and for
sub-samples of employees aged 40-45 in the 1989 Family Expenditure Survey (FES) and
General Household Survey (GHS). In 1989, 18.5 per cent of men in the cohort sample
had earnings which fell into the top open-ended interval, representing 15 per cent of the
population once the sample is weighted to adjust for stratification. This relatively high
fraction in the top band, compared to distributions for the whole population, reflects
the combined effects of stratification, i.e. the oversampling of men from higher social
class backgrounds, and, more importantly, the higher earnings of older male employees.
Around 13 per cent of women’s earnings fell in the bottom open-ended interval. A
quarter of female part-time employees (half of female employees) had earnings in this
lowest band.
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Table 4.6: Cumulative percent in each earnings band, 1946 cohort, FES and GHS, by
sex
Women Men
Earnings band 1946 cohort FES GHS 1946 cohort FES GHS
(£per annum) (1) (2) (3) (3) (1) (2) (3) (3)
less than 1,999 12.6 13.4 16.5 13.8 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.0
2,000-2,999 25.3 26.8 27.2 26.6 0.9 0.7 1.0 0.7
3,000-3,999 35.6 36.9 37.9 36.8 1.1 0.9 1.2 1.1
4,000-4,999 44.8 46.1 46.0 44.9 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.7
5,000-5,999 53.0 54.7 52.5 53.9 2.9 2.7 2.7 3.2
6,000-6,999 60.6 62.0 61.6 61.7 5.2 5.2 4.7 6.5
7,000-7,999 66.4 68.9 66.4 68.3 7.7 7.5 6.1 9.2
8,000-8,999 72.6 74.8 69.3 75.3 11.4 11.3 11.3 13.5
9,000-9,999 76.8 78.8 72.7 79.7 16.0 16.8 17.2 19.9
10,000-10,999 80.2 82.5 75.4 82.0 23.2 25.3 24.5 28.9
11,000-11,999 82.8 85.1 78.1 84.5 28.6 31.4 30.2 35.4
12,000-12,999 85.8 87.8 80.4 87.8 35.2 38.9 35.1 43.5
13,000-13,999 88.7 90.1 82.3 90.0 41.0 45.0 40.2 49.3
14,000-14,999 91.6 92.6 84.2 92.1 47.6 51.4 45.3 53.7
15,000-15,999 94.5 95.2 86.3 94.8 53.5 57.7 49.7 58.9
16,000-16,999 95.9 96.5 87.4 96.2 57.7 61.9 54.6 64.1
17,000-17,999 96.8 97.2 88.2 96.9 61.8 66.5 60.3 68.5
18,000-18,999 97.3 97.8 88.7 97.4 66.8 71.3 64.4 74.1
19,000-19,999 98.1 98.7 89.9 97.7 69.2 73.3 68.4 76.6
20,000-20,999 98.4 98.9 90.1 98.0 72.9 77.2 71.6 80.3
21,000-21,999 99.0 99.2 90.4 98.5 74.9 79.5 73.8 83.4
22,000-22,999 99.0 99.2 90.6 100.0 77.1 81.0 75.3 85.5
23,000-23,999 99.1 99.4 90.9 100.0 79.4 83.3 77.7 86.3
24,000-24,999 99.1 99.4 100.0 100.0 81.6 85.1 80.0 88.7
25,000+ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sample size 1,157 - 593 737 1,121 - 592 710
The horizontal lines mark off the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of the female and male earnings
distributions. (1) Percentages are unweighted. (2) Percentages are weighted. (3) Sub-samples of
individuals aged 40-45 from the 1989 FES and 1989-90 GHS.
The banding of the earnings data results in a loss of information. Micklewright
and Schnepf (2007) quantified the loss of information associated with banding of single-
question income data, relative to collection of more detailed information via multiple
questions. They used detailed data on individual incomes from the Family Resources
Survey (FRS) and the Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS) to analyse the effects of
banding the data. Using methods to decompose income variation into within-band and
between-band components, they found some loss of information, with a more substantial
loss of information at the top of the distribution, coming from the top unbounded
interval (containing around 8% sample). The implications for the present analysis are
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two-fold: first, the greater concentration of the male earnings in the top, unbounded
interval is likely to lead to a greater loss of information; and second, measures of the
gender pay gap that weight the top of the distribution more heavily (i.e. differences in
means vs. medians) are likely to be more sensitive to this loss of information.
It has become fairly standard to use interval regression methods to model banded in-
come data as a dependent variable (e.g. Dearden et al., 2003; Micklewright and Schnepf,
2007). Interval regression simultaneously estimates within-band values of earnings and
the model parameters by maximum likelihood, using the assumption that earnings are
log-normally distributed.6 However, testing the interval regression model on grouped
data for the FES, GHS and the 2000 survey of the 1958 cohort (at age 42) suggested
that, for older, male earnings, the results of interval regression are sensitive to the frac-
tion of cases observed in the top open-ended interval. The greater this fraction, the
lower the estimated intercept and the higher the estimated coefficients on covariates.
This may be because model-based approach requires strong distribtional assumptions,
i.e. log-normality, and that small departures from this become more important when
a larger fraction of the data are censored. After experimenting with a number of ap-
proaches, I instead imputed within-band values for cohort members using unbanded
data from the FES and GHS, rather than modelling the intervalised data. Imputation
using unbanded earnings data is more likely to restore the underlying shape of the
earnings distribution.
The approach taken was to replace observed banded income for cohort members
with imputed continuous values using the 1989 Family Earnings Survey (FES) and the
1989 General Household Survey (GHS). The FES and GHS samples were restricted to
employees aged between 40 and 45. Propensity-score matching was used to identify
individuals who were most similar within each band, using information on gender,
weekly hours of work, region of residence and occupational status. Samples of between
100 and 200 individuals were used in 25 separate probit models to estimate propensity
scores and match on these scores, separately for each band. With these small sample
sizes, only weekly hours of work and gender appeared as significant determinants of
within-band variation in earnings. Consequently, the within-band values can be viewed
in many cases as random draws from the within-band distributions. This is likely to
introduce more uncertainty into estimates based on these imputed continuous data, but
it is not obvious that it generates any particular biases.
6The Stata program intreg can be used to fit these models. This is based on an two-step estimator
proposed by Stewart (1983).
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For the 1970 cohort, the postal survey sent out in 1996 at age 26 asked cohort
members about their net earnings, but not their gross earnings. Again, missing values
for gross earnings were replaced with observed values taken from external datasets.
Gross earnings data were used from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) for 1996 (four
quarters) and the first quarter of 1997. The LFS sample was restricted to employees
aged between 20 and 40. First, the samples were divided into eight groups, classified
by gender, marital and parental status, on the basis that these characteristics, as well
as the level of earnings, affect the tax rate (and therefore the ratio of gross to net
earnings). Second, each cohort member was matched to their nearest neigbour in the
LFS (in the same group) based on their observed net weekly wage. Third, missing gross
weekly earnings for each cohort member were replaced with the value of gross earnings
observed for their match in the LFS.
Table 4.7 shows mean net and gross earnings for the cohort sample and the matched
LFS sample. The large LFS samples meant that near exact matches on net weekly
earnings were made in each case. The average ratio of gross-to-net earnings is around
1.4 and did not vary significantly across the groups. For the final cohort sample of
employees, the ratio of women’s to men’s median weekly earnings was 0.78 based on
imputed gross earnings, compared to 0.8 based on net earnings. However, the difference
in estimated ratios was not statistically significant.
Table 4.7: Mean net and gross weekly earnings by gender, marital and parental status,
matched samples from the 1996 survey of the 1970 cohort and the 1996 LFS
Sample sizes Net earnings (£) Gross earn-
ings (£)
Gross-to
net ratio
Group 1970
cohort
LFS 1970
cohort
LFS LFS LFS
Women
Not married, with children 235 1,339 132.8 133.1 172.1 1.3
Married, with children 342 4,112 125.3 125.4 172.2 1.4
Not married, no children 1,952 3,089 208.0 212.7 312.0 1.5
Married, no children 730 1,561 199.4 200.6 291.2 1.4
Men
Not married, with children 154 672 234.6 234.4 412.1 1.8
Married, with children 308 4,055 253.2 252.9 358.3 1.4
Not married, no children 1,937 3,894 248.5 251.4 357.0 1.4
Married, no children 409 1,328 264.0 262.7 362.4 1.4
Values are in 1996 prices.
For the 2000 surveys of the 1958 and 1970 cohorts, values for gross hourly earnings
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have also been imputed for cases with missing values using observed values for net
earnings. This was based on code written by Lorraine Dearden and Alissa Goodman
(see Bynner et al. (2001) for details).
4.2.3 Employment experience
Estimates of the number of years spent in paid employment and the number of years
in full-time and part-time work have been used throughout the analyses in this thesis.
To estimate these figures, I created employment histories for the 1958 and 1970 cohorts
using retrospective job and unemployment history data collected from cohort members
at two or three surveys in adult life.7 For the 1946 cohort, the job history data were too
incomplete for this approach, particularly the data collected via postal surveys when
cohort members were in their late teens and early twenties. Instead, I estimated lengths
of time spent in paid employment from the age of twenty-five.
1946 cohort employment histories
The work experience variables constructed for members of the 1946 cohort include
estimates of the length of time spent in employment from the age of twenty-five. An
attempt was made to construct complete employment histories since leaving school, but
the data were too incomplete for this approach. Around two thirds of the cohort left
school and entered the labour market between the ages of 15 and 18. In their teens and
early twenties, cohort members were asked to update employment histories in a series of
frequent postal questionnaires. A further complication was that different questionnaires
were sent to those who were in full-time education and those who had left school by
their teens. As a consequence, data collected between the ages of 16-25 are incomplete,
not fully coded and not all available electronically. A derived variable is available in
the datasets containing information on the number of months out of the labour market
between the ages of 18 and 25. In the final part of this chapter, this variable is used
in an assessment of the likely effects of the truncation of the employment experience
variables at age twenty-five on the various analyses of unequal pay.
The task of constructing the employment histories was carried out in several steps.
Table 4.8 gives an overview of the original survey data used to construct the employment
histories. Table 4.19 in the appendix to this chapter shows the actual questions that
7The job histories created by Kelly Ward and available from the UK Data Archive were not suit-
able for my purposes since these focus on job and occupation data and do not make full use of the
unemployment histories.
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were asked at each survey. First, the original variables containing the information shown
in table 4.8 were collected into a single data file, including start dates for current jobs,
the length of time spent out of work and retrospective job and unemployment histories
collected via the 1982 and 1989 surveys.
Table 4.8: Summary of information used to construct employment histories for the 1946
cohort
Survey (age) Information used Sample size (1)
1972 (26) Start date of current job. FT/PT status. Length
of current spell out of work. Number of jobs held
1971-72. Number and length of spells out of work
1971-72.
3,750 (3,729)
1977 (31) Start date of current job. FT/PT status. Number
of jobs held 1972-77.
3,340 (3,205)
1982 (36) Start date of current job. FT/PT status. Start and
end dates and FT/PT status for up to 7 previous jobs
since last job on record (from 1977 or 1972). Start
and end dates for up to 4 non-employment spells
since last recorded spell.
3,322 (3,307)
1989 (43) Start date of current job. FT/PT status. Start and
end dates and FT/PT status of job held in 1982 (if
not interviewed then) and longest job held between
1982 and 1989. Start and end dates for up to 6 non-
employment spells since last recorded spell.
3,262 (3,248)
(1) This figure is the number who responded to the survey. The figure in brackets is the number who
responded to questions on employment.
Second, the start and end dates for job and non-employment spells collected via the
1982 and 1989 surveys were converted into century month code (CMC) 8 and organised
into chronological order. The job and non-employment spells were combined using an
iterative algorithm (looping over consecutive values in Stata) to form a single work
history. Partially complete or conflicting start or end dates were imputed or amended
using the following principles:
1. Use June as the start or end month where the start or end year for a spell is given,
but the start or end month is missing. This was for the purposes of converting all
dates into century month code (CMC).
2. Use the start date of a next spell for a missing end date of a current spell.
8DATE [CMC] = ((YEAR-1900) x 12) + MONTH. Thus, January 1900 is coded ‘1’, February 1900
is coded ‘2’ and March 1946 is coded ‘555’, and so on.
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3. Allow non-employment spells to be ‘nested’ in reported job spells.
4. Where the end date for one spell is later than the start date for a subsequent
(different) spell, assume start date to be correct.
Third, work experience was estimated separately for four work-history segments
covering the periods: March 1971- March 1972; April 1972- March 1977; April 1977-
March 1982; and April 1982- March 1989. In cases where the start date for a current
job pre-dated the start date for the work segment in question, the whole of the period
could simply be counted as time spent in work. In other cases, a mixture of information
was used to estimate time spent in and out of work, including: current employment
status (reported at the current survey); spells in and out of work from the employment
history (reported at the current or the subsequent survey); and, for the first segment
only, the length of time out of work in the past year and the number of jobs held. For
the first segment, full-time and part-time experience was estimated based on current
job status. For other work segments, full-time and part-time experience was either
calculated directly from the reported job histories or was estimated based on the fraction
of reported time spent in full-time or part-time work for that work segment i.e. if
FT/PT status were missing for one of the jobs, the fraction of time spent in FT and
PT work for the other jobs in the relevant work segment would be applied to the whole
period. Finally, the four work-segments were combined, as appropriate, to generate
work experience variables for ages twenty-six (in 1972), thirty-one (in 1977) and forty-
three (in 1989).
1958 and 1970 cohort employment histories
For the 1958 cohort, retrospective employment history data were collected at ages 23,
33 and 42. I used the retrospective employment history data collected at ages 33 and 42
to estimate work experience totals for these ages. I used the derived variables provided
with the dataset at age 23 (see Centre for Longitudinal Studies (1981)).
In 1981, at age 23, cohort members were asked for the start and end dates for up
to four jobs and for up to four periods of unemployment. The questions are shown in
table 4.20. In 1991, at age 33, cohort members were asked to complete a questionnaire
entitled ‘Your Life Since 1974’. This questionnaire asked cohort members to fill in start
and end dates for up to twelve paid jobs and, separately, for twelve periods out of paid
employment since the age of 16 (in 1974). In 2000, at age 42, cohort members were
asked in the main face-to-face interview about start dates of up to ten previous spells
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engaged in different economic activities (jobs and non-employment), dating back to the
previous interview at age 33 (in 1991).
I combined the job and unemployment histories to create a single employment his-
tory. The set of principles applied to the 1946 employment histories was also used for
the 1958 and 1970 employment histories to impute or amend incomplete or conflicting
start and end dates. Where the start dates for spells reported at age 42 conflicted with
those reported at age 33, the age 33 data were treated as more likely to be correct,
being closer to the period in question.
For the 1970 cohort, retrospective employment history data were collected at ages 30
and 34. In the 2000 interview at age 30, the question was the same as for the 1958 cohort
survey in that year, requesting start dates of up to ten previous spells of employment
or non-employment (including full-time education) from the age of 16 onwards. In
the 2004 interview at age 34, cohort members were asked to update economic activity
histories or to recall full histories if they had not been interviewed in 2000. Information
on up to ten spells was collected. I again applied the same set of principles to create a
single employment history.
4.2.4 Highest educational qualification
Measures of the highest qualification achieved at each age, including academic and
vocational qualifications obtained in adult life, are used in both of the main analyses in
this thesis. Some work was required to group the large number of different types and
levels of qualifications into broad, comparable categories. This exercise was complicated
by changes in the education system, changes in the content of particular qualifications
and changes in the recognised classification of qualifications over the period covered.
The majority (more than 60%) of the 1946 cohort left school at age 15 or 16, of whom a
minority had O-levels. Around 60% of the 1958 cohort left school at 16 (the minimum
school-leaving age for this cohort), the majority with O-levels. The 1970 cohort were
the last cohort to take O-levels and CSEs - GCSEs were introduced in England and
Wales in September 1986. Around a fifth of the cohort left school without qualifications.
Cohort members have been asked in detail about types and grades of academic and
vocational qualifications gained throughout their teens and adult life. In the 1972 in-
terview (age 26), members of the 1946 cohort were asked in detail about qualifications
they had obtained since leaving school. In surveys conducted at ages 36 and 43, they
were asked a shorter question asking about any qualifications gained since they had last
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been interviewed. The 1958 cohort members were asked in detail about their qualifica-
tions in all adult surveys. The 1991 survey (age 33) additionally collected information
about all qualifications obtained from age 16 onwards, as well as qualifications obtained
since the 1981 survey (age 23). The 2000 survey (age 42) asked cohort members about
qualifications obtained since the 1991 survey (or since the age of 16 for those who had
not been interviewed in 1991). The 1970 cohort members were asked a short question
about their qualifications in the postal survey sent out in 1996 (age 26). In the 2000
survey (age 30), they were asked in detail about any qualifications gained since the age
of 16. In the 2004 survey (age 34), they were asked about any qualifications gained
since they were last interviewed and about their highest qualification.
I have used adapted versions of two general classification frameworks, which have
previously been used to construct two alternative measures of highest qualification for
the cohort studies. The first corresponds broadly to National Vocational Qualifications
(NVQ) levels, which are designed to reflect different levels of competence, covering
both academic and vocational qualifications. The second is based on the classification
of qualifications used in the General Household Survey (GHS). This differs from the
NVQ framework in distinguishing between degree-level qualifications, on the one hand,
and diplomas in higher education and equivalents, including some nursing and teaching
qualifications. The latter are classified as below degree-level. The GHS classification
also groups NVQ level 1 qualifications together with no formal qualifications. Table 4.9
shows the classification used for the analysis in this thesis, based on Makepeace et al.
(2003).
For the 1946 cohort, a variable containing the highest academic or vocational qual-
ification achieved by 26 years uses the Burnham scale (Department of Education and
Science, 1972). This contains eight levels: no qualifications, below ordinary secondary
qualifications, ordinary secondary qualifications (O-levels and their vocational equiv-
alents), advanced secondary education (A-levels and their equivalents), professional
qualifications (below degree-level), degree-level qualfications, masters and doctorates.
I have used a mapping of these eight categories onto the NVQ and GHS frameworks,
devised by Gerald Makepeace and Andrew Jenkins (Makepeace et al., 2003). I updated
the highest qualification measure for the 1946 cohort at age 43 using information col-
lected in the 1982 (age 36) and 1989 (age 43) surveys. Information about qualifications
was not collected via the postal survey in 1977 (age 31), so the variable used at this age
is the highest qualification achieved by age 26.
Some work was required to modify existing derived measures of highest qualification
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Table 4.9: Classification of qualifications
Group Academic Vocational 1946 cohort
Degree or
above
Higher Degree, Degree,
PGCE
NVQ level 5 Burnham A1, Mas-
ters, Doctorate, First
Degree, Dip Tech etc.
Diploma
or equiva-
lent
HE diploma, Teacher
training qualification (not
PGCE)
BTEC Higher Certifi-
cate/Diploma, HNC/HND
NVQ level 4, Professional
degree-level qualifications,
Nursing/paramedic, RSA
Higher Diploma
Burnham A2, Profes-
sional (surveying etc)
A-level or
equivalent
1 or more A level, 2 or more
AS levels, Scottish Highers,
Scottish Certificate of 6th
Year Studies
BTEC National Diploma,
ONC/OND, City & Guilds Part
4/Career Ext/Full Tech, City &
Guilds Part 3/Final/Advanced
Craft, City & Guilds Part
2/Craft/Intermediate, RSA
Advanced Diploma, Pitmans
level 3, Advanced GNVQ, NVQ
level 3
A level, Burnham B
O-level or
equivalent
GCSE grade A*-C, O lev-
els grade A-C, CSE grade 1,
Scottish Standard grades 1-
3, Scottish lower or ordinary
grades
BTEC First Certificate, BTEC
First Diploma, City & Guilds
Part 1, Apprenticeships, RSA
First Diploma, Pitmans level 2,
Intermediate GNVQ, NVQ level
2
1 or more O-levels
or training equiva-
lent, Burnham C
Below O-
level
O levels grade D-E (not
GCSE), GCSE grade D-G,
CSEs grades 2-5, Scottish
Standard grades 4-5, Other
Scottish school qualification
City & Guilds/Other, RSA
Cert/Other, Pitmans level 1,
Other vocational qualifications,
HGV Foundation GNVQ/Other
GNVQ, NVQ level 1/Other
NVQ, Units towards NVQ
Nominal, Sub O-
level, Below Burn-
ham C
included in the 1958 and 1970 datasets, since the framework for classifying qualifica-
tions has changed over the period covered. For example, highest qualification measures
available in the datasets for the 1981 and 1991 surveys of the 1958 cohort classify a
first bachelors degree as NVQ level 5 (see Smith, 1991, part 5, p.31). In contrast, mea-
sures of highest qualification created for the 2000 surveys of the 1958 and 1970 cohorts
classify a first bachelors degree as NVQ level 4 (Bynner et al., 2001, p.44). This is
because the NVQ framework changed between 1991 and 2000. Makepeace et al. (2003)
also point out that the form of the survey questions asked about qualifications has also
changed alongside changes in the structure of qualifications. I have used notes and
code produced by Andrew Jenkins, Gerald Makepeace and Samantha Parsons to group
the different qualifications up to 2000 for the 1958 and 1970 cohorts, using the more
recent NVQ framework (Bynner et al., 2001, pp.39-62). For the 2004 survey of the 1970
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cohort, Augustin de Coulon generously shared his code to group qualifications by NVQ
level. I adapted this to group the qualifications using the classification shown in table
4.9.
88
4.2.5 Description of the final datasets
Table 4.10 gives the definitions of variables used in the analyses. In addition to data
on wages, employment experience and highest qualification, additional information has
been used on job tenure, parental status, social class of first job, maths and reading
ability at age 10 or 11 and childhood family circumstances. Most of this information
has been coded into variables in the original datasets that can be used, with minimal
adaptation, in the present analysis. Where items are missing for categorical variables,
an extra category has been used. Variables containing information on the number and
ages of children in the household were derived from information on parental histories
and current household structure. Scores from mathematics and reading tests taken
at age ten or eleven are used as indicators of educational achievement at these ages.
Similar to Joshi et al. (2007), I have standardised the scores to make them comparable,
with a mean zero and standard deviation 1 derived from the sample of cohort members
(girls and boys) who took the test. Observations with missing values were given a
standardised score of zero and a dummy variable was included in models, indicating
that the information was missing.
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Table 4.10: Variable definitions
Gross hourly wage Derived gross wage per hour worked (including overtime) (£)
Part-time worker Dummy = 1 if self-defined part-time worker
Work experience Years in paid employment up to time of survey since age 16 for the
1958 and 1970 cohorts and since age 25 for the 1946 cohort
Full-time experience Years in full-time paid employment since age 16 (1958 and 1970 cohorts)
or 25 (1946 cohort). Full-time work is self-defined
Part-time experience Years in part-time paid employment since age 16 (1958 and 1970 co-
horts) or 25 (1946 cohort). Part-time work is self-defined
Job tenure Years working for current employer at time of survey
O-level or equivalent Dummy = 1 if highest qualification = O-level or equivalent at time of
survey
A-level or equivalent Dummy = 1 if highest qualification = A-level or equivalent at time of
survey
Diploma Dummy = 1 if highest qualification = diploma from non-degree higher
education at time of survey
Degree or higher Dummy = 1 if highest qualification = Bachelors degree, equivalent or
higher at time of survey
Maths score at age 11 Standardardised score (z-score) from maths test taken at age 10 (1970
cohort) or 11 (1946 and 1958 cohorts)
Reading score at age 11 Standardardised score (z-score) from reading test taken at age 10 or 11
Missing maths score Dummy = 1 if maths test not taken or score from test missing
London or SE Dummy = 1 if living in London or the South East at time of survey
Children in hhld Dummy = 1 if own or other children living in household at time of
survey
Children under five Dummy = 1 if children under five years living in household at time of
survey
More than one child Dummy = 1 if more than one child living in household at time of survey
Cohabiting Dummy = 1 if living with spouse or partner at time of survey
Social class of first job
I Dummy = 1 if first job in RG Class I
II Dummy = 1 if first job in RG Class II
III Dummy = 1 if first job in RG Class II
IV Dummy = 1 if first job in RG Class IV
V Reference category
VI Dummy = 1 if first job in RG Class VI
Missing Dummy = 1 if information on occupation of first job missing
Table 4.10: Variable definitions - continued
Father in non-manual
job
Dummy = 1 if father in non-manual occupation at birth for 1946 cohort
Father’s social class:
I Dummy = 1 if father in RG Class I
II Dummy = 1 if father in RG Class II
III Dummy = 1 if father in in RG Class II
IV Dummy = 1 if father in RG Class IV
V Reference category
Mother’s age at birth:
Youngest quartile Reference category
Second quartile Dummy = 1 if mother’s age in second quartile of age distribution
Third quartile Dummy = 1 if mother’s age in third quartile of age distribution
Oldest quartile Dummy = 1 if mother’s age in top quartile of age distribution
Missing Dummy = 1 if information on mother’s age at birth missing
Mother’s education:
Left before 16 Reference category
Left at 17 Dummy = 1 if mother left school at age 17
Left at 18 Dummy = 1 if mother left school at age 18 or older
Missing Dummy = 1 if information on mother’s schooling missing
Father’s education:
Left before 16 Reference category
Left at 17 Dummy = 1 if father left school at age 17
Left at 18 Dummy = 1 if father left school at age 18 or older
Missing Dummy = 1 if information on father’s schooling missing
Number of siblings at age 16
Only child Dummy = 1 if no siblings at age 16
One sibling Dummy = 1 if one sibling at age 16
Two or three siblings Dummy = 1 if two or three siblings at age 16
Four or more siblings Reference category
Older siblings at age 16
No older siblings Dummy = 1 if no older siblings at age 16
One older sibling Dummy = 1 if one older sibling at age 16
Two or more Reference category
The figures and analyses presented in this thesis use the following samples:
1. The core cross-section samples include all cohort members who responded to the
relevant survey, shown in table 4.1. Simple descriptions of proportions in work
and proportions of women with children are based on these samples.
2. The cross-section samples used to estimate the propensity-score models in chapter
5 exclude individuals with missing values for highest qualification or employment
experience. Women with missing values for items on the presence of children in
the household are also excluded.
3. The cross-section samples used to estimate the wage models in chapter 7 exclude
individuals who are not employed or who are self-employed. They also exclude
those who have missing values for hourly wages, highest qualification or employ-
ment experience.
4. The longitudinal samples used to estimate wage trends for the 1958 and 1970
cohorts in chapter 7 include individuals who took part in all three of the adult
surveys and who were employees with observed wages at the time of each survey.
Table 4.11 shows the sample sizes for each of these four samples. The next section
assesses the representativeness of each of these samples using information on maths
and reading scores in childhood and wages in adulthood.
Table 4.11: Sample sizes used in different analyses, by gender
Birth
cohort
Survey
(age)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
1946 1972 (26) 1,897 1,853 1,768 1,710 1,385 692 - -
1946 1977 (31) 1,668 1,672 1,467 1,431 974 514 - -
1946 1989 (43) 1,635 1,627 1,283 1,167 902 836 - -
1958 1981 (23) 6,268 6,271 5,535 5,721 4,263 3,514 1,965 1,392
1958 1991 (33) 5,630 5,836 5,441 5,682 3,672 3,128 1,965 1,392
1958 2000 (42) 5,627 5,794 5,585 5,764 3,957 3,998 1,965 1,392
1970 1996 (26) 4,101 4,902 3,367 3,836 2,375 2,841 1,505 1,451
1970 2000 (30) 5,461 5,785 5,360 5,735 4,166 3,894 1,505 1,451
1970 2004 (34) 4,625 5,039 4,588 5,014 3,289 3,004 1,505 1,451
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4.3 Assessment of data quality
This final section asssess the quality of the datasets, including:
• the effects of the stratification of the 1946 sample on wage estimates;
• the potential effects of measuring work experience since age 25 rather than since
leaving full-time education on estimates of unequal treatment of women and men
for the 1946 cohort ; and
• the combined effects of attrition, survey non-response and missing data on the
representativeness of the samples and on wage estimates based on these.
The treatment of these data quality issues is described in each case.
4.3.1 Stratification of the 1946 cohort sample
A smaller, stratified sample of the 1946 cohort was followed-up in 1948 (age two) and has
formed the core target sample that has been tracked ever since. The sample included
5,632 children (2,547 girls and 2,815 boys) out of the original 16,695 births in the target
week. All children born to fathers in non-manual and agricultural occupations were
included and one in four of children born to fathers in urban, manual occupations,
the aim being to preserve roughly equal numbers from the two social class groups
(Wadsworth, 1991). Three-quarters of the fathers of the whole birth cohort were at
this time in manual occupations. Babies born to unmarried mothers (672), most of
whom had been adopted in this cohort, and multiple births (180) were excluded from
the study.
Class origins, the basis upon which the sample was stratified, are strongly associated
with future earnings. Further, their effects differ by gender. Figure 4.3 shows mean
hourly earnings by father’s occupational class at birth, separately at each survey for
women and men. There are clear differences by social class origin, which differ by gender
and appear to increase with age for men. As well as these straightforward differences,
social class origins are also likely to mediate the effects of other characteristics, such
as educational attainment, on wages. Consequently, estimates of unequal treatment of
women and men may also differ by social class origin.
A weighting variable (INF) is provided with the 1946 cohort datasets. This vari-
able contains information on the frequency with which each individual in the stratified
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Figure 4.3: Mean hourly earnings by age, gender and father’s occupational class at
birth, 1946 cohort (£, 2000 prices)
sample appears in the target population (i.e. the whole cohort). It takes the value
4 for cohort members whose fathers were in urban, manual occupations at birth, i.e.
those who were undersampled, and 1 for those whose fathers were in non-manual or
agricultural occupations. This variable has been used in the different analyses in the
following ways:
• To be representative of the class origins of the whole cohort (not just those in-
cluded in the stratified sample), the data have been reweighted to estimate simple
statistics (e.g. proportions in work or average wages). In Stata, analytic weights
are used, [aweight=INF], which assign observations for those with fathers in man-
ual occupations at birth a weight four times greater than those with fathers in
non-manual and agricultural occupations.
• To improve the quality of imputations in the propensity-score models used for the
analysis in chapter 5 and 7, father’s social class has been included as a covariate
in the model (in binary form, taking the values 1 and 0, rather than 1 and 4); and
• The weighting variable has been included as a probability weight (the inverse
of the probability of an observation being selected into the sample) in the wage
models used in the analysis in chapter 7 to adjust for the combined effects of strat-
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ification on sample estimates and standard errors. In Stata, probability weights
[pweight=INF] are used.
4.3.2 Truncation of work experience measures for the 1946 cohort
Labour market experience is measured as the number of years in work since age 25 for
the 1946 cohort, rather than since leaving full-time education. Up to ten years potential
labour market experience are therefore not accounted for.9 Labour market experience
is used as a covariate in the following ways: 1) to predict potential hourly earnings
for non-workers in the analysis presented in chapter 5; and 2) to account for gender
differences in hourly earnings in the analysis presented in chapter 7. The truncation
of employment experience may bias estimates from these two analyses, particularly
estimates for the age 26 sample for whom only one year of labour market history is
measured. This section uses a derived variable containing information on labour market
experience from 18-25, available in the existing datasets, to assess the extent and likely
effects of the truncation of employment experience.
A derived variable (NOWK1825) contains information on the number of months not
working from 18 to 25, excluding months seeking work. The exclusion of time spent
unemployed and seeking work from this measure means that it is likely to be an under-
estimate of men’s non-employment over this period. The variable contains information
for 4,001 cohort members. Figure 4.4 shows gender differences in the distribution of
this variable. For men, the mean amount of time spent out of work is nearly 12 months
(a year), whereas the mean for women is close to 29 months (2 12 years). More than
half of men spent no time out of work (and not looking for work) between the ages of
18 and 25.
Table 4.12 shows gender differences in mean employment experience over different
ages. The greatest measured difference is between the ages of 25 and 31, over which
period the majority of women in the cohort spent several years out of work raising
children. Gender differences in early work experience (7 years - years not working aged
18-25 ) are smaller than gender differences in experience at later ages.
The analyses presented in chapters 5 and 7 were also run including the estimate
of 18-25 experience as a covariate in the models. For the analysis in chapter 5, the
9For the 1958 and 1970 cohorts, the measures are based on recall data which have their own problems,
not explored here. For example, Gregg (2001) found that past experiences of unemployment appeared
to be underestimated by men in the 1958 cohort, comparing the recall data to official data for the
corresponding period and age group. Short episodes occurring some years before the interview were
more likely to be forgotten.
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Figure 4.4: Months not working aged 18-25 for 1946 cohort, by sex
Table 4.12: Gender differences in mean employment experience over the life-cycle, 1946
cohort
Years in work Gender difference
Ages Potential Women Men Abs. Std. (1) Sample size
18-25 (2) 7 4.66 6.29 -1.62 -26.6 4,001
25-31 6 3.41 5.78 -2.37 -36.8 3,301
31-36 5 2.85 4.64 -1.79 -30.3 3,178
36-43 7 5.86 6.64 -0.77 -12.3 3,248
Restricted sample (3)
18-25 (2) 7 - - - -25.9 3,700
25-26 1 - - - -39.6 3,700
All figures are weighted to account for stratification.
(1) The standardised difference = (difference)/(standard error of diffference) i.e. the t-statistic.
(2) Exp (years) = (7 - NOWK1825).
(3) Sample is restricted to those with observed values for experience for ages 18-25 and 25-26
variable was included in the probit models used to generate a propensity score. The
results were unchanged and are not shown. For the analysis presented in chapter 7, the
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point estimate of unequal treatment were slightly smaller for the age 26 sample of the
1946 cohort, but the difference in estimates was not statistically significant.
4.3.3 Combined effects of attrition and survey non-response
The main analyses in this thesis use cross-section samples that exclude cohort members
who did not respond to a survey and those with missing values for highest qualifica-
tion, employment experience or, for women only, presence of children in the household.
Missing values for employment experience arise, in the main, from non-response to a
previous survey in which information on job and unemployment histories was collected.
The combined effects of attrition, non-response and missing educational or employment
history data on the representativeness of the samples are assessed using information on
early achievement in maths tests taken at age 10 or 11 by each cohort.10 The likely
bias in wage estimates from these samples is assessed by comparing estimates of me-
dian wages and female-to-male wage ratios with those from cross-sections of the Family
Expenditure Survey for the same years.
Scores from mathematics tests taken at age ten or eleven are strongly correlated
with family background characteristics, and positively correlated with future earnings
and with the probability of remaining in the studies. As such, they are useful summary
indicators of the extent of selectivity biases in samples induced by non-random attrition
and survey non-response. The maths scores were were standardised to have mean zero
and standard deviation 1 for the sample of boys and girls who took the test. There were
small gender differences in scores at this age, with boys in the 1958 and 1970 cohorts
tending to do slightly better than girls (table 4.13).
Table 4.13: Means of standardised maths scores taken at age 10 or 11, by sex and cohort
Cohort Sample size Mean score (std. deviation)
Girls Boys
1946 cohort 4,025 +0.02 (0.97) -0.02 (1.03)
1958 cohort 14,127 -0.02 (0.97) +0.02 (1.02)
1970 cohort 11,685 -0.05 (0.96) +0.04 (1.04)
Each score is standardised using the formula xi − x¯/sd(x). The mean of the standardised distribution
for the whole sample who took the test (boys and girls) is zero and the standard deviation is 1. The
sample excludes children with either did not take the test or did not have a completely observed score.
10The effects of attrition, survey non-response and missing data arising from previous non-response
were also analysed separately.
97
Changes in the sample participating in the cohort study over time show up as
changes in sample means of maths scores. Figure 4.5 shows that 1946 cohort members
with lower maths scores at age 11 were more likely to have left the study by age 31 and
43 and that the cumulative effects of non-response and attrition amongst those with
lower scores increased between these ages. Positive selection into the sample appears to
have been stronger amongst men than amongst women (i.e. men with lower scores were
more likely than women with lower scores to leave the study). Figure 4.6 shows that
1958 cohort members with systematically lower maths scores at age 11 have also been
more likely to have left the study by the age of 23. Again, the effects of selection have
been slightly stronger for men than for women. Most strikingly, figure 4.7 shows strong
positive selection into the sample that responded to the postal survey at age 26 (in
1996) and positive selection, although weaker, into both the age 30 and age 34 samples.
The stronger selection bias in the age 26 sample of the 1970 cohort also shows up in
wage differentials later on. The hourly wages, at ages 30 and 34, of cohort members
who did not respond to the postal survey were between 8 and 12 per cent lower than
those of cohort members who did take part in the postal survey.
Figure 4.5: Mean standardised maths score at each survey of 1946 cohort, by gender
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Figure 4.6: Mean standardised maths score at each survey of 1958 cohort, by gender
Figure 4.7: Mean standardised maths score at each survey of 1970 cohort, by gender
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Table 4.14 compares estimates of median hourly wages and female-to-male ratios
from the cohort samples with those from samples from the Family Expenditure Survey
(FES) carried out in the same years. The FES samples include individuals of a similar
age to the cohort members. The suggested patterns of bias are consistent with the
pattern observed in maths scores. The effects of positive selection into the studies
appears to increase with age. By age 43, the effects of positive selection amongst men
into the sample appears to bias upward slightly the estimated female-to-male median
wage ratio. The effects of positive selection into the 1958 cohort samples also bias
upwards the estimates of the female-to-male median wage ratio by ages 33 and 42.
For the 1970 cohort, the estimated ratio is biased upward at age 26, reflecting strong
positive selection into the sample that responded to the postal survey at this age, plus
stronger selection amongst men than women. The estimates at ages 30 and 34 are not
significantly different from the FES estimates - the confidence intervals around the FES
estimates are quite wide for these samples.
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The picture of selectivity bias induced by non-participation in the studies is consis-
tent across internal (maths scores) and external checks (FES wages). In terms of bias in
the present analyses, the results suggest that women’s relative pay may be overstated at
older ages in both the 1946 and the 1958 cohorts. In the 1970 cohort, women’s relative
pay is likely to be overstated at age 26.
There are a number of ways of handling non-random non-response and missing data.
One method is to use sample weights containing information on the probability of re-
sponding (or not responding) based on complete earlier data. Universal weights are not
provided with the cohort datasets, unlike the BHPS for example, which provides several
different sets of weights. Hawkes and Plewis (2006) suggested that the application of
universal weights could, in any case, increase rather than decrease bias in the case of the
1958 cohort. They point out that patterns of wave non-response, attrition and lacking
education data differ and that different substantive models may require different sets
of weights. Weights were not derived for the present analysis simply because of the
additional work involved in specifying a sound model to predict non-response weights.
Another option is imputation of values for missing items. Mean imputation has in
fact been used for some covariates in the probit models in chapter 5 (i.e. the child-
hood background characteristics and maths scores). Mean imputation is a fairly crude
approach and is not viewed as a good way to impute missing covariates. In prac-
tice though, the predictions from these models were not sensitive to the inclusion of
childhood variables, once qualifications, parental status and employment characteristics
were included. On this basis, more sophisticated imputation models were not pursued.
Missing educational qualifications and employment experience were not imputed, again
because of the complexity of the datasets and the additional work required to specify a
good imputation model.
Both weighting and imputation models use the assumption that the data are missing
at random (MAR) - that is missing at random, conditional on the observed data, as
opposed to missing completely at random (MCAR). If there is a strong possibility that
there are unobserved sources of selectivity bias, heckman-type methods may be more
suitable. These were described in the last chapter with application to employment
participation and the application to survey response is similar. ? used Heckman (1979)
to adjust for unobserved differences in occupational attainment across respondents and
non-respondents to the 1981 (age 23) survey of the 1958 cohort. They also tested the
stability of estimates to the exclusion of variables with a lot of missing items and used
occupation of first job as an additional covariate to minimise unobserved fixed individual
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effects.
A final approach is to test the robustness of important estimates to variation in the
sample and variable selections that are most likely cause bias. Similar to ?, the internal
consistency of the results can be checked in a pragmatic way, by testing the stability of
parameters to different models. This was the approach taken in the present analysis:
• Based on the evidence that relatively low response rates to the postal survey of
the 1970 cohort in 1996 (age 26) did affect the representativeness of the sample
at this age, the analysis was carried out both for the cross-sections who took part
in any one of the adult surveys, and also for the sub-sample who took part in all
three of the adult surveys (not presented). Our conclusions were not altered.
• To test the effects of increasing positive sample selection on estimated life-cycle
trends, the same estimates were made for longitudinal samples. This deals with
internal consistency, but not external consistency i.e. we can be sure that the
trends have not arisen from attrition, but not that they are generalisable to a
broader population.
4.4 Conclusions
The birth cohort data offer critical advantages for the present analysis. Detailed in-
formation on job and unemployment histories and childbearing histories are important
for the analysis of gender wage differentials. The longevity and longitudinal aspects of
the datasets are also valuable for analysing trends over an important period of British
history and for looking at life-cycle trends. However, the data are difficult to use and
a lot of work was put into identifying the appropriate original variables, checking and
recoding the data and deriving suitable variables for analysis. The derived work expe-
rience and hourly earnings variables have been contributed to the NSHD data access
system. Derived variables for the NCDS and BCS70 will be contributed to the CLS
collection.
Some bias in wage estimates is caused by the combined effects of attrition, survey
non-response and question non-response. The samples have become less representative
over time for the 1946 and 1958 samples and the 1996 (age 26) postal survey of the
1970 cohort had a lower response rate and non-random patterns of response. As a
consequence, there is slight upward bias in estimates of women’s relative pay for the
1946 and 1958 cohorts at older ages and for the 1970 cohort at age 26. The approach
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taken in the analyses in this thesis has been to test the sensitivity of the main substantive
conclusions to different sample and variable selections, including longitudinal samples.
104
A
p
p
e
n
d
ix
4
:
Q
u
e
st
io
n
s
a
sk
e
d
a
t
e
a
ch
su
rv
e
y
T
ab
le
4
.1
5
:
C
u
rr
en
t
ec
on
om
ic
st
at
u
s
q
u
es
ti
on
s
at
ea
ch
su
rv
ey
-
19
46
b
ir
th
co
h
or
t
Y
e
a
r
A
g
e
E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
st
a
tu
s
q
u
e
st
io
n
s
E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
st
a
tu
s
c
a
te
g
o
ri
e
s
F
u
ll
-t
im
e
/
p
a
rt
-t
im
e
19
72
26
A
re
yo
u
n
ow
in
p
ai
d
w
or
k
?
A
re
yo
u
se
lf
-e
m
p
lo
y
ed
?
Is
th
is
w
o
rk
fu
ll
ti
m
e
o
r
p
a
rt
ti
m
e?
D
o
y
o
u
w
o
rk
o
n
av
er
a
g
e
fo
r
a
s
m
u
ch
a
s
8
h
o
u
rs
a
w
ee
k
?
W
h
at
ar
e
yo
u
d
oi
n
g
at
th
e
m
o
m
en
t?
u
n
em
p
lo
ye
d
,
fu
ll
ti
m
e
st
u
-
d
en
t,
fu
ll
ti
m
e
h
o
u
se
w
if
e,
o
th
er
19
77
31
A
re
yo
u
n
ow
..
.
..
.w
o
rk
in
g
fu
ll
-t
im
e,
w
o
rk
-
in
g
p
a
rt
-t
im
e,
a
fu
ll
-t
im
e
h
o
u
se
w
if
e,
u
n
em
p
lo
ye
d
,
o
r
d
o
in
g
so
m
et
h
in
g
el
se
?
A
re
y
ou
se
lf
-e
m
p
lo
ye
d
?
F
u
ll
o
r
p
a
rt
-t
im
e?
19
89
43
A
re
yo
u
in
p
ai
d
w
or
k
n
ow
?
P
le
a
se
d
e-
sc
ri
b
e
th
e
jo
b
.
A
re
yo
u
..
.
..
.a
n
em
p
lo
ye
e,
se
lf
-
em
p
lo
ye
d
D
o
y
o
u
w
o
rk
fu
ll
-t
im
e
(3
0
h
rs
o
r
m
o
re
)
o
r
p
a
rt
-t
im
e?
A
re
yo
u
n
ot
in
p
ai
d
w
or
k
b
ec
a
u
se
o
f
h
ea
lt
h
p
ro
b
le
m
s?
D
u
ri
n
g
th
is
ti
m
e
w
er
e
yo
u
a
st
u
d
en
t
or
on
a
tr
ai
n
in
g
co
u
rs
e?
W
h
at
is
yo
u
r
o
cc
u
p
at
io
n
?.
..
lo
o
k
in
g
a
ft
er
th
e
h
o
m
e,
n
o
o
th
er
o
cc
u
p
a
ti
o
n
,
o
th
er
(s
p
ec
if
y
)
T
ab
le
4
.1
6
:
C
u
rr
en
t
ec
on
om
ic
st
at
u
s
q
u
es
ti
on
s
at
ea
ch
su
rv
ey
-
19
58
b
ir
th
co
h
or
t
Y
e
a
r
A
g
e
E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
st
a
tu
s
q
u
e
st
io
n
s
E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
st
a
tu
s
c
a
te
g
o
ri
e
s
F
u
ll
-t
im
e
/
p
a
rt
-t
im
e
19
81
23
A
re
yo
u
..
.
..
.
a
n
em
p
lo
ye
e,
w
o
rk
in
g
a
s
a
te
m
p
fo
r
a
n
a
g
en
cy
,
se
lf
-e
m
p
lo
y
ed
?
D
o
yo
u
th
in
k
o
f
y
o
u
rs
el
f
a
s
w
o
rk
-
in
g
fu
ll
-t
im
e
o
r
p
a
rt
-t
im
e?
(o
n
ly
a
sk
ed
if
re
po
rt
ed
a
ve
ra
ge
w
ee
kl
y
h
o
u
rs
w
a
s
le
ss
th
a
n
3
0
o
r
va
ri
ed
to
o
m
u
ch
to
sa
y)
A
re
yo
u
re
gi
st
er
ed
w
it
h
ei
th
er
a
jo
b
ce
n
-
tr
e
or
G
ov
er
n
m
en
t
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
o
ffi
ce
a
s
lo
ok
in
g
fo
r
w
or
k
?
A
re
yo
u
cu
rr
en
tl
y
ta
k
in
g
a
co
u
rs
e
fo
r
an
y
q
u
al
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
s?
Is
re
sp
on
d
en
t
cu
rr
en
tl
y
o
u
t
o
f
th
e
la
b
ou
r
fo
rc
e?
W
h
at
is
re
sp
o
n
d
en
t
cu
r-
re
n
tl
y
d
oi
n
g?
h
o
u
se
w
o
rk
,
p
ri
so
n
/
b
o
rs
ta
l,
u
n
a
b
le
to
w
o
rk
/
si
ck
/
d
is
a
b
le
d
,
ex
te
n
d
ed
h
o
li
d
ay
,
o
th
er
19
91
33
W
h
ic
h
of
th
e
th
ei
n
gs
on
th
is
li
st
d
e-
sc
ri
b
es
w
h
at
yo
u
ar
e
cu
rr
en
tl
y
d
o
in
g
?
co
d
e
o
n
e
o
n
ly
-
m
a
in
a
ct
iv
it
y
fu
ll
-t
im
e
p
a
id
em
p
lo
ye
e
(3
0
+
h
o
u
rs
a
w
ee
k
),
p
a
rt
-
ti
m
e
p
a
id
em
p
lo
ye
e
(u
n
d
er
3
0
h
o
u
rs
a
w
ee
k
),
fu
ll
ti
m
e
se
lf
-e
m
p
lo
ye
d
,
p
a
rt
-t
im
e
se
lf
-e
m
p
lo
y
ed
,
u
n
-
em
p
lo
ye
d
a
n
d
se
ek
in
g
w
o
rk
,
fu
ll
-t
im
e
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
,
te
m
p
o
ra
ri
ly
si
ck
/
d
is
a
b
le
d
(u
p
to
6
m
o
n
th
s)
,
p
er
-
m
a
n
en
tl
y
si
ck
/
d
is
a
b
le
d
,
lo
o
k
in
g
a
ft
er
h
o
m
e/
fa
m
il
y,
o
th
er
(p
le
a
se
sp
ec
if
y
)
D
o
y
o
u
w
o
rk
3
0
o
r
m
o
re
h
o
u
rs
a
w
ee
k
in
th
is
jo
b
?
o
n
ly
in
cl
u
d
e
h
o
u
rs
o
n
ca
ll
if
th
ey
a
re
pa
id
fo
r,
te
a
ch
er
s:
te
rm
ti
m
e
h
o
u
rs
20
00
42
W
h
ic
h
of
th
e
th
in
gs
on
th
is
ca
rd
b
es
t
d
es
cr
ib
es
w
h
at
yo
u
ar
e
cu
rr
en
tl
y
d
o
in
g
?
co
d
e
o
n
e
o
n
ly
-
m
a
in
a
ct
iv
it
y
fu
ll
-t
im
e
p
a
id
em
p
lo
ye
e
(3
0
+
h
o
u
rs
a
w
ee
k
),
p
a
rt
-
ti
m
e
p
a
id
em
p
lo
ye
e
(u
n
d
er
3
0
h
o
u
rs
a
w
ee
k
),
fu
ll
ti
m
e
se
lf
-e
m
p
lo
ye
d
,
p
a
rt
-t
im
e
se
lf
-e
m
p
lo
ye
d
,
u
n
em
-
p
lo
ye
d
a
n
d
se
ek
in
g
w
o
rk
,
fu
ll
-t
im
e
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
,
o
n
a
g
ov
er
n
m
en
t
sc
h
em
e
fo
r
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
tr
a
in
in
g
,
te
m
-
p
o
ra
ri
ly
si
ck
/
d
is
a
b
le
d
(u
p
to
6
m
o
n
th
s)
,
p
er
m
a
n
en
tl
y
si
ck
/
d
is
a
b
le
d
,
lo
o
k
in
g
a
ft
er
h
o
m
e/
fa
m
il
y,
w
h
o
ll
y
re
-
ti
re
d
,
o
th
er
(p
le
a
se
sp
ec
if
y
)
T
ab
le
4
.1
7
:
C
u
rr
en
t
ec
on
om
ic
st
at
u
s
q
u
es
ti
on
s
at
ea
ch
su
rv
ey
-
19
70
b
ir
th
co
h
or
t
Y
e
a
r
A
g
e
E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
st
a
tu
s
q
u
e
st
io
n
s
E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
st
a
tu
s
c
a
te
g
o
ri
e
s
19
96
26
W
h
ic
h
of
th
e
fo
ll
ow
in
g
b
es
t
d
es
cr
ib
es
w
h
at
y
ou
ar
e
cu
rr
en
tl
y
d
oi
n
g
?
fu
ll
-t
im
e
p
a
id
em
p
lo
ye
e
(3
0
o
r
m
o
re
h
o
u
rs
a
w
ee
k
),
p
a
rt
-
ti
m
e
p
a
id
em
p
lo
ye
e
(u
n
d
er
3
0
h
o
u
rs
a
w
ee
k
),
fu
ll
-t
im
e
se
lf
em
p
lo
ye
d
,
p
a
rt
-t
im
e
se
lf
em
p
lo
y
ed
,
u
n
em
p
lo
ye
d
a
n
d
se
ek
-
in
g
w
o
rk
,
fu
ll
-t
im
e
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
,
te
m
p
o
ra
ri
ly
si
ck
/
d
is
a
b
le
d
(l
es
s
th
a
n
6
m
o
n
th
s)
,
lo
n
g
-t
er
m
si
ck
/
d
is
a
b
le
d
(6
m
o
n
th
s
o
r
lo
n
g
er
),
lo
o
k
in
g
a
ft
er
h
o
m
e/
fa
m
il
y,
o
n
a
tr
a
in
in
g
sc
h
em
e,
so
m
et
h
in
g
el
se
20
00
30
W
h
ic
h
of
th
e
th
in
gs
on
th
is
ca
rd
b
es
t
d
es
cr
ib
es
w
h
at
yo
u
ar
e
cu
rr
en
tl
y
d
o
in
g
?
co
d
e
o
n
e
o
n
ly
-
m
a
in
a
ct
iv
it
y
fu
ll
-t
im
e
p
a
id
em
p
lo
ye
e
(3
0
+
h
o
u
rs
a
w
ee
k
),
p
a
rt
-t
im
e
p
a
id
em
p
lo
ye
e
(u
n
d
er
3
0
h
o
u
rs
a
w
ee
k
),
fu
ll
ti
m
e
se
lf
-
em
p
lo
ye
d
,
p
a
rt
-t
im
e
se
lf
-e
m
p
lo
ye
d
,
u
n
em
p
lo
ye
d
a
n
d
se
ek
-
in
g
w
o
rk
,
fu
ll
-t
im
e
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
,
o
n
a
g
ov
er
n
m
en
t
sc
h
em
e
fo
r
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
tr
a
in
in
g
,
te
m
p
o
ra
ri
ly
si
ck
/
d
is
a
b
le
d
(u
p
to
6
m
o
n
th
s)
,
p
er
m
a
n
en
tl
y
si
ck
/
d
is
a
b
le
d
,
lo
o
k
in
g
a
ft
er
h
o
m
e/
fa
m
il
y,
w
h
o
ll
y
re
ti
re
d
,
o
th
er
(p
le
a
se
sp
ec
if
y
)
20
04
34
W
h
ic
h
of
th
e
th
in
gs
on
th
is
ca
rd
b
es
t
d
es
cr
ib
es
w
h
at
yo
u
ar
e
cu
rr
en
tl
y
d
o
in
g
?
co
d
e
o
n
e
m
a
in
a
ct
iv
it
y
o
n
ly
fu
ll
-t
im
e
p
a
id
em
p
lo
ye
e
(3
0
+
h
o
u
rs
a
w
ee
k
),
p
a
rt
-t
im
e
p
a
id
em
p
lo
ye
e
(u
n
d
er
3
0
h
o
u
rs
a
w
ee
k
),
fu
ll
-t
im
e
se
lf
-
em
p
lo
ye
d
,
p
a
rt
-t
im
e
se
lf
-e
m
p
lo
ye
d
,
u
n
em
p
lo
ye
d
a
n
d
se
ek
-
in
g
w
o
rk
,
fu
ll
-t
im
e
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
,
o
n
a
g
ov
er
n
m
en
t
sc
h
em
e
fo
r
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
tr
a
in
in
g
,
te
m
p
o
ra
ri
ly
si
ck
/
d
is
a
b
le
d
(¡
6
m
o
n
th
s)
,
p
er
m
a
n
en
tl
y
si
ck
/
d
is
a
b
le
d
(6
+
m
o
n
th
s)
,
lo
o
k
in
g
a
ft
er
h
o
m
e/
fa
m
il
y,
w
h
o
ll
y
re
ti
re
d
,
o
th
er
(s
p
ec
if
y
a
t
n
ex
t
q
u
es
ti
o
n
)
T
a
b
le
4.
18
:
W
ag
e
q
u
es
ti
on
s
at
ea
ch
su
rv
ey
(r
ef
er
ri
n
g
to
m
ai
n
jo
b
on
ly
)
-
19
46
b
ir
th
co
h
or
t
Y
e
a
r
A
g
e
P
a
y
q
u
e
st
io
n
P
a
y
p
e
ri
o
d
H
o
u
rs
q
u
e
st
io
n
19
72
26
‘I
n
cl
u
d
in
g
al
l
re
gu
la
r
p
ay
m
en
ts
su
ch
a
s
ov
er
-
ti
m
e,
b
on
u
se
s
et
c.
..
,
h
ow
m
u
ch
d
o
yo
u
ea
rn
in
a
ty
p
ic
al
w
ee
k
or
m
on
th
b
ef
o
re
d
ed
u
ct
io
n
s
fo
r
ta
x
,
n
at
io
n
al
in
su
ra
n
ce
et
c.
.?
’
(p
er
w
ee
k
,
p
er
ca
le
n
d
a
r
m
o
n
th
,
p
er
fo
u
r
w
ee
k
s,
o
th
er
)
‘h
ow
m
a
n
y
h
o
u
rs
w
o
u
ld
yo
u
sa
y
yo
u
w
o
rk
in
a
ty
p
ic
a
l
w
ee
k
,
ex
cl
u
d
in
g
ov
er
ti
m
e?
’
‘I
n
yo
u
r
jo
b
is
th
er
e
a
b
as
ic
o
r
st
a
n
d
a
rd
ra
te
of
p
ay
?
If
ye
s,
h
ow
m
u
ch
is
th
is
,
b
ef
o
re
d
e-
d
u
ct
io
n
s
fo
r
ta
x
,
n
at
io
n
al
in
su
ra
n
ce
et
c.
..
’
‘D
o
y
o
u
ev
er
w
o
rk
p
a
id
ov
er
ti
m
e
h
o
u
rs
?’
‘h
ow
m
u
ch
ov
er
ti
m
e
d
o
yo
u
w
o
rk
re
g
u
la
rl
y
a
n
d
h
ow
m
u
ch
o
cc
a
si
o
n
a
ll
y
?’
19
77
31
‘O
n
av
er
ag
e,
h
ow
m
u
ch
d
o
yo
u
ea
rn
a
w
ee
k
?
(i
n
cl
u
d
in
g
ov
er
ti
m
e
an
d
ot
h
er
p
ay
m
en
t)
b
e-
fo
re
d
ed
u
ct
io
n
s’
‘H
ow
m
a
n
y
h
o
u
rs
a
w
ee
k
d
o
yo
u
u
su
a
ll
y
w
o
rk
in
cl
u
d
in
g
ov
er
ti
m
e?
’
19
89
43
‘W
ou
ld
yo
u
m
in
d
te
ll
in
g
m
e
w
h
ic
h
o
f
th
e
le
t-
te
rs
on
th
is
ca
rd
re
p
re
se
n
ts
yo
u
r
ow
n
av
er
a
g
e
gr
os
s
ea
rn
in
gs
,
b
ef
or
e
d
ed
u
ct
io
n
o
f
in
co
m
e
ta
x
an
d
n
at
io
n
al
in
su
ra
n
ce
?’
2
6
w
a
g
e
b
a
n
d
s
sh
ow
n
in
a
n
u
u
a
l,
m
o
n
th
ly
a
n
d
w
ee
k
ly
a
m
o
u
n
ts
‘H
ow
m
a
n
y
h
o
u
rs
a
w
ee
k
o
n
av
er
a
g
e
d
o
yo
u
h
av
e
to
w
o
rk
to
ea
rn
th
is
a
m
o
u
n
t?
’
‘H
ow
m
a
n
y
m
o
n
th
s
a
y
ea
r
o
n
av
er
a
g
e
d
o
yo
u
h
av
e
to
w
o
rk
to
ea
rn
th
is
a
m
o
u
n
t?
(i
f
in
p
a
rt
-t
im
e
o
r
se
a
so
n
a
l
w
o
rk
)’
‘L
a
st
w
ee
k
(o
r
la
st
fu
ll
w
o
rk
in
g
w
ee
k
)
h
ow
m
a
n
y
h
o
u
rs
d
id
yo
u
a
ct
iv
el
y
sp
en
d
w
o
rk
in
g
in
cl
u
d
in
g
ov
er
ti
m
e
a
n
d
w
o
rk
in
g
a
t
h
o
m
e?
’
T
ab
le
4
.1
8
:
W
a
g
e
q
u
es
ti
on
s
a
t
ea
ch
su
rv
ey
(r
ef
er
ri
n
g
to
m
ai
n
jo
b
on
ly
)
-
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
-
19
58
b
ir
th
co
h
or
t
Y
e
a
r
A
g
e
P
a
y
q
u
e
st
io
n
P
a
y
p
e
ri
o
d
H
o
u
rs
q
u
e
st
io
n
19
81
23
‘O
n
th
e
la
st
o
cc
as
io
n
w
h
at
w
a
s
yo
u
r
p
ay
b
e-
fo
re
d
ed
u
ct
io
n
s
fo
r
ta
x
an
d
N
a
ti
o
n
a
l
In
su
r-
an
ce
:
in
cl
u
d
in
g
an
y
ov
er
ti
m
e,
b
o
n
u
s,
co
m
m
is
-
si
on
,
ti
p
s?
(i
f
la
st
o
cc
as
io
n
w
a
s
u
su
a
l
a
m
o
u
n
t)
’
p
er
d
ay
,
p
er
w
ee
k
,
p
er
2
w
ee
k
s,
p
er
m
o
n
th
,
p
er
3
m
o
n
th
s,
p
er
6
m
o
n
th
s,
p
er
ye
a
r,
o
th
er
‘H
ow
m
a
n
y
h
o
u
rs
o
f
p
a
id
w
o
rk
d
o
yo
u
a
ct
u
a
ll
y
d
o
in
a
n
av
er
a
g
e
w
ee
k
-
in
cl
u
d
in
g
a
n
y
p
a
id
ov
er
ti
m
e
yo
u
u
su
a
ll
y
d
o
,
b
u
t
ex
cl
u
d
in
g
m
ea
l
b
re
a
k
s?
’
‘A
n
d
w
h
at
is
yo
u
r
u
su
al
p
ay
b
ef
o
re
a
n
y
d
ed
u
c-
ti
on
s
fo
r
ta
x
an
d
N
at
io
n
al
In
su
ra
n
ce
:
in
cl
u
d
-
in
g
an
y
ov
er
ti
m
e,
b
on
u
s,
co
m
m
is
si
o
n
,
ti
p
s,
et
c.
,
th
at
yo
u
u
su
al
ly
re
ce
iv
e?
(i
f
la
st
p
ay
w
a
s
u
n
u
su
al
)’
19
91
33
‘W
h
at
is
yo
u
r
u
su
al
gr
os
s
p
ay
b
ef
o
re
d
ed
u
c-
ti
on
s?
’
‘H
ow
lo
n
g
a
p
er
io
d
d
o
es
th
a
t
p
ay
co
ve
r?
’
(1
w
ee
k
,
fo
rt
n
ig
h
t,
fo
u
r
w
ee
k
s,
ca
l-
en
d
a
r
m
o
n
th
,
ye
a
r,
o
th
er
)
‘H
ow
m
a
n
y
h
o
u
rs
a
w
ee
k
d
o
y
o
u
u
su
a
ll
y
w
o
rk
fo
r
th
a
t
p
ay
,
ex
cl
u
d
in
g
m
ea
l
b
re
a
k
s
b
u
t
in
cl
u
d
-
in
g
p
a
id
ov
er
ti
m
e?
’
‘L
as
t
ti
m
e
yo
u
w
er
e
p
ai
d
,
w
h
a
t
w
a
s
yo
u
r
g
ro
ss
p
ay
b
ef
or
e
d
ed
u
ct
io
n
s?
’
(i
n
cl
u
d
in
g
ov
er
ti
m
e,
b
on
u
se
s,
co
m
m
is
si
on
an
d
ti
p
s)
’
20
00
42
‘L
as
t
ti
m
e
yo
u
w
er
e
p
ai
d
,
w
h
a
t
w
a
s
yo
u
r
g
ro
ss
p
ay
b
ef
or
e
d
ed
u
ct
io
n
s?
’
(i
n
cl
u
d
in
g
ov
er
ti
m
e,
b
on
u
se
s,
co
m
m
is
si
on
an
d
ti
p
s)
a
s
a
b
ov
e
‘(
st
il
l
th
in
k
in
g
o
f
yo
u
r
m
a
in
jo
b
)
D
o
yo
u
ev
er
d
o
a
n
y
w
o
rk
w
h
ic
h
yo
u
w
o
u
ld
re
g
a
rd
a
s
p
a
id
o
r
u
n
p
a
id
ov
er
ti
m
e?
’
‘H
ow
m
a
n
y
h
o
u
rs
p
er
w
ee
k
d
o
yo
u
u
su
a
ll
y
w
o
rk
in
yo
u
r
(m
a
in
)
jo
b
/
b
u
si
n
es
s
n
o
t
in
cl
u
d
-
in
g
m
ea
l
b
re
a
k
s?
(i
f
n
o
ov
er
ti
m
e)
’
‘H
ow
m
a
n
y
h
o
u
rs
a
w
ee
k
d
o
y
o
u
u
su
a
ll
y
w
o
rk
n
o
t
in
cl
u
d
in
g
m
ea
l
b
re
a
k
s
a
n
d
ov
er
ti
m
e
(i
f
ov
er
ti
m
e)
’
‘H
ow
m
a
n
y
h
o
u
rs
p
a
id
ov
er
ti
m
e
d
o
yo
u
u
su
a
ll
y
w
o
rk
p
er
w
ee
k
?’
T
ab
le
4
.1
8
:
W
a
g
e
q
u
es
ti
on
s
a
t
ea
ch
su
rv
ey
(r
ef
er
ri
n
g
to
m
ai
n
jo
b
on
ly
)
-
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
-
19
70
b
ir
th
co
h
or
t
Y
e
a
r
A
g
e
P
a
y
q
u
e
st
io
n
P
a
y
p
e
ri
o
d
H
o
u
rs
q
u
e
st
io
n
19
96
26
‘W
h
at
is
yo
u
r
u
su
al
ta
ke
h
o
m
e
p
ay
(a
ft
er
d
e-
d
u
ct
io
n
s,
b
u
t
in
cl
u
d
in
g
an
y
b
o
n
u
se
s
o
r
ov
er
-
ti
m
e)
?
P
le
as
e
w
ri
te
in
am
ou
n
t’
‘t
ic
k
o
n
e
b
ox
fo
r
p
er
io
d
co
ve
re
d
’
(h
o
u
r,
d
ay
,
w
ee
k
,
m
o
n
th
,
ye
a
r,
o
th
er
p
er
io
d
)
‘H
ow
m
a
n
y
h
o
u
rs
d
o
y
o
u
u
su
a
ll
y
w
o
rk
ea
ch
w
ee
k
?
P
le
a
se
in
cl
u
d
e
a
n
y
p
a
id
ov
er
ti
m
e
yo
u
u
su
a
ll
y
d
o
,
b
u
t
ex
cl
u
d
e
m
ea
l
b
re
a
k
s’
20
00
30
‘L
as
t
ti
m
e
yo
u
w
er
e
p
ai
d
,
w
h
a
t
w
a
s
yo
u
r
g
ro
ss
p
ay
b
ef
or
e
d
ed
u
ct
io
n
s?
(i
n
cl
u
d
in
g
ov
er
ti
m
e,
b
on
u
se
s,
co
m
m
is
si
on
an
d
ti
p
s)
’
‘H
ow
lo
n
g
a
p
er
io
d
d
o
es
th
a
t
p
ay
co
ve
r?
’
‘(
st
il
l
th
in
k
in
g
o
f
yo
u
r
m
a
in
jo
b
)
D
o
y
o
u
ev
er
d
o
a
n
y
w
o
rk
w
h
ic
h
yo
u
w
o
u
ld
re
g
a
rd
a
s
p
a
id
o
r
u
n
p
a
id
ov
er
ti
m
e?
’
(1
w
ee
k
,
fo
rt
n
ig
h
t,
fo
u
r
w
ee
k
s,
ca
le
n
d
a
r
m
o
n
th
,
ye
a
r,
so
m
e
o
th
er
p
er
io
d
)
‘H
ow
m
a
n
y
h
o
u
rs
p
er
w
ee
k
d
o
yo
u
u
su
a
ll
y
w
o
rk
in
yo
u
r
(m
a
in
)
jo
b
/
b
u
si
n
es
s
n
o
t
in
cl
u
d
-
in
g
m
ea
l
b
re
a
k
s?
(i
f
n
o
ov
er
ti
m
e)
’
‘H
ow
m
a
n
y
h
o
u
rs
a
w
ee
k
d
o
y
o
u
u
su
a
ll
y
w
o
rk
n
o
t
in
cl
u
d
in
g
m
ea
l
b
re
a
k
s
a
n
d
ov
er
ti
m
e
(i
f
ov
er
ti
m
e)
’
‘H
ow
m
a
n
y
h
o
u
rs
p
a
id
ov
er
ti
m
e
d
o
yo
u
u
su
a
ll
y
w
o
rk
p
er
w
ee
k
?’
20
04
34
as
ab
ov
e
a
s
a
b
ov
e
a
s
a
b
ov
e
T
a
b
le
4.
19
:
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
h
is
to
ry
q
u
es
ti
on
s
at
ea
ch
su
rv
ey
,
19
46
b
ir
th
co
h
or
t
S
u
rv
e
y
y
e
a
r
M
a
in
q
u
e
st
io
n
/
in
st
ru
c
ti
o
n
s
D
e
ta
il
e
d
q
u
e
st
io
n
s
19
72
C
ou
ld
yo
u
te
ll
u
s
ab
ou
t
a
ll
th
e
jo
b
s,
in
cl
u
d
in
g
p
ro
m
o
ti
o
n
s
o
r
ch
a
n
g
es
w
it
h
in
th
e
fi
rm
,
th
at
yo
u
h
av
e
d
o
n
e
si
n
ce
yo
u
r
2
5
th
b
ir
th
d
ay
?
C
o
u
ld
yo
u
st
ar
t
w
it
h
th
e
jo
b
,
if
a
n
y,
o
n
y
o
u
r
2
5
th
b
ir
th
d
ay
.
W
h
en
d
id
yo
u
st
a
rt
?
W
a
s
it
fu
ll
ti
m
e
o
r
p
a
rt
ti
m
e?
W
h
en
d
id
yo
u
le
av
e?
C
ou
ld
I
n
ow
as
k
yo
u
so
m
e
m
o
re
d
et
a
il
s
a
b
o
u
t
th
e
p
er
io
d
s
w
h
en
yo
u
h
av
e
n
ot
b
ee
n
in
p
ai
d
w
or
k
fo
r
a
w
ee
k
o
r
m
o
re
fo
r
a
n
y
re
a
so
n
si
n
ce
y
o
u
r
2
5
th
b
ir
th
d
ay
(a
sk
ed
if
re
le
va
n
t)
W
h
a
t
w
er
e
yo
u
d
o
in
g
in
th
is
p
er
io
d
?
W
h
en
d
id
th
is
st
a
rt
?
W
h
en
d
id
th
is
en
d
?
D
id
y
o
u
re
g
is
te
r
a
s
u
n
-
em
p
lo
ye
d
?
19
77
T
h
e
la
st
jo
b
yo
u
to
ld
u
s
a
b
o
u
t
is
w
ri
tt
en
in
re
d
b
el
ow
.
P
le
a
se
g
iv
e
d
et
a
il
s
of
al
l
jo
b
s
(i
n
cl
u
d
in
g
p
ro
m
o
ti
o
n
s
o
r
ch
a
n
g
es
w
it
h
in
th
e
fi
rm
)
yo
u
h
av
e
h
ad
si
n
ce
th
en
,
p
u
tt
in
g
in
a
n
y
p
er
io
d
s
yo
u
h
av
e
h
a
d
o
ff
w
o
rk
(e
.g
.
a
s
a
h
ou
se
w
if
e
or
st
u
d
en
t)
.
If
th
er
e
h
av
e
b
ee
n
n
o
ch
a
n
g
es
a
t
a
ll
,
p
u
t
‘s
ti
ll
th
er
e’
.
F
u
ll
o
r
p
a
rt
ti
m
e?
D
a
te
st
a
rt
ed
m
o
n
th
,
ye
a
r?
D
a
te
le
ft
m
o
n
th
,
ye
a
r?
H
av
e
yo
u
h
ad
a
lo
n
g
sp
el
l
(a
m
o
n
th
o
r
m
o
re
)
o
ff
w
o
rk
th
ro
u
g
h
il
ln
es
s
si
n
ce
M
ar
ch
19
72
?
H
av
e
y
o
u
h
a
d
a
lo
n
g
sp
el
l
(a
m
o
n
th
o
r
m
o
re
)
o
ff
w
o
rk
b
ec
au
se
yo
u
w
er
e
u
n
em
p
lo
ye
d
a
n
d
lo
o
k
in
g
fo
r
a
jo
b
si
n
ce
M
a
rc
h
1
9
7
2
?
D
a
te
st
a
rt
ed
(m
o
n
th
,
ye
a
r)
,
T
im
e
o
ff
w
o
rk
/
L
en
g
th
o
f
ti
m
e
u
n
em
p
lo
ye
d
19
82
T
h
e
la
st
jo
b
yo
u
to
ld
u
s
a
b
o
u
t
w
a
s
in
[
].
S
in
ce
th
en
h
av
e
yo
u
ch
a
n
g
ed
yo
u
r
jo
b
?
C
ou
ld
yo
u
te
ll
m
e
a
b
o
u
t
a
ll
th
e
p
ay
in
g
jo
b
s
yo
u
’v
e
h
a
d
si
n
ce
th
en
,
n
ot
in
cl
u
d
in
g
y
ou
r
p
re
se
n
t
jo
b
.
In
te
rv
ie
w
er
-
be
gi
n
w
it
h
la
st
jo
b
be
fo
re
p
re
se
n
t
jo
b
(o
r
sp
el
l
o
u
t
o
f
w
o
rk
)
a
n
d
w
o
rk
ba
ck
w
a
rd
s
in
o
rd
er
,
to
th
e
jo
b
im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
o
u
r
la
st
re
co
rd
..
U
p
to
7
jo
b
s.
W
a
s
it
fu
ll
-t
im
e
(3
0
h
o
u
rs
o
r
m
o
re
a
w
ee
k
)
o
r
p
a
rt
-
ti
m
e?
W
h
en
d
id
yo
u
st
a
rt
th
is
jo
b
?
(m
o
n
th
,
ye
a
r)
W
h
en
d
id
yo
u
le
av
e?
(m
o
n
th
,
y
ea
r)
H
av
e
yo
u
h
ad
an
y
p
er
io
d
s
o
f
a
m
o
n
th
o
r
m
o
re
w
h
en
yo
u
w
er
en
’t
in
a
n
y
k
in
d
of
p
ai
d
w
or
k
(i
n
cl
u
d
e
fu
ll
-t
im
e
o
r
p
a
rt
-t
im
e)
si
n
ce
[
]?
In
te
rv
ie
w
er
-
be
gi
n
w
it
h
th
e
p
re
se
n
t
o
r
la
st
pe
ri
od
a
n
d
w
o
rk
ba
ck
w
a
rd
s
in
o
rd
er
.
U
p
to
4
sp
el
ls
.
W
h
en
d
id
th
is
st
a
rt
?
(m
o
n
th
,
ye
a
r)
W
h
en
d
id
it
en
d
?
19
89
J
ob
h
el
d
in
19
82
(o
n
ly
fo
r
th
o
se
n
o
t
vi
si
te
d
in
1
9
8
2
).
C
u
rr
en
t
o
r
m
o
st
re
ce
n
t
jo
b
.
L
on
ge
st
jo
b
si
n
ce
1
9
8
2
.
D
o
yo
u
/
d
id
yo
u
w
o
rk
fu
ll
-t
im
e
(3
0
h
o
u
rs
o
r
m
o
re
)
o
r
p
a
rt
-t
im
e?
W
h
en
d
id
y
o
u
b
eg
in
th
is
jo
b
?
(m
o
n
th
ye
a
r)
W
h
en
d
id
yo
u
en
d
th
is
jo
b
?
G
oi
n
g
b
ac
k
to
19
82
h
av
e
y
o
u
h
a
d
a
n
y
sp
el
ls
o
f
a
m
o
n
th
o
r
m
o
re
w
h
en
yo
u
w
er
e
n
ot
in
an
y
k
in
d
o
f
p
a
id
w
o
rk
?
B
eg
in
w
it
h
th
e
p
re
se
n
t
sp
el
l
(i
f
a
p
p
li
ca
bl
e)
a
n
d
w
o
rk
ba
ck
w
a
rd
s
in
o
rd
er
.
U
p
to
6
sp
el
ls
.
W
h
en
d
id
yo
u
b
eg
in
th
is
sp
el
l?
(m
o
n
th
,
ye
a
r)
W
h
en
d
id
it
en
d
?
A
n
d
so
it
la
st
fo
r
(w
ee
k
s)
?
T
a
b
le
4.
20
:
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
h
is
to
ry
q
u
es
ti
on
s
at
ea
ch
su
rv
ey
,
19
58
b
ir
th
co
h
or
t
Y
e
a
r
A
g
e
M
a
in
q
u
e
st
io
n
s
D
e
ta
il
e
d
in
st
ru
c
ti
o
n
s
19
81
23
H
as
th
e
re
sp
on
d
en
t
h
ad
a
n
y
jo
b
s
si
n
ce
le
av
in
g
sc
h
o
ol
?
T
ot
al
n
u
m
b
er
of
jo
b
s
w
h
ic
h
la
st
ed
o
n
e
m
o
n
th
or
m
or
e
ex
cl
u
d
in
g
va
ca
ti
on
jo
b
s.
A
jo
b
is
a
p
er
io
d
o
f
ti
m
e
w
it
h
th
e
sa
m
e
em
p
lo
ye
r
o
r
a
p
er
io
d
se
lf
-e
m
p
lo
y
ed
.
D
o
n
o
t
in
cl
u
d
e:
h
o
li
d
ay
jo
b
s
w
h
il
e
a
t
sc
h
o
o
l
o
r
in
fu
ll
-t
im
e
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
;
jo
b
s
w
h
ic
h
d
id
n
o
t
la
st
fo
r
a
t
le
a
st
o
n
e
m
o
n
th
;
p
a
rt
-t
im
e
jo
b
s
d
o
n
e
a
t
th
e
sa
m
e
ti
m
e
a
s
fu
ll
-t
im
e
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
;
p
a
rt
-
ti
m
e
jo
b
s
d
o
n
e
a
t
th
e
sa
m
e
ti
m
e
a
s
a
fu
ll
-t
im
e
jo
b
.
T
h
e
jo
b
is
a
p
er
io
d
sp
en
t
w
o
rk
in
g
a
s
a
te
m
p
fo
r
o
n
e
o
r
m
o
re
a
g
en
ci
es
n
o
t
ea
ch
em
p
lo
ye
r
w
o
rk
ed
fo
r
o
n
a
te
m
p
o
ra
ry
b
a
si
s.
C
an
I
ju
st
ch
ec
k
so
m
e
d
et
a
il
s
a
b
o
u
t
th
e
jo
b
s
yo
u
h
av
e
d
on
e.
B
y
a
jo
b
I
m
ea
n
a
p
er
io
d
o
f
ti
m
e
w
it
h
th
e
sa
m
e
em
p
lo
ye
r
ev
en
th
o
u
g
h
y
o
u
m
ay
h
av
e
d
o
n
e
d
iff
er
en
t
w
or
k
d
u
ri
n
g
th
at
p
er
io
d
o
r,
if
yo
u
w
er
e
se
lf
-e
m
p
lo
y
ed
,
a
p
er
io
d
of
ti
m
e
d
o
in
g
th
e
sa
m
e
se
lf
-
em
p
lo
ye
d
w
or
k
.
C
o
ll
ec
t
d
et
a
il
s
o
f
u
p
to
fo
u
r
jo
b
s.
If
re
sp
o
n
d
en
t
h
a
s
h
a
d
fi
v
e
o
r
m
o
re
jo
b
s,
co
ll
ec
t
fi
rs
t
th
re
e
a
n
d
la
te
st
o
n
e.
C
h
ec
k
jo
b
w
a
s.
..
fu
ll
-t
im
e
(3
0
h
rs
o
r
m
o
re
)
o
r
p
a
rt
-t
im
e
(l
es
s
th
a
n
3
0
h
rs
)
H
as
th
e
re
sp
on
d
en
t
h
ad
an
y
p
er
io
d
s
o
f
u
n
em
p
lo
y
-
m
en
t
si
n
ce
le
av
in
g
sc
h
o
ol
?
U
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
m
ea
n
s
b
ei
n
g
ou
t
of
w
or
k
an
d
w
an
ti
n
g
w
o
rk
.
Y
o
u
d
o
n
o
t
h
av
e
to
b
e
re
gi
st
er
ed
as
u
n
em
p
lo
y
ed
.
D
o
n
o
t
in
cl
u
d
e
h
ol
id
ay
s
or
va
ca
ti
on
s
w
h
il
e
in
fu
ll
-t
im
e
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
.
C
o
ll
ec
t
d
et
a
il
s
o
f
u
p
to
fo
u
r
p
er
io
d
s
o
f
u
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t.
If
re
sp
o
n
-
d
en
t
h
a
s
h
a
d
fi
ve
o
r
m
o
re
,
co
ll
ec
t
fi
rs
t
th
re
e
a
n
d
la
te
st
p
er
io
d
.
T
a
b
le
4.
20
:
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
h
is
to
ry
q
u
es
ti
on
s
at
ea
ch
su
rv
ey
,
19
58
b
ir
th
co
h
or
t
-
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
Y
e
a
r
A
g
e
M
a
in
q
u
e
st
io
n
s
D
e
ta
il
e
d
q
u
e
st
io
n
s/
in
st
ru
c
ti
o
n
s
19
91
33
P
le
as
e
gi
v
e
d
et
ai
ls
of
ea
ch
p
a
id
jo
b
yo
u
h
av
e
d
o
n
e
w
h
ic
h
la
st
ed
at
le
as
t
a
m
on
th
,
b
y
a
n
sw
er
in
g
q
u
es
-
ti
on
s
(a
)-
(f
).
P
le
as
e
st
ar
t
w
it
h
yo
u
r
fi
rs
t
jo
b
a
n
d
w
or
k
fo
rw
ar
d
s
to
y
ou
r
cu
rr
en
t
o
r
la
st
jo
b
.
W
a
s
jo
b
fu
ll
-t
im
e
(3
0+
h
ou
rs
)
or
p
ar
t-
ti
m
e
(<
3
0
h
o
u
rs
)?
In
cl
u
d
e
a
n
y
jo
b
,
fu
ll
-t
im
e
o
r
p
a
rt
-t
im
e,
w
h
ic
h
yo
u
d
id
fo
r
a
t
le
a
st
a
m
o
n
th
.
If
yo
u
ch
a
n
g
ed
th
e
k
in
d
o
f
w
o
rk
yo
u
d
id
w
h
il
e
w
o
rk
in
g
fo
r
a
n
em
p
lo
ye
r,
co
u
n
t
th
is
a
s
st
il
l
th
e
sa
m
e
jo
b
.
O
n
ly
a
ch
a
n
g
e
o
f
em
p
lo
ye
r
co
u
n
ts
a
s
a
ch
a
n
g
e
o
f
jo
b
.
If
yo
u
h
av
e
w
o
rk
ed
fo
r
a
G
ov
er
n
m
en
t
D
ep
a
rt
m
en
t,
sc
h
o
o
l
o
r
h
o
sp
it
a
l,
co
u
n
t
a
s
a
ch
a
n
g
e
o
f
jo
b
a
n
y
ch
a
n
g
e
o
f
G
ov
er
n
m
en
t
D
ep
a
rt
m
en
t,
sc
h
o
o
l
o
r
h
o
sp
it
a
l.
If
yo
u
h
a
d
a
p
er
io
d
o
f
“
te
m
p
in
g
”
,
o
r
fr
ee
-l
a
n
ci
n
g
,
o
r
co
n
su
lt
a
n
cy
,
o
r
se
lf
-e
m
p
lo
y
ed
co
n
tr
a
ct
w
o
rk
,
co
u
n
t
th
e
w
h
o
le
p
er
io
d
a
s
o
n
e
jo
b
.
In
cl
u
d
e
w
o
rk
in
sh
el
te
re
d
w
o
rk
sh
o
p
s.
D
o
n
’t
co
u
n
t
w
o
rk
ex
p
er
i-
en
ce
,
sa
n
d
w
ic
h
jo
b
s
o
r
h
o
li
d
ay
jo
b
s
w
h
il
e
yo
u
w
er
e
in
fu
ll
-t
im
e
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
.
If
yo
u
w
en
t
o
n
m
a
te
rn
it
y
le
av
e
o
r
si
ck
le
av
e
a
n
d
w
en
t
b
a
ck
to
th
e
sa
m
e
jo
b
,
co
u
n
t
th
e
w
h
o
le
p
er
io
d
a
s
o
n
e
jo
b
.
D
o
n
’t
co
u
n
t
ti
m
e
sp
en
t
o
n
a
G
ov
er
n
m
en
t
w
o
rk
o
r
tr
a
in
in
g
sc
h
em
e.
S
in
ce
le
av
in
g
sc
h
o
ol
h
as
th
er
e
b
ee
n
a
n
y
p
er
io
d
o
f
a
m
on
th
or
m
or
e
w
h
en
yo
u
d
id
n
o
t
h
av
e
a
p
a
id
jo
b
an
d
w
h
en
yo
u
r
si
tu
at
io
n
w
a
s
b
es
t
d
es
cr
ib
ed
b
y
o
n
e
of
th
e
ca
te
go
ri
es
b
el
ow
.
(u
n
em
p
lo
ye
d
a
n
d
se
ek
in
g
w
or
k
,
G
ov
er
n
m
en
t
tr
ai
n
in
g
o
r
w
o
rk
sc
h
em
e,
fu
ll
-t
im
e
ed
u
ca
ti
on
,
fu
ll
-t
im
e
h
ou
se
w
o
rk
o
r
ch
il
d
ca
re
,
u
n
a
b
le
to
w
or
k
b
ec
au
se
of
si
ck
n
es
s
o
r
h
a
n
d
ic
a
p
,
o
th
er
).
If
yo
u
w
er
e
o
n
m
a
te
rn
it
y
le
av
e
o
r
si
ck
le
av
e
fr
o
m
a
jo
b
,
a
n
d
th
en
w
en
t
b
a
ck
to
th
e
sa
m
e
jo
b
,
d
o
n
o
t
co
u
n
t
th
a
t
a
s
ti
m
e
n
o
t
in
a
jo
b
20
00
42
W
e
h
av
e
ta
lk
ed
ab
ou
t
w
h
at
yo
u
a
re
cu
rr
en
tl
y
d
o
in
g
.
N
ow
I
w
an
t
to
ga
th
er
a
fe
w
d
et
a
il
s
a
b
o
u
t
th
e
jo
b
s
an
d
ot
h
er
th
in
gs
th
at
yo
u
m
ay
h
av
e
b
ee
n
d
o
in
g
si
n
ce
M
ar
ch
19
91
.
Y
ou
sa
id
y
ou
st
a
rt
ed
yo
u
r
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
e-
ri
o
d
of
[l
a
st
re
co
rd
ed
a
ct
iv
it
y
]
in
[m
o
n
th
]
o
f
[y
ea
r
].
W
h
ic
h
of
th
e
th
in
gs
on
th
is
ca
rd
b
es
t
d
es
cr
ib
es
w
h
a
t
yo
u
w
er
e
d
oi
n
g
b
ef
or
e
th
is
p
er
io
d
o
f
[l
a
st
re
co
rd
ed
a
ct
iv
it
y
]?
(1
).
C
h
ec
k
th
a
t
re
sp
o
n
d
en
t
h
a
s
b
ee
n
d
o
in
g
th
is
co
n
ti
n
u
o
u
sl
y
si
n
ce
th
e
st
a
rt
d
a
te
a
n
d
th
a
t
th
er
e
h
a
s
b
ee
n
n
o
ti
m
e
w
h
en
th
e
si
tu
a
ti
o
n
ch
a
n
g
ed
.
(1
)
T
h
e
li
st
of
ac
ti
v
it
ie
s
is
th
e
sa
m
e
as
fo
r
th
e
q
u
es
ti
o
n
o
n
cu
rr
en
t
m
a
in
a
ct
iv
it
y
-
se
e
ta
b
le
4
.1
6
.
T
a
b
le
4.
21
:
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
h
is
to
ry
q
u
es
ti
on
s
at
ea
ch
su
rv
ey
,
19
70
b
ir
th
co
h
or
t
Y
e
a
r
A
g
e
M
a
in
q
u
e
st
io
n
s
D
e
ta
il
e
d
q
u
e
st
io
n
s/
in
st
ru
c
ti
o
n
s
20
00
30
W
e
h
av
e
ta
lk
ed
ab
ou
t
w
h
at
yo
u
a
re
cu
rr
en
tl
y
d
o
in
g
.
N
ow
I
w
an
t
to
ga
th
er
a
fe
w
d
et
a
il
s
a
b
o
u
t
th
e
jo
b
s
an
d
ot
h
er
th
in
gs
th
at
yo
u
m
ay
h
av
e
b
ee
n
d
o
in
g
si
n
ce
M
ar
ch
19
86
.
Y
ou
sa
id
y
ou
st
a
rt
ed
yo
u
r
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
e-
ri
o
d
of
[l
a
st
re
co
rd
ed
a
ct
iv
it
y
]
in
[m
o
n
th
]
o
f
[y
ea
r
].
W
h
ic
h
of
th
e
th
in
gs
on
th
is
ca
rd
b
es
t
d
es
cr
ib
es
w
h
a
t
yo
u
w
er
e
d
oi
n
g
b
ef
or
e
th
is
p
er
io
d
o
f
[l
a
st
re
co
rd
ed
a
ct
iv
it
y
]?
(1
).
C
h
ec
k
th
a
t
re
sp
o
n
d
en
t
h
a
s
b
ee
n
d
o
in
g
th
is
co
n
ti
n
u
o
u
sl
y
si
n
ce
th
e
st
a
rt
d
a
te
a
n
d
th
a
t
th
er
e
h
a
s
b
ee
n
n
o
ti
m
e
w
h
en
th
e
si
tu
a
ti
o
n
ch
a
n
g
ed
.
20
04
34
W
e
h
av
e
ta
lk
ed
ab
ou
t
w
h
a
t
y
o
u
a
re
cu
rr
en
tl
y
d
o
-
in
g.
N
ow
I
w
an
t
to
ga
th
er
a
fe
w
d
et
a
il
s
a
b
o
u
t
th
e
jo
b
s
an
d
ot
h
er
th
in
gs
th
at
y
o
u
m
ay
h
av
e
b
ee
n
d
o
-
in
g
si
n
ce
[D
a
te
o
f
la
st
in
te
rv
ie
w
/
yo
u
w
er
e
a
ge
1
6
].
Y
ou
sa
id
yo
u
st
ar
te
d
yo
u
r
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
er
io
d
o
f
[c
u
r-
re
n
t/
p
re
vi
o
u
s]
p
er
io
d
of
[a
ct
iv
it
y
]
in
[m
o
n
th
a
n
d
ye
a
r
w
h
en
st
ar
te
d
ac
ti
v
it
y
].
W
h
ic
h
o
f
th
e
th
in
g
s
o
n
th
is
ca
rd
b
es
t
d
es
cr
ib
es
w
h
at
yo
u
w
er
e
d
o
in
g
b
ef
o
re
th
is
p
er
io
d
of
[a
ct
iv
it
y
]?
(1
).
C
h
ec
k
th
a
t
re
sp
o
n
d
en
t
h
a
s
b
ee
n
d
o
in
g
th
is
co
n
ti
n
u
o
u
sl
y
si
n
ce
th
e
st
a
rt
d
a
te
a
n
d
th
a
t
th
er
e
h
a
s
b
ee
n
n
o
ti
m
e
w
h
en
th
e
si
tu
a
ti
o
n
ch
a
n
g
ed
.
C
o
d
e
o
n
ly
o
n
e
m
a
in
a
ct
iv
it
y.
(G
lo
ss
a
ry
o
f
d
efi
n
it
io
n
s)
.
(1
)
T
h
e
li
st
of
ac
ti
v
it
ie
s
is
th
e
sa
m
e
as
fo
r
th
e
q
u
es
ti
o
n
o
n
cu
rr
en
t
m
a
in
a
ct
iv
it
y
-
se
e
ta
b
le
4
.1
7
.
Chapter 5
Analysis I: Trends in women’s
and men’s relative pay
opportunities
This chapter analyses changes in the pay opportunities of women and men across the
three British birth cohorts over the period 1972-2004. The analysis of earnings is
extended to take into account the potential earnings of those not in paid work. Potential
hourly earnings are imputed for each non-employee using the actual hourly earnings of
an otherwise-similar employed individual, based on nearest-neighbour matching. The
results suggest that the large fraction of women not in paid work in the 1970s had
low average potential earnings. Consequently, the cross-cohort increase in women’s
pay opportunities is estimated to be greater than the increase in the pay of employed
women, both in real terms and relative to men’s.
The chapter is organised into four sections. The first section summarises the datasets
used and trends in employment and pay across the three cohorts. The second section
describes the methods used to impute potential wages for non-working individuals. The
third section presents the main results of the imputations, including results from tests
to assess the validity of the model assumptions. The final section discusses the results.
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5.1 Data and description of trends
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the percentage of women and men in each main economic
activity category for each of the survey samples used. Potential wages are imputed for
individuals who are either not employed, who are self-employed or who are employed,
but did not respond to the questions about earnings. For women, most of those who
are not employees are full-time housewives. For men, a substantial fraction are self-
employed at later ages, whilst a significant minority are unemployed in the 1958 cohort
at age twenty-three (in 1981). The unemployment category includes registered and
unregistered unemployment, plus those enrolled on a Government training scheme.
Table 5.1: Percentage of women in each economic activity category, by cohort and age
1946 cohort 1958 cohort 1970 cohort
Age at survey 26 31 43 23 33 42 26 30 34
Full-time employee 31 21 37 56 33 40 62 48 40
Part-time employee 13 29 34 6 29 31 12 21 29
Full-time self-employed 1 3 6 1 4 4 3 3 3
Part-time self-employed 1 2 2 · 3 3 1 2 3
Employed, hours unknown · · 1 1 · · · · ·
Full-time housewife/carer 51 45 11 24 27 13 14 20 19
Unemployed 1 1 4 7 2 2 2 2 2
Not in work, ill or disabled · · 3 · 1 5 2 2 2
Full-time student 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1
Other · · · 2 1 1 2 1 2
Sample size (1) 1,852 1,649 1,618 6,256 5,785 5,777 4,835 5,766 5,025
(1) The samples include all cohort members who participated in the survey and who answered the
question on current economic activity. Individuals engaged in more than one economic activity count
only once, based on their self-reported main economic activity. Percentages are rounded up or down
to nearest integer are not given when less than half a percent of the sample fell into the specified
category. Percentages for 1946 cohort are weighted to account for the stratification of the sample.
The changes in women’s employment and pay across the cohorts is striking. In 1972,
just under half of women from the 1946 cohort were in paid employment at the age of
twenty-six. Nearly quarter of a century later, more than three-quarters of women from
the 1970 cohort were in paid work at the same age. Across these samples, women’s
relative median pay increased from 70 per cent to 90 per cent of men’s.
The proportion of women who are in paid employment, when surveyed in their
twenties and thirties, has increased across each successive cohort. This is illustrated in
Figure 5.1.1
1The figures in this section are all based on data from the cross-sections of cohort members who
participated in the surveys. Figures for the 1946 data are weighted to adjust for stratification.
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Table 5.2: Percentage of men in each economic activity category, by cohort and age
1946 cohort 1958 cohort 1970 cohort
Age at survey 26 31 43 23 33 42 26 30 34
Full-time employee 84 83 70 75 74 71 75 77 77
Part-time employee · · 1 1 1 1 2 1 1
Full-time self-employed 10 12 21 6 16 17 10 11 14
Part-time self-employed · · · · · 1 1 1 1
Employed, hours unknown · · 1 1 · · · · ·
Full-time carer · · · · · 1 · 1 1
Unemployed 3 4 2 12 6 3 7 5 3
Not in work, ill or disabled 1 · 4 · 2 5 2 3 3
Full-time student 1 1 · 3 · · 4 1 1
Other · · · 2 1 1 1 1 1
Sample size (1) 1,897 1,661 1,607 6,249 5,582 5,605 4,063 5,436 4,609
Figure 5.1: Percentage of women in work at each age, by cohort (including self-
employees)
The cross-cohort increase in women’s rates of employment is composed both of an
increase in the proportion of women not having children or having them later, and
an increase in rates of employment amongst mothers of young children. Figure 5.2
shows the percentage of women in each cohort who had become mothers by each age
for the three cohorts.2 The flatter slopes for the two later cohorts show that years of
2The figure uses birth history data collected from all mothers and is based on the sample interviewed
at age 43 for the 1946 cohort, age 42 for the 1958 cohort and age 34 for the 1970 cohort.
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childbearing have become more spread out, as well as later.
Figure 5.2: Percentage of women who have had a first child by each age, by cohort (live
births only)
The length of time spent out of work amongst women who have children has also
decreased across the three cohorts. For the 1946 cohort, only a fifth returned to work
within a year of a first birth, compared to nearly two-fifths for the 1958 cohort and
nearly 60 per cent for the 1970 cohort (for a fuller analysis, see Macran et al., 1996;
Smeaton, 2006).
Among men, in contrast to women, rates of employment have decreased slightly
across the three cohorts. The decrease is most marked across the 1946 and 1958 cohorts
when in their twenties and thirties. This is illustrated in Figure 5.3. Both the 1958 and
1970 cohorts were affected by recessions at the start of their careers. The 1946 cohort
were in their mid-thirties by the time of the 1980s recession.
Women’s median hourly earnings have increased relative to men’s across the three
cohorts. This is illustrated in Figure 5.4. This shows an increase in women’s relative
pay across the cohorts (reading vertically across the lines). In the two later cohorts, it
shows a decrease women’s relative pay with age during their twenties and early thirties.
3
3Women’s and men’s median real earnings both increase with age, but men’s increase more than
women’s.
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Figure 5.3: Percentage of men in work at each age (including self-employees)
Figure 5.4: Women’s median hourly earnings as a % of men’s at each age, by cohort
(employees only)
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The purpose of the analysis presented in the rest of the chapter is to assess how
well trends in the relative pay of men and women in work (figure 5.4) represent trends
in the relative pay opportunities facing women and men in the whole population. The
concern is that cross-cohort changes in patterns of life-cycle employment participation
will have altered the relationship between actual and potential wage distributions. As a
consequence, trends in relative median pay may misrepresent cross-cohort and within-
cohort changes in women’s and men’s relative pay opportunities.
The approach taken here is to impute potential hourly wages for non-working in-
dividuals based on the wages of observably-similar working individuals. For employed
individuals, the potential wage is taken to be the wage that they are currently earn-
ing.4 For non-employed individuals, the potential wage is defined as the wage that they
could expect to earn if they entered paid work. This is estimated as the actual wage
of an employee born in the same year, of the same sex and the same age, with similar
qualifications, childhood ability scores, social class and family background and a similar
child-bearing and employment history. The large and detailed files of information on
members of the British Birth Cohort Studies make these studies an ideal source of data
for this statistical exercise. The approach used is similar to that used by Blau and Kahn
(2006a) and Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) to analyse gender gaps in employment and
pay in the US and across OECD countries respectively.
The validity of the imputation exercise rests on the assumption that there is a
meaningful existing distribution of potential wages for non-employed individuals at
each point in time, over the period covered by the analysis. This would not be a valid
assumption, for example, if there were complete cultural, legal or economic restrictions
on employment for certain non-employed groups.5 A further assumption is that the
potential wage can be meaningfully defined in situations in which individuals may not
be actively seeking work or may have only a vague expectation of what they could earn
if they took a paid job.6 The exercise here does not attempt to model the general
equilibrium and other effects of women’s (and men’s) changing patterns of employment
participation on wages, and vice versa. Rather, a more modest aim is to estimate the
distribution of wage opportunities, as it exists, in a real but intangible form, alongside
4From a search-theoretic perspective, their current actual wage could be seen as just one in a range
of potential wages that they could earn, depending upon their job search activity.
5In the extreme, if there were no paid employment opportunities for a particular group, the potential
wages of individuals in that group would, by definition, be valued at zero.
6In the period covered by my analysis, most married women and nearly all men work for a large part
of their adult lives. However, cultural norms about the employment of mothers with young children
have changed over the period covered.
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a given rate of employment and distribution of wages.
5.2 Model and variables used for imputing potential wages
The imputation exercise is aimed at estimating E(wo|g, s = 0), where wo is the potential
wage, g is an indicator of the age-cohort-sex specific group (for whom potential wages are
separately imputed) and s is an indicator of employment status where s = 0 indicates
non-employment (and s = 1 refers to employees). Potential wages are also imputed for
self-employees and for employees who have missing wages. A significant fraction of men
in each cohort are self-employed at each age. The discussion in chapter 3 referred to the
problem of selectivity bias induced by non-employment, rather than by self-employment
or non-response to questions on earnings. This section separately considers imputation
for self-employees and employees with missing wages.
The imputation methods I have used assign each non-employee (including self-
employees) and employees with missing wages a potential hourly wage using data on the
actual wages of employees who are similar to them across a range of selected characteris-
tics and whose wages are observed.7 The assumption is that the selected characteristics
capture the important influences on the potential wage. These characteristics may have
a direct and/or an indirect effect on the employment decision. Any residual correla-
tion between the employment decision and the potential wage, i.e. differences in the
potential wage across employed and non-employed groups with the same characteris-
tics, is assumed to be small and negligible. The general assumptions upon which this
‘imputation on observables’ strategy is based were discussed in chapter 3 (section 3.2.1).
It is the ratio of women’s to men’s median hourly wage that is the summary statistic
used as the measure of relative wages. The ratio of women’s to men’s potential wage,
including imputed values for non-workers, is the statistic used to measure relative wage
opportunities. The decision was to focus on median wages, rather than the mean or,
if log wages were used, the geometric mean. In practice, the substantive conclusions
presented in the chapter were the same when relative mean wages (and mean log wages)
were used. However, comparing medians means that less reliance is placed on the
goodness of the imputed value - the median is stable as long as the value imputed is
on the correct side of the median. Further, within-cohort and cross-cohort comparisons
of relative medians, rather than means, place less weight on changes in the effects of
7I have not used wage data collected in past surveys to impute potential wages for formerly-employed
individuals who are not in work. This is partly because the data collections were between four and ten
years apart, but mainly because the life-cycle dimension of wage dynamics is itself a focus of interest.
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the widening wage distribution and the associated increasing distance between women’s
wages at the bottom and men’s wages at the top of the distribution.
Standard errors using bootstrap methods, rather than analytically, since there is no
simple formula for the standard error of the ratio of two medians. This involved drawing
repeated, random sub-samples from the imputed wage samples, calculating the median
(or other percentile) for each sub-sample and combining these sub-sample estimates to
calculate the standard deviation in the medians (or other percentile), which is then used
as the estimate of the standard error. The size of each of these repeated sub-samples
was restricted to the number of observations in the original non-imputed wage sample.
5.2.1 Propensity score matching vs. regression methods
The assumption of selection on observables is not sufficient on its own to impute po-
tential wages. I have experimented with different forms of imputation, which rely upon
different identifying assumptions about the structural forms of the relationships be-
tween employment, potential wages and characteristics. The results presented in the
main body of this chapter are from a model which uses nearest-neighbour imputation
based on the propensity score.
Regression methods were also used to model the effects of the selected characteristics
on log wages for employees and to predict log wages for non-employees using this model.
In fact, the results from this model were substantively similar to those obtained from
propensity score matching.8
The results from the propensity score model were preferred for two reasons:
1. Tests of the fit of the least-squares regression models (e.g. tests for heterosked-
asiticity of residuals) suggested that the functional form was not well-specified
in all cases. The wage predictions from the regression model are reliant on the
functional form.
2. The Stata program psmatch2 (Leuven and Sianesi (2003)) includes some useful
built-in features (under the command pstest) for examining differences in charac-
teristics across matched groups.
Propensity score matching also has an important disadvantage. Reducing reliance
on functional form using propensity-score matching comes at the cost of increasing
8Stata results are available on request. In chapter 7, results vary by method and each is shown.
122
reliance on the validity of a relatively small number of observations, when matching is
performed with replacement. In other words, for non-working women with low wage
characteristics, there may be only a small sample of working women who share similar
characteristics. The wages of this small sample are used to impute wages for the non-
working group. In contrast, in a regression model, the reliance is primarily on the
functional form - potential wage predictions for the non-working group are based on
an extrapolation of specified (log-linear) relationships between characteristics and wage
levels observed for the working sample.
5.2.2 Nearest-neighbour imputation using propensity score
The imputation method used for the present analysis involves two stages. First, the
degree of similarity and difference between employees and non-employees across a range
of characteristics is reduced to a single propensity score. The propensity score is the
predicted individual probability of being in paid employment. This score is calculated
from a probit model using a set of observed characteristics to discriminate between the
working population and the non-working population. In essence, the propensity-score
gives greatest weight to those characteristics which discriminate most strongly between
these two groups. Second, each non-employed individual is matched to an employee
with the most similar propensity score. Each empty cell, representing the unobserved
potential wage for a non-employee, is replaced with a value equal to the observed wage
for a matched employee. Propensity score matching stems from the work by Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983) (see section 3.2.1 and equation 3.5 in chapter 3). Matching on the
propensity score is less computationally intensive and more efficient than matching
cell-by-cell across a large set of variables.
The parametric part of the method is the estimation of a probit model. The propen-
sity score, p is a scalar value representing the probability of being in paid employment,
estimated from a probit model separately for each gender, cohort and age, conditioning
on some set of characteristics included in X. The estimated propensity score, pˆ, is given
by:
pˆ = Φ(X ′βˆ) = P (s = 1|X) (5.1)
where Φ, is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution
and βˆ is a vector of parameters estimated by maximum likelihood.
By construction, the majority of non-employees have lower propensity scores than
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employees and their corresponding employed wage donors have lower propensity scores
than other employees. A necessary condition for propensity score matching is that the
distributions of propensity scores for employees and non-employees overlap i.e. there
are individuals who are working despite a low predicted probability of doing so.
The matching is carried out on a pair-by-pair basis. Given a sample of r employees
and n− r non-employees, the estimated propensity scores for the sample are pˆ1, ....., pˆn.
The wages for employees are observed as w1, ...., wr whilst the potential wages for non-
employees, wr+1, ....., wn, are unobserved. A potential wage is imputed for each non-
employed individual, i, using the wage, wi, of the most similar employed individual, j,
where j is identified by the algorithm
|pˆi − pˆj | = min1≤k≤r|pˆi − pˆk| (5.2)
for any individual k amongst the employed sample.
5.2.3 Variables used
In selecting variables to include in the probit models, forming the basis for the propen-
sity score, the following points were considered:
1. The aim is to cover the main joint influences on employment decisions and poten-
tial earnings. Variables that affect only earnings do not need to be included.
2. Variables that would make for appropriate exclusion restrictions in a control func-
tion model are not suitable in a matching/imputation model, and vice versa. For
example, husband’s employment characteristics are often used as exclusion re-
strictions in modelling married women’s employment and wages. Although the
assumption that these are excludable in the present context is rejected, it would
be perverse to used these in a matching model which make the opposite assump-
tion i.e. that married women in and out of work who have husbands with similar
earnings are more like than unlike. See the discussion in chapter 6 (p.52) for a de-
tailed explanation of the difference in the role of the propensity score in matching
and control function models.
3. It is clearly necessary to avoid matching on information that excludes the possi-
bility of a plausible, random reason for the difference in actual employment status
at a given survey e.g. for women, I have implicitly treated as random small dif-
ferences in the timing of childbirth and in the length of time out of paid work
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after having children. Also, occupational and employer characteristics cannot be
included since these are missing for non-working individuals.
4. Variables should not have too many missing items. e.g. information on partner’s
earnings and employment would not have been used on this basis even had it
not been rejected on the grounds that it was potentiall excludable from the wage
model.
Coming from a larger family, having poorly educated parents, being born to a
younger mother, being a younger sibling and having a father in a lower status job have
all been found to be markers of childhood disadvantage. There is also evidence that
these childhood factors have shaped employment and earnings prospects in adulthood
for the three birth cohorts (Kuh and Wadsworth, 1991; Kuh et al., 1997; Schoon et al.,
2002; Blanden et al., 2007; Plewis and Kallis, 2008; Flouri and Hawkes, 2008). On
this basis, these variables have been included in the probit models used to estimate the
propensity score.
In adulthood, the variables included in the probit model are:
- level of highest qualification obtained;
- years spent in full-time work;
- years spent in part-time work;
- region of residence;
- whether any children under 16 are living in the household;
- whether there is more than one child in the household; and
- whether there are children aged under five years old in the household.
For the 1958 and 1970 cohorts, information on the social class status of the first job after
leaving full-time education was also included. These variables have all previously been
shown to be strong predictors of wages and employment patterns for cohort members
(Joshi and Paci, 1998; Blundell et al., 2000; Dolton et al., 2002; Joshi et al., 2007).
Variable definitions are given in table 4.10 in chapter 4.
125
5.2.4 Pooled vs. separate probit regression models
The probit models have been estimated separately for each cohort-age-gender group.9
A suitable wage ‘donor’ is always of the same sex, age and cohort. Importantly, no as-
sumption is made about the similarity of potential wages for individuals across cohorts,
ages or the two sexes, even if they have similar characteristics.
The probit models discriminate between employees with observed wages, on the
one hand, and non-workers, self-employees and employees with missing wages, on the
other. In the present analysis, I have used a set of pooled probit models to generate
propensity scores. The pooled model would be unsuitable if the pattern of selection into
self-employment or the predictors of not reporting wages were qualitatively different to
the pattern of selection into paid work. To test this, a set of multinomial logistic re-
gression models were estimated, discriminating between each of the four groups. These
showed that the self-employed and missing wage groups were heterogeneous, with very
few statistically significant predictors of being self-employed or having a missing wage
(vs. being employed with an observed wage). One characteristic that did discriminate
self-employees from employees for men was father’s social class status. This was also
the only characteristic which was a significantly different predictor of self-employment
vs. non-employment; self-employed men tended to have been born to fathers in higher
social class jobs (most likely self-employees themselves), where unemployed men tended
to have been born to fathers in lower social class jobs. Given that the groups were het-
erogeneous and that the propensity score (and wage level) was most strongly determined
by qualifications and employment experience, the pooled model was used.
In a similar vein, although the focus of the analysis in this chapter is not on the
differences between women working part-time and full-time, these differences might
matter in a practical way for successful matching. If the patterns of differences be-
tween full-time employees, part-time employees and non-employed were qualitatively
different, a better wage match might be made by using a propensity score estimated
from a multinomial model, discriminating between each of the three groups. However,
multinomial logistic models distinguishing part-time and full-time work only revealed
important differences for women in the 1946 cohort at age 31. At this age, the part-time
female workforce was less qualified than the non-working female population, whereas
the full-time workforce was more qualified. However, on the basis that the simplest pro-
bit model was nested in more complex models for all but this one survey, the simplest
models were used.
9In total, probit models were estimated for 18 samples.
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5.3 Results
5.3.1 Probit models used to estimate the propensity score
Women
Table 5.3 shows the probit regression parameters from the models used to estimate
propensity scores for women. These coefficients pick up the relationship between each
characteristic and the (cumulative) probability of being out of work. Although self-
employees and employees with missing wages are included in the non-employed group,
these groups are very small (see tables 5.1 and table 4.3 in chapter 4) and the estimated
parameters are not sensitive to their inclusion. The results discussed in this section are
based on the final models shown in table 5.3 and also on models including childhood
characteristics on their own (not shown) and childhood plus educational characteristics
(not shown).
Having a father with a lower status job (defined by occupation) when young and
scoring poorly in maths and reading tests at age ten or eleven are consistently positive
predictors of being out of work in adult life for the 1958 and 1970 cohorts, although only
at age 43 for the 1946 cohort. However, partial correlations between most childhood
characteristics and subsequent employment patterns in adulthood are not statistically
significant once educational, employment and family characteristics in adulthood are
included in the final models.
In all three cohorts, women without formal qualifications are more likely to be out
of work in their twenties than women without qualifications. In the two later cohorts,
less qualified women are also less likely to be out of work in their thirties. However, the
association between education and the probability of being out of work is reversed for
the 1946 cohort at ages 26 and 31 once information about children is included in the
model.
Social and educational differences in the timing of motherhood complicate patterns
of employment for women. The association between having young children (under five
years old) in the household and being out of work, holding fixed other characteristics,
is large and positive in all of the surveys. The coefficients on some of the social and
educational variables become non-significant or reverse their association with employ-
ment probabilities once information about motherhood is included in the model. This
is most marked for the 1946 cohort samples, in which the association between having
a diploma or A-level (versus no formal qualifications) and being out of paid work at
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age 31 switches from negative or non-significant to positive and significant, once infor-
mation about children is included in the model.10 An interpretation of this pattern of
correlations is that more educated mothers in the 1946 cohort, who have had children
later than average (bearing in mind that the median age was 24), are likely to have had
younger children when surveyed at ages 26 and 31 and were consequently more likely
to still be out of paid employment at these ages. Unlike in the two later cohorts, nearly
all women in the 1946 cohort spent several years out of employment after childbirth.
The association between employment experience and the likelihood of being out of
work is negative at all surveys. The association between social class status of a first job
and later employment probabilities for the 1958 and 1970 cohorts is more mixed and
varies by age and cohort.
Employment rates for mothers are lower in London and the South East than in
other parts of Britain, holding fixed other characteristics, for the age 31 survey of the
1946 cohort and the age 30 and 34 surveys of the 1970 cohort. The inclusion of an
interaction term showed that the negative association was only for mothers, not other
women. This could be related to the higher costs of childcare and transport relative
to potential wages, which may reduce or reverse the financial advantages for families
associated with mothers returning to paid work. Alternatively, particularly in the 1946
cohort, it could be related to the higher wages of husbands, enabling mothers to stay
out of paid work.
10Further modelling confirms that it is the presence of young children which changes the signs on the
education variables in the model, rather than the inclusion of any of the other characteristics.
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Men’s employment
Table 5.4 shows the estimated probit regression parameters from models used to predict
propensity scores for men. The results are from pooled probit models, including non-
employed, self-employed and employed with missing wages all in the same group. A
significant fraction of men were self-employed in their thirties and forties in each of the
three cohorts (between 10 and 21 per cent). Further modelling (not presented in tables
here) suggested that self-employed men are a heterogeneous group. For the most part,
they appear to be less highly-qualified than male employees, but more likely to have
had fathers in social class II, which includes self-employees.
For men, the markers of childhood disadvantage and lower maths and reading abil-
ity have consistently positive associations with being in work, which includes self-
employment (not shown) in each survey. These associations are weakened but not
reversed in the final pooled model. Table 5.4 shows the negative associations between
higher educational attainment and non-employment probabilities, except for the early
surveys of the 1946 cohort (at which point though, 95 per cent of men in the cohort
were employed). There is also a negative association between employment experience
and the probability of being out of work. Lower social class status of a first job is a
predictor of unemployment later on.
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5.3.2 Multivariate analysis of employment and wages
In addition to the estimated probit regression models, used directly in the imputation
model to generate propensity scores, a set of log-linear wage models, containing the same
selected variables, were estimated for the employed samples who had an observed wage.
These wage models formed the basis for an alternative set of predicted potential wages
for non-employees, the results of which are not presented in this chapter. They also
though, provided a useful set of results in themselves for the purpose of understanding
educational and social differences in patterns of employment and wages for women and
men in each cohort.
Summarising the results from the set of probit and wage regression models, these
showed that higher qualifications, higher childhood maths ability, higher status upon
entering the job market and continuity of employment are all consistently and systemati-
cally associated higher employment probabilities and with higher wages when employed.
This is the straightforward pattern we would expect if we assumed that higher potential
wages incentivise being in work. It is also what we would see if employers offering lower
wages also offered less security of employment.
Women’s employment patterns are complicated by the fact that the timing of child-
birth differs by social and educational status. More educated women are likely to have
children later in life. As a consequence, non-employed women become a more diverse
group with age. For the 1946 cohort, nearly all new mothers spent several years out of
employment but there are social and educational differences in the timing of childbirth,
spread out over a relatively short period (early-twenties to early-thirties). As a conse-
quence, at age thirty-one, by which age most women in the cohort had become mothers
(see fig. 5.2), there are few systematic differences between the group in and out of em-
ployment. In contrast, in the 1958 and 1970 cohorts, systematic educational differences
persist at older ages, although they also become weaker with age. This is because the
composition effects of the delay in childbirth amongst more qualified women are partly
offset by the more rapid return to work amongst this group after childbirth.
In the 1958 and 1970 cohorts, the results from the employment and wage models for
women, taken together, suggest positive selection into later motherhood and/or positive
selection into work when children are young amongst older mothers. The indication of
positive selection comes from the fact that the partial correlation between having small
children and being in work is negative, but the partial correlation between having small
children and wages is positive for mothers in work in their thirties and forties. The
selection effect (i.e. the opposite signs on the coefficients on having small children
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in the wage and employment models) appears to be stronger in London and the South
East. It is unclear whether positive selection into later motherhood or positive selection
into employment amongst older mothers is behind this pattern. The issue of unobserved
selectivity bias is explored further in the section following a more general description
of the goodness of the imputation strategy.
5.3.3 Details of imputations
Some important practical questions about the imputations are addressed briefly here,
including:
1. How many imputations have been made in each sample?
2. How far do the distributions of propensity scores for employees and non-employees
overlap in each sample?
3. How well does matching on the propensity score balance the distributions of vari-
ables across the employed and non-employed groups?
The aim of the imputation exercise was to impute potential wages for as many non-
employed individuals as possible, since the proportion, as well as the potential wages
of non-employed individuals, affect the overall estimates of average potential pay.11
For this reason, no stringent limits were placed on how numerically close the propensity
scores had to be before the imputation was accepted. A common support restriction was
used, which meant not imputing potential wages for non-employed individuals who had
a propensity score lower than the lowest propensity score estimated for any employed
individual in the same sample. Tables 5.5 and 5.6 show the numbers of individuals in
each sample for whom imputations were made and not made. Very few imputations
failed because of the common support restriction. In appendix 4.3, figures 5.11 and
5.12 show the overlap in the distributions of propensity scores for those in and out
of employment at each sample. They also show that the observed differences between
those in and out of work are greatest amongst women at younger ages.
Another issue is how well matching on the propensity score manages to balance the
distributions of actual variables across the groups in and out of work. In appendix
4.3, tables summarise differences in specific variables between the group with imputed
potential wages (including those out of work, self-employees and employees with missing
11This is different from the application of propensity score matching to research questions in which
differences in outcomes between smaller sub-samples of very similar matched individuals are of interest.
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Table 5.5: Numbers of observed and imputed cases for women in each sample
1946 cohort 1958 cohort 1970 cohort
Age at survey 26 31 43 23 33 42 26 30 34
Observed wage 739 630 1,129 3,400 3,078 3,999 3,237 3,894 2,986
Imputed potential wage, 969 878 299 2,518 2,655 1,769 1,202 1,804 2,031
of which
Not employed 845 684 183 1,947 1,816 1,207 802 1,459 1,280
Self-employed 50 70 88 87 385 426 152 261 300
Employed, missing wage 74 124 25 449 439 135 248 83 451
No imputation, of which 152 139 155 338 52 9 396 68 8
No support 41 3 4 86 2 3 11 46 1
Missing covariates 101 136 151 252 50 6 385 22 7
Total* 1,860 1,647 1,583 6,256 5,785 5,777 4,835 5,766 5,025
Table 5.6: Numbers of observed and imputed cases for men in each sample
1946 cohort 1958 cohort 1970 cohort
Age at survey 26 31 43 23 33 42 26 30 34
Observed wage 1,463 1,184 1,105 4,084 3,697 3,959 2,779 4,167 3,270
Imputed potential wage, 356 408 363 1,752 1,816 1,622 972 1,147 1,319
of which
Not employed 74 60 51 788 503 507 385 451 319
Self-employed 163 189 285 304 865 992 333 605 658
Employed, missing wage 119 159 27 619 436 121 254 89 342
No imputation, of which 78 69 124 356 69 24 312 383 20
No support 18 3 16 69 12 9 4 75 13
Missing covariates 60 66 108 344 57 15 308 47 7
Total* 1,897 1,661 1,592 6,249 5,582 5,605 4,063 5,436 4,609
*This total includes nearly all of those who responded to the survey, excluding only those individuals
who responded but did not report their current main economic activity.
wages) and the group of employees who form the group of matched wage donors. These
show non-significant differences for all the male samples, but significant variables for
women across selected variables. Appendix 4.3 also gives more information on the
effectiveness of propensity scores generated by a pooled probit model (discriminating
between employees with observed wages, on the one hand, and all other groups without
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observed wages, on the other) in discriminating between employees and the different
missing-wage groups, as opposed to a set of separate probit models. The conclusion is
that the pooled model is adequate.
5.3.4 Signs of unobserved selectivity bias
Three data exercises were used to investigate possible unobserved selectivity biases.
First, the estimated coefficients on variables in the probit models (Table 5.3) were com-
pared to a set of coefficients on the same variables in log-linear wage models estimated
by least squares (not shown). For the 1958 and 1970 cohorts, gthere were signs of
positive selection for women in their thirties and forties. Having young children was a
positive predictor both of being out of work at these ages and of having higher wages
when in work. This result is suggestive of either: positive selection into motherhood
at older ages, which would not affect our wage imputations; or, positive selection into
work amongst older mothers, which would result in an upward bias in imputed potential
wages for these samples.
A second exercise was to compare the means of each characteristic used in the
probit models across the matched samples. We found that the means were generally
not significantly different across the matched samples, with some important exceptions.
For the 1946 cohort at age 26 and for the 1958 cohort at age 23, working women as a
whole group had higher levels of education and higher average maths scores than non-
working women. In contrast, the matched working samples had fewer qualifications and
significantly lower scores than the matched non-working samples. This pattern suggests
negative selection into work amongst mothers at these ages, not adequately accounted
for by the matching exercise. For the 1946 cohort, within the group of mothers with
young children, it was less educated mothers 21 who had given birth slightly earlier and
were more likely to have returned to work by the age of 26. Imputed wage offers for these
non-working groups may consequently be biased downwards. The size of this downward
bias is likely to be small and our estimated trends appear to be robust to alternative
specifications, e.g. imputing the predicted wage from a log-linear wage model.
A third investigation was carried out for women in the 1958 cohort only, using
additional information collected about their weekly wage in their first job after leaving
full-time education, requested at the age 23 survey. For the 281 women who provided
this information, there was a difference in mean log first wage across the unmatched
working and non-working samples, which was marginally significant (at the 10% level),
supporting the view that observed selection biases show up slightly in the first wage.
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In contrast, there was no difference in mean log first wage across the matched working
and non-working samples, suggesting that the matching successfully removed any fixed,
unobserved biases that appear in the first wage. Positive selectivity biases associated
with job search intensity or with having a better potential employer would not show up
in the tests carried out.
Gronau’s (1974) observation that similar individuals face a range of wage offers, and
that the better wage offers are more likely to be accepted, would further imply that
the imputed wage offers in our analysis overstate the actual wage offers faced by non-
working individuals. Without exclusion restrictions, it is not possible to quantify the
likely size of such biases, although the evidence in the literature (discussed in chapter
3) suggests that these are likely to be small relative to those captured by differences in
education and work experience.
5.3.5 Description of potential wage distributions
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 show median values for employees with observed wages at each
survey and for the group with imputed potential wages, plus a breakdown for the
different imputation groups. For women, in the majority of surveys, those who are
out of work have much lower median potential wages than those in work and it is the
imputed values for non-employees which drag down the median for the whole imputed
group. Self-employees and employees with missing wages do not have systematically
lower wages in the majority of surveys and, at any rate, comprise only a small fraction
of imputed cases (see table 5.5).
Table 5.7: Median observed wages and imputed potential wages for women, by survey
(£, 2000 prices)
1946 cohort 1958 cohort 1970 cohort
Age at survey 26 31 43 23 33 42 26 30 34
Observed wage 4.06 3.95 5.07 4.76 6.26 6.51 6.33 7.10 7.83
Imputed potential wage, 3.33* 3.74* 4.69 3.92* 5.00* 5.55* 5.71* 5.30* 6.32*
of which
Not employed 3.33 3.71 4.35 3.84 4.73 5.34 5.43 5.13 5.38
Self-employed 4.23 3.63 5.14 4.37 5.74 6.38 6.46 6.66 7.47
Employed, missing wage 3.84 3.94 5.87 4.85 6.14 5.54 6.44 6.39 7.66
*Difference from median observed wage is statistically significant at the 5% level.
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For men, the imputed potential wages of those not in work are also systematically
lower than the wages of men in work at most of the surveys. However, in the majority
of the surveys, these comprise a small number of the imputed cases, relative to the
number of imputations for male self-employees and missing wage cases (see table 5.6).
As a consequence, the median potential wage for the whole imputed group of men is
systematically lower than the median wage for employed men (with observed wages) in
around half of the surveys (table 5.8).
Table 5.8: Median observed wages and imputed potential wages for men, by survey (£,
2000 prices)
1946 cohort 1958 cohort 1970 cohort
Age at survey 26 31 43 23 33 42 26 30 34
Observed wage 5.94 6.29 8.50 5.69 8.96 9.70 7.06 8.21 9.72
Imputed potential wage, 5.40* 6.47 8.53 5.61 8.11* 8.39* 6.90 7.24* 8.69*
of which
Not employed 4.79 6.01 8.19 5.50 7.10 7.02 6.96 6.76 7.05
Self-employed 5.43 6.43 9.30 5.77 8.31 9.10 6.61 7.72 9.57
Employed, missing wage 5.42 6.82 7.73 5.66 8.52 8.94 7.02 7.17 9.04
*Difference from median observed wage is statistically significant at the 5% level.
Figure 5.5 compares the median observed wage for women employees to the es-
timated median potential wage for non-employed women and the median for the full
sample, including employees, non-employees and self-employees. Medians are not shown
separately for self-employees. Figure 5.9 in appendix 5.1 shows wage distributions for
employees and potential wage distributions for the whole samples.
For women in their twenties and thirties, the size of the difference between the
median imputed potential wage for non-employees and median observed wage for em-
ployees has increased across the three cohorts (Figure 5.5). The increase in the strength
of the selection effect may be owing to the widening of the wage distribution over this
period, as well as to increasing differences in the social and educational characteristics
of employed and non-employed women. However, the aggregate effect of selectivity bias
has reduced across the cohorts, as the fraction of women out of work has decreased.
This effect shows up as a decreasing gap between the median observed wage for the
employed population and the median potential wage for the whole population.
The error bars (representing the 95% confidence intervals) in figure 5.5 show that
the medians calculated from the full distributions are systematically lower than the
139
median observed wage for the 1946 cohort at age 26, for the 1958 cohort at ages 23 and
33 and for the 1970 cohort at ages 30 and 34. These ages cover the average childbearing
years for women in each of the cohorts, and at least a fifth of women in each of these
surveys describe themselves as being full-time housewives or carers (see table 5.1.)
Figure 5.5: Medians of (1) observed wages for employees (2) potential wages for non-
employees (3) observed wages and imputed potential wages (employees, self-employees
and non-employees), women
Only a small fraction of men were not employed for some period, although the
potential wages of the non-employed minority are significantly lower than those of em-
ployees for men in the 1958 and 1970 cohorts in their thirties and forties (Figure 5.6).
Owing to the small fraction out of work, the median potential wage for the whole male
population is not significantly different from the median observed wage for employees
at any of the surveys.
5.3.6 Estimates of women’s and men’s relative pay opportunities
Figure 5.7 compares estimates of the ratio of women’s to men’s median actual hourly
pay at each survey with estimates of their relative median pay opportunity, including
observed and imputed values. The error bars on the points (the 95% confidence inter-
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Figure 5.6: Medians of (1) observed wages for employees (2) potential wages for non-
employees (3) observed wages and imputed potential wages (employees, self-employees
and non-employees), men
vals) are non-overlapping for the 1946 cohort at age 26, for the 1958 cohort at age 23
and, marginally, for the 1970 cohort at age 30.12
Taking the trends for women and men together, women’s relative wage opportunities
have improved across the three cohorts, moving in the same direction as observed wage
trends (figure 5.8). However, the increase in younger women’s wage opportunities is
greater than the observed increase in wages for this group. In particular, the ratio of
women’s to men’s median potential wages is substantially and significantly lower than
the observed wage ratio for the 1946 cohort at age 26 (figure 5.7), when only half of
women were in work.
There is also weak evidence in the 1970 cohort that women’s selective withdrawal
and re-entry into the workforce around childbearing years conceals some of the decline in
women’s labour market position after childbirth. Between the ages of 26 and 30, around
a fifth of women in the cohort had a first baby (Figure 5.2). The proportion of women
in work fell from around 78% to around 74% (Figure 5.1) and the estimated potential
12The error bar on the difference in the ratios includes zero for the 1970 cohort sample.
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Figure 5.7: Female to male ratios for observed median wages and for observed-plus-
imputed median potential wages, by survey
wage gap between employed and non-employed women increased (Figure 5.5). Median
hourly wages for working women decreased from 89.7% of mens to 86.5% of men’s
between these ages. Median potential wages for all women decreased more though,
from 89.2% to 81.7% (figure 5.8).
5.4 Discussion
Women’s position in the labour market has changed dramatically across the three birth
cohorts, with a simultaneous increase in their rates of employment and in their rates
of pay, relative to men’s. For example, comparing the cohorts when in their early
thirties: for the 1946 cohort, women’s median hourly wage was around 60 per cent of
men’s; for the 1958 cohort, the ratio had increased to 70 per cent; and for the 1970
cohort, the ratio had increased again to 80 per cent. Across the same surveys, women’s
rates of employment increased from just over half for the 1946 cohort, to three-quarters
for the 1970 cohort. In contrast, men’s employment rates decreased slightly, though
they remained high (over 90% for men in their thirties). The cross-cohort change is
even more marked when comparing the cohorts in their twenties, but less marked when
comparing the 1946 and 1958 cohorts in their forties.
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Figure 5.8: Trends in women’s median observed pay and median pay opportunities
(observed plus imputed potential pay), relative to men’s
The analysis presented in this chapter tackled the problem of how to assess changes
in women’s and men’s underlying pay opportunities, in light of the simultaneous and
interdependent changes in women’s earnings and employment rates. The approach
taken was to impute potential wages for individuals not in work. These were imputed
using the assumption that the potential wage of each individual not in work would be
equal to the actual wage of an individual who was in work, of the same gender, cohort
and age and who had similar social, educational and family characteristics and a similar
employment history up to that point. The results of this exercise suggest a cross-cohort
improvement in women’s pay opportunities, relative to men’s, even greater than the
improvement in the relative pay of working women.
The methods used to take into account the potential wages of non-employees, and
the assumptions upon which they are based, are important. The method here was based
on the assumption of ‘selection on observables’, working on the basis that unobserved
differences between observably-similar individuals in and not in work are negligible.
Some additional work was done to investigate the validity of this assumption for the
samples used. The evidence was mixed, with some evidence supporting the assumption
of selection on observables, some evidence of possible negative selection into employment
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amongst women in the two earlier cohorts when in their twenties, and some evidence of
possible positive selection into employment for the later cohorts when in their thirties
and forties. It is possible that unobserved selection effects could offset some of the
observed selection effects that are picked up, which show the reverse trend i.e. negative
for the 1946 and 1958 cohort at younger ages and neutral at older ages. In light of this
evidence, the effects of accounting for employment selection may be overstated in the
imputed data. However, the unobserved selectivity bias would have to be very strong
to undermine the main finding of a cross-cohort improvement in women’s relative pay
opportunities.
The broad picture here is of an improvement in women’s position in the labour
market in Britain since the 1970s, including an improvement in their underlying pay
opportunities relative to men’s. The next chapter turns to the question of the unequal
remuneration of women’s and men’s skills in the labour market, focusing on a narrower
concept of labour market inequality and the measurement issues involved in quantifying
this. Chapter 7 analyses the same cohort samples that have been used in this chapter,
focusing on differences in the pay of women and men with similar levels of education
and employment experience.
144
Appendix 5: Figures
Figure 5.9: Observed and observed-plus-imputed potential wage distributions for
women, by survey
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Figure 5.10: Observed and observed-plus-imputed potential wage distributions for men,
by survey
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Figure 5.11: Distribution of propensity scores for female employees (with observed wage)
and female non-employees (plus self-employees and employees with a missing wage) at
each sample
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Figure 5.12: Distribution of propensity scores for male employees (with observed wage)
and male non-employees (plus self-employees and employees with a missing wage) at
each sample
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Chapter 6
Methodological literature II:
Measuring unequal treatment in
the labour market
This chapter is concerned with the measurement of unequal treatment of women and
men in the labour market.1 The concept of unequal treatment here is from the con-
ventional economic literature, which defines this in terms of differences in the pay (or
other treatment) of equally productive individuals. Applied to the question of gender
inequality, the implication is that differences in women’s and men’s pay stem partly
from unequal treatment and partly from decisions about education, work and family
life that contribute to gender differences in productivity. The labour market theories
that form the basis for this view of inequality were surveyed in chapter 2. This chapter
focuses on the measurement problems associated with quantifying unequal treatment
and productivity.
The first part of the chapter sets out the standard decomposition method for mea-
suring discrimination (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973). The fraction of the gender pay
gap associated with systematic gender differences in productive characteristics is at-
tributed to productivity differences. The unexplained fraction, associated with gender
differences in the wage returns to those characteristics, is attributed to discrimination.
Semi-parametric methods which directly compare the pay of matched sub-groups of
1The terms ‘unequal treatment’ and ‘discrimination’ are used interchangeably in this chapter. The
term ‘unequal treatment’ is useful because it is not associated with specific forms of discrimination e.g.
those set out in legislation.
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women and men are described and briefly compared to traditional parametric methods.
The second part of the chapter focuses on some of the problems with measuring
productivity and the associated biases in the estimated effects of discrimination on
pay. The latter depend critically upon the individual characteristics that are selected
as measures of productivity. These contribute, directly in the decomposition model
and implicitly in the matching model, to the explained fraction of the pay gap. It is
standard in these models to use educational attainment and length of time in employ-
ment as measures of individual productivity. Measurement problems arise from the
potential correlation of employment experience with other, discriminatory, influences
on pay, such as negative signalling associated with taking career breaks. Further, the
interdependence (endogeneity) of higher earnings and employment decisions leads to
possible biases in the estimated wage returns to experience. Different ways of incor-
porating estimated selectivity biases into estimates of unequal treatment depend upon
different assumptions about the relationship between unobserved influences on wages
and productivity. Different methods for estimating trends in unequal treatment also
depend upon the assumed relationship between observed individual characteristics and
underlying individual productivity and how to compare like with like over time.
The third part of the chapter briefly discusses cumulative, feedback effects of dis-
crimination over the life-cycle. This is the idea that discrimination experienced at a
certain point in the life-cycle, e.g. women at younger ages, may be masked by its ef-
fects on subsequent employment decisions and productivity, such that gender pay gaps
later in life are wholly accounted for. The final part of the chapter summarises existing
estimates of unequal treatment of women and men in the British labour market over
the last four decades, drawing attention to the measurement strategies used.
6.1 Methods for quantifying discrimination
6.1.1 The standard decomposition method
The statistical decomposition of gender pay gaps into productivity-related and discrim-
inatory elements is common in the empirical measurement of pay discrimination. This
is based on a method proposed by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973).
Oaxaca (1973) originally proposed the method to quantify Becker’s market discrim-
ination coefficient i.e. ‘the percentage wage differential between two types of perfectly
substitutable labor’. In line with Becker’s theory, Oaxaca identified ‘culture, tradition
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and overt discrimination’ as factors which restrict women’s participation in paid work.
Where the two groups are not perfect substitutes, the discrimination coefficient can be
generalised as the difference between the observed wage ratio and the hypothetical wage
ratio that would exist in the absence of discrimination:
D =
E(wm/wf )− E(wcm/wcf )
E(wcm/w
c
f )
(6.1)
where E(wm/wf ) is the expected value of observed ratio of men’s to women’s wages
(typically the ratio of mean wages) and E(wcm/w
c
f ) is the expected value of the hy-
pothetical non-discriminatory male to female wage ratio. In a competitive frictionless
labour market, the non-discriminatory ratio would be equal to the expected ratio of
male to female marginal products E(mpm/mpf ). Equation 6.1 can also be written
D = [E(wm/wf )/E(w
c
m/w
c
f )]− 1
The essence of the decomposition approach is to estimate wage equations separately
for women and men and to rearrange the difference in mean log wages into two terms;
the first relating to differences in women’s and men’s characteristics (for some fixed set of
prices) and the second relating to differences in the wage returns to those characteristics
(for some fixed set of characteristics). The second of these terms forms the basis for an
estimate of the discrimination coefficient, D.
The wage equations, estimated separately for women and men, have the log-linear
forms:
ln(wf ) = X
′
fβf + uf (6.2)
for men; and
ln(wm) = X
′
mβm + um (6.3)
for women.
w is the hourly wage, X is a vector of individual characteristics, β is a vector of
coefficients and u is an individual error term. The expected log wage for women is
E[ln(wf )] = X¯
′
fβf and for men, it is E[ln(wm)] = X¯
′
mβm.
Using the properties of natural logarithms, the discrimination coefficient, D, can be
written as:
ln(D + 1) = (E[ln(wm)]− E[ln(wf )])− (E[ln(wcm)]− E[ln(wcf )]) (6.4)
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2If men’s wage structure, represented in coefficients in βm, were taken to be the
hypothetical non-discriminatory wage-structure (βc), this would imply that men’s wages
would not change with a shift to a hypothetical, non-discriminatory labour market. In
equation 6.4, E[ln(wm)] = E[ln(w
c
m)], so these two terms drop out of the equation. For
women, their expected wage in a non-discriminatory labour market would be given by
E[ln(wcf )] = X¯
′
fβm. Their expected actual wage would be E[ln(wf )] = X¯
′
fβf . Equation
6.4 can be re-written as:
ln(D + 1) = X¯ ′fβm − X¯ ′fβf (6.5)
.
A different route to the same result is to rearrange the raw log differential into two
terms:
E(ln(wm)− ln(wf )) = βm(X¯m − X¯f )︸ ︷︷ ︸
explained
+ X¯ ′f (βm − βf )︸ ︷︷ ︸
unexplained
(6.6)
where the second term is the part of the log wage differential that is not accounted
for by differences in men’s and women’s characteristics. This is equal to ln(D + 1) in
6.5.
Alternatively, if women’s wage structure were assumed to be the non-discriminatory
wage structure, represented in coefficients in βf , we would get:
ln(D + 1) = X¯ ′mβm − X¯ ′mβf (6.7)
Oaxaca (1973) estimated D using both expressions, on the basis that the non-
discriminatory wage structure βc would lie somewhere in between men’s and women’s
observed wage structures, βm and βf . Cotton (1988) and Neumark (1988) suggested
measures based on alternative hypothetical non-discriminatory wage structures, which
lie somewhere in between the actual male and female wage structures. Oaxaca and
Ransom (1994) pointed out that the different decompositions based on different assumed
non-discriminatory wage structures can be represented as choices between different
weighting matrices Ω in:
2In a finite sample, the arithmetic mean of the log wage is equivalent to the geometric mean of the
actual wage.
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βc = Ωβm + (I − Ω)βf (6.8)
where βc is a vector of coefficients representing the non-discriminatory wage struc-
ture and I is an identity matrix, such that βc = βm when Ω = I. This gives the general
form for the decomposition:
ln(D + 1) = X¯ ′m(βm − βc) + X¯ ′f (βc − βf ) (6.9)
.
6.1.2 Semi-parametric methods
If the relationships between wages and characteristics are very non-linear, the wage
structure for a group may not be adequately described by the log-linear wage equations
( in equations 6.2 and 6.3). The general, non-parametric wage function can instead be
written:
w = F (X, g, u) (6.10)
where F (.) is some unspecified function and g indicates gender.
Semi-parametric methods for analysing differences in outcomes between groups are
based around the idea of matching and weighting samples to compare groups with
similar distributions of characteristics in X. This method can be used to get a direct
estimate of the percentage wage differential for groups of women and men with similar
distributions of characteristics:
D = E[(wm/wf )|X)]− 1 (6.11)
where X represents a fixed distribution of characteristics such that E[(wcm/w
c
f )|X] =
1.
Matching groups using the propensity score (discussed in chapter 4, section 4.2.2
and chapter 3, section 3.2.1) implies that equation 6.11 can be estimated as:
D = E[(wm/wf )|p)]− 1 (6.12)
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where p is the propensity score, which in this application reduces X to a scalar that
weights the characteristics in X according to how strongly they differ across women
and men.
The choice of which set of characteristics X to use to compare the pay of groups
of women and men matters if unequal treatment varies across the distribution(s) of
X. Comparing women’s average pay to that of a weighted or sub-sample of men with
the same characteristics (Xf ) implies that it is men’s wages that would not change if
the labour market were non-discriminatory. This is equivalent to the estimate given
by the decomposition given in equation 6.5. The choice of X in the matching model is
equivalent to the selection of βc in the decomposition model.
Angrist and Pischke (2009) have argued that parametric regression methods can
be viewed as a particular form of weighting estimator and that differences in results
from matching and regression models are unlikely, on their own, to be of empirical
importance. They have also pointed out that extrapolation across cells is involved in
both matching and regression methods3 and that both require some form of practical
compromise in the exercise of comparing like-with-like.
6.2 Measuring productivity
The main difficulty with trying to measure the difference in pay for equally productive
individuals is that we can’t directly measure individual productivity. Individual labour
productivity can be defined broadly as the economic value of the contribution that an
individual makes (or is able to make) toward the production of some good or service.
In the conventional economic analysis of discrimination, it is typically differences in the
pay of equally productive individuals that is the focus of analysis, rather than differences
in the pay of individuals working in jobs that require the same level of skill. This is
because most theories of discrimination encompass barriers to access to certain jobs and
levels of seniority for discriminated-against groups, implying under-use of their skills
(see chapter 2, section 2.2).
3In matching methods, extrapolation may be from very sparsely populated cells i.e. predicted
counterfactual outcomes for one group may be based on actual outcomes for a very few individuals in
the matched group.
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6.2.1 Selection of variables to measure individual productivity
In his original paper, Oaxaca (1973) pointed out that a theoretical stance was implied
in the selection of characteristics used to measure productivity:
It is clear that the magnitude of the estimated effects of discrimination cru-
cially depends upon the choice of control variables for the wage regressions.
A researcher’s choice of control variables implicitly reveals his or her atti-
tude toward what constitutes discrimination in the labor market. If it were
possible to control for virtually all sources of variation in wages, one could
pretty well eliminate labor market discrimination as a significant factor in
determining wage differentials by sex (or race)... The result is that whatever
the wage differential observed, it is completely justified on the grounds of
alleged productivity differences. The other extreme is to control for virtu-
ally nothing and thereby minimize the role of productivity differences. This
is tantamount to declaring at the outset that the two labor inputs are near
perfect substitutes and therefore attributing virtually all of the observed
wage differential to labor market discrimination.
The decomposition method proposed by Oaxaca (1973) was originally presented
as a way of measuring Becker’s market discrimination coefficient. In contrast, empir-
ical applications of this method have explicitly viewed labour market discrimination
as a broader, mixed phenomenon, including monopsonistic behaviour and statistical
discrimination by employers (see for example Joshi and Paci, 1998 on gender discrimi-
nation and Ermisch and Wright, 1993 on the lower pay of part-time employees). Which
of these models of discrimination is assumed to be the right one affects the choice of
control variables.
The starting point for most empirical studies is Mincer’s specification of the log wage
equation, in which the log wages are modeled as a linear function of years in formal
education and years of employment experience, plus a quadratic of the experience term.
These covariates are treated as measures of human capital, that are presumed to affect
individual productivity and, via productivity, individual wages.
ln(w) = β0 + β1educ + β2exp + β3exp
2 + u (6.13)
Mincer and Ofek (1982) proposed a slightly different specification for women, sepa-
rately modelling periods in and out of employment, which are interpreted as periods of
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investment in and depreciation of human capital respectively:
ln(w) = β0 + β1educ + β2exp0 + β3exp1 + β4home0 + β5home1 + u (6.14)
where exp0 represents past experience (prior to the most recent spell of non-participation),
exp1 represents recent experience, home0 represents past non-participation (prior to the
most recent spell in work) and home1 represents years of non-participation since the
most recent spell in employment. Positive values for exp1 and home1 will not occur for
the same observation.
Measures of occupational status and group have been included in many empirical
studies of the gender pay gap (e.g. Anderson et al., 2001). In many countries, women
and men remain quite segregated in the labour market and rates of pay tend to be
lower in female-dominated occupations. The argument for including occupational mea-
sures in decomposition models to measure unequal treatment is that the segregation of
women and men into different occupations, and the related differences in pay, are non-
discriminatory. Under this view, women choose occupations that are lower-paid, but
which are also less demanding and which offer more flexibility, enabling a combination
of childcare and paid work. The alternative point of view is that women are segregated
into different occupations partly through discriminatory barriers to entry into certain
fields of work and to promotions within a particular field. Further, lower rates of pay in
female-dominated occupations may be viewed as the outcome either of the oversupply
of women’s labour and/or of monopsonistic behaviour by employers. If occupation is
viewed as an outcome of labour market discrimination rather than individual choice or
productivity, it does not belong in the regression or matching model. More generally,
it can be thought of as ‘bad control’ that is itself an outcome of the phenomenon being
investigated (see Angrist and Pischke, 2009, chapter 3, section 3.2.3).
6.2.2 The relationship between earnings and employment experience
The empirical evidence on experience-earnings profiles for the US and the UK suggest
that the simple specifications proposed by Mincer and Polachek (1974) and Mincer and
Ofek (1982) do not fully capture the variation in this relationship (Murphy, 1993;Man-
ning, 2000; Robinson, 2003a). There is considerable evidence on the long-term ‘scarring’
effects of unemployment on future earnings and job prospects, including for members of
the 1958 cohort (Arulampalam, 2001; Gregory and Jukes (2001); Gregg (2001)). Using
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data from the British Household Panel Study (1991-1996), Swaffield (2007) found that
the negative effects of periods out of employment differ by type of activity.
It is standard to include years of employment experience and job tenure as mea-
sures of productivity in wage equations. The basis for doing so is that individuals
enhance their general human capital through years spent in employment and develop
their specific skills through years spent in the same job. The positive associations be-
tween employment experience and length of time in the same job, on the one hand, and
wages, on the other, are typically interpreted in this light. However, this interpretation
has been challenged and alternative interpretations have been offered, focusing on the
role of job search and asymmetric information in the labour market.
An alternative interpretation to the human capital model, arising from a monop-
sonistic/job search view of the labour market, is that the observed correlation between
employment experience and earnings is not primarily through the effects of experience
on productivity, but via job mobility. Years spent in employment are correlated with
job mobility, and it is the effects of job mobility on earnings that is picked up in the wage
model (e.g. see Manning, 2000 or Manning, 2003, chapter 6). On this view, the longer
the time spent in and out of the labour market overall, the greater the opportunities
to invest time in searching for a good job and the greater the likelihood of receiving a
good wage offer. Further, where a good match is achieved, a person is likely to stay in
the job, also giving rise to a positive association between earnings and job tenure.
Manning (2003) has drawn attention to empirical evidence that is not consistent with
a straightforward human capital interpretation of earnings-experience profiles. Using
data for the US Current Population Study (CPS), he found that earnings losses associ-
ated with involuntary job loss are greater for those who have been in employment for
longer, holding fixed the time spent in the same job. He pointed out that this pattern
of earnings losses is not consistent with a human capital interpretation, since the wage
returns to general human capital should not be affected by job loss. Focusing on the
gender gap in pay, Manning (2003) further pointed out that the wage returns to job
tenure are higher for women than for men. He argued that this pattern is again not
consistent with a simple model of returns to firm-specific training.
A third interpretation of the relationship between earnings and employment expe-
rience draws on the idea of asymmetric information in the labour market. Under this
interpretation, employers use positive and negative signals when making decisions about
employment and wage offers. Unemployment and periods out of the labour market may
be treated as negative signals about an individual’s likely productivity and work com-
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mitment. Albrecht et al. (1999) used Swedish panel data to re-examine the relationship
between career interruptions and subsequent earnings. Using fixed-effects estimation to
allow for unobserved differences across individuals, they found that the negative effects
of parental leave and household time on wages are significantly larger for men than for
women.4 The authors estimated a 6 per cent annual loss of earnings for men taking
parental leave, compared to a 2 per cent annual loss for women.5 The authors argued
that the larger negative effect on men’s (vs women’s) earnings from taking time out of
work to raise children was more consistent with a signaling model than with a human
capital model.
For Britain, estimated female returns to experience are found to be lower for part-
time vs full-time employment (Robinson, 2003a; Swaffield, 2007). Using longitudinal
data from the New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset (NESPD), Connolly and Gregory
(2009) have also drawn attention to the long-term negative effects on earnings of periods
in part-time work. They pointed out that moving from full-time into part-time work
may represent a permanent decline in individuals’ work commitment and productivity
or may be wrongly interpreted by employers as signalling such a decline. Either way,
the result would be a relative loss of earnings associated with the change. Ermisch
and Wright (1993) estimated wage functions for women in full-time and part-time jobs
using data from the 1980 Women and Employment Survey. They found evidence that
part-timers receive lower wage offers than similarly qualified full-timers and argued that
the lower mobility of women in part-time jobs may also be part of the explanation.
The predictions about the effects of employment experience (and unemployment) on
future earnings offered by the different labour market theories are not very different. As
a consequence, it is difficult, on the basis of the empirical evidence, to choose between
them. If the search and/or signalling models are right (or partly right) though, this
implies that employment experience and job tenure are not just measuring productivity.
Further, the positive effects of job mobility on pay can be seen as a consequence of em-
ployers’ monopsonistic market power i.e. their ability to pay less mobile individuals less
than their economic value. From this point of view, gender differences in pay associated
with differences in job mobility could legitimately be considered to be discriminatory.
Similarly, employers’ less favourable treatment of potential employees who have been
out of work or who have spent long periods in part-time work, not in proportion to
4Unlike in other countries, the authors point out that Sweden has a well-established generous system
of 15 months statutory parental leave, which extends to fathers, with benefits set at 75 per cent of prior
earnings for most of the period.
5They also divided the analysis by public and private sector to check that the lower rate of earnings
loss for women was not related to women’s greater representation in the public sector.
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decreases in their skills or commitment, could also be viewed as discriminatory.
6.2.3 Interdependence (endogeneity) of earnings and employment ex-
perience
A further problem with treating the positive correlation between employment experience
and earnings as a measure of the wage returns to human capital is that the correlation
may also pick up the positive association between past and current earnings. Length
of time in employment is the outcome of past employment decisions. As discussed
in chapter 3, these decisions are responsive to potential earnings. As a result, the
partial correlation between employment experience and current earnings may pick up
the correlations between past and present earnings, as well as the direct causal effects
of employment experience on current pay. In this context, employment experience
is described as being endogenous in the wage equation and, as a consequence, the
estimated wage returns to experience are biased. The wage equation can be written:
ln(wt) = X
′
tβ + β1expt + β2ln(wt−1) + ut (6.15)
where expt is a measure of current employment experience (at time t), β1 is the true
wage return to employment experience and ln(wt−1) is the log of the past wage (at time
t− 1). If the past wage is omitted from the equation, the estimate of β1 will be biased.
The omitted variables bias formula in this model is:
Cov(wt, expt)
Var(expt)
= β1 + β2δ (6.16)
where δ is the coefficient from the regression of the past log wage ln(wt−1) on
experience expt. The size of the bias depends upon the strength of the serial correlation
between wages β2 and the strength of the partial correlation between past wages and
subsequent employment decisions (represented in δ).
A common finding across studies and countries is that men’s earnings are highly
correlated from one year to the next and also over longer periods, suggesting a significant
‘permanent’ element to life-time earnings, although with greater mobility at younger
ages (Atkinson et al., 1992). A similar form of bias may produce an inflated return
to time spent in a current job. Analysing longitudinal data from the BHPS (1992-98)
the US PSID (1985-97) and the US NLSY (1980-94), Manning (2003) found evidence
of substantial ‘stayer bias’ likely to pollute estimates of the wage returns to job tenure
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using cross-sectional data. This bias arises in a similar way, from the fact that employees
in higher paid jobs are more likely to stay in those jobs. This is consistent with a job
search model, in which employees in the better paid jobs are less likely to get higher
outside wage offers.
6.2.4 Alternative interpretations of selectivity bias
Similar to the problem of the bias arising from omitted past wages in the wage equation,
Heckman (1979) modeled selectivity bias related to non-random employment participa-
tion as an omitted variables problem. The two-step method he proposed for estimating
selectivity bias was outlined in the appendix to chapter 3. The equation of interest here
is:
ln(wo) = X ′β + θλ+ u (6.17)
where λ is the selection term and θ is the coefficient on the selection term (θ =
ρuvσu). This indicates the size and significance of the selectivity bias i.e. the partial
correlation between the wage offer and the participation decision. The way in which
this term is incorporated into the estimate of unequal treatment depends upon the
theoretical stance taken about the source and nature of the selectivity bias.
Neuman and Oaxaca (2004) propose three alternative decompositions that incorpo-
rate the selection term in different ways, based on three alternative assumptions about
the nature of the selectivity bias. The first approach is to remain neutral about the
sources of selectivity bias and to net out the gender differential in log pay associated
with selectivity bias as a separate term.
A second approach is to interpret the selection term as a measure of unobserved
differences in the individual work-orientation and motivation of participants and non-
participants that affect their pay. Under this interpretation, gender differences in the
value of the selection term (λm − λf ) contribute to the explained part of the gender
differential in log pay, whilst differences in the coefficients on the selection term in the
male and female wage equations (θm − θf ) contribute to the unexplained gap.
A third interpretation of the selection term is that it represents discriminatory dif-
ferences in wage offers for participants and non-participants. Under this interpretation,
differences in the value of the selection term and also in the coefficient on the selection
term in the wage equation would both be counted toward the unexplained part of the
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differential.
Dolton and Makepeace (1987b) discuss more fundamental problems with the eco-
nomic interpretation of the selection term. They point out that the coefficient on the
selection term only provides information about the relationship between participation
probabilities and wage levels for those individuals who are actually in paid work. It can
only be used to infer the expected wages of those not in paid work if it is assumed that
they share the same wage equation as individuals in paid work. If, instead, the structure
of employment opportunities, as well as the individual characteristics, of non-employees
is assumed to differ from those of employees, the interpretation is indeterminate.
6.2.5 Measuring change in unequal treatment over time
The analysis of change in unequal treatment over time compounds the measurement
problems already discussed and raises further questions about the relationship between
observed characteristics and underlying individual productivity. Work by Juhn et al.
(1993) on analysing changes in wage structures have inspired two different approaches
to the analysis of gender discrimination in pay.
Juhn et al. (1993) suggested a decomposition of changes in the wage structure into
three parts:
• first, the effects of changing observed characteristics for a fixed set of prices
(wages);
• second, the effect of changing prices (wages) for a fixed set of characteristics; and
• third, the effects of a changing dispersion of wages not captured in the price (wage)
structures for observed characteristics, but instead captured in the spread of the
residuals.
Juhn et al. (1993) explicitly interpreted the dispersion in wages, controlling from the
observable elements (the residual terms) as ‘a distribution of unobservable ability in the
population in conjunction with a current market value of this unobservable ability.’
Based on this framework, Dolton et al. (2002) proposed a decomposition of changes
in gender wage differentials. Using decomposition 6.5, the change in the estimated
discriminatory log differential, ∆d (where d = ln(D + 1)), across two time periods, 0
and 1 is:
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∆d = d1 − d0 = X¯f,1(βm,1 − βf,1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
d1
− X¯f,0(βm,0 − βf,0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
d0
(6.18)
Dolton et al. (2002) pointed out that the change in the log differential itself could be
rearranged into two terms. First, there is a change in women’s and men’s relative wage
structures, represented in the βs. Second, there is a change in the weighting of these
wage structures, resulting from any change in women’s mean characteristics over time.
Dolton et al. (2002) proposed a method to decompose the change in the discriminatory
log differential over time, rearranging equation 6.18 into two terms:
d1 − d0 = X¯f,0 ((βm,1 − βf,1)− (βm,0 − βf,0))︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆β
+ (X¯f,1 − X¯f,0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆X¯f
(βm,0 − βf,0) (6.19)
The term ∆β represents the change in coefficients over time, whilst the term ∆X¯f
represents the change in women’s average characteristics over time. The second term
affects the change in the unexplained differential through altering the weighting of
the coefficients (βm,0 − βf,0). Dolton et al. (2002) proposed that the change in the
unexplained log differential associated with the first of these terms, ∆β, should be
interpreted as the ‘pure’ change in discrimination.
Taking this approach a step further, the non-parametric equivalent to this method
would be to estimate the trend in gender differentials for some fixed set of characteristics
i.e. compare the relative pay of a sub-group or weighted sample with fixed characteristics
X¯f,0.
There are reasons to be cautious about this approach. First, if women’s character-
istics have changed over time (∆X¯f ) in such a way that a greater fraction of them have
characteristics which attract more equal treatment (e.g. say more educated women and
men were treated more equally), this still represents a reduction in unequal treatment
overall, which would not be captured in the term associated just with ∆β. Second,
general equilibrium effects are important here. It is not clear that it is a sensible
thought-experiment to abstract the wage returns (prices) for characteristics from the
composition (supply) of characteristics in the population.
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A second strand of research inspired by the work of Juhn et al. (1993) has focused
on disentangling the effects of a changing wage structure from the effects of changes
in characteristics and the wage returns to observed characteristics. Blau and Kahn
(2006a) and Harkness (1996) have examined the relationship between changes in the
wage distribution and trends in the gender pay gap, for the US and the UK respectively.
Blau and Kahn (2006a) adapted the framework proposed by Juhn et al. (1993) to analyse
changes in the gender differential in wages, where the male wage structure is used to
estimate the changes in characteristics and the changes in wage returns (prices) for those
characteristics over time, whilst the unexplained gender gap forms part of the residual
term. This approach is also rather problematic, since strong parametric assumptions
are required and the broad approach proposed by Juhn et al. (1993) has been criticised
on these grounds (Suen, 1997). Blau and Kahn (2001) and Harkness (1996) have also
used simpler methods to infer the effects of wage institutions and wage structures on
gender pay gaps (across countries as well as over time). There is, however, a question
as to whether gender discrimination effects can usefully be abstracted from changes in
wage structures and the ‘prices’ on characteristics that are distributed differently across
women and men.
6.3 Cumulative life-cycle effects of unequal treatment
A final problem with measurement strategies which compare the pay of women and
men with similar characteristics, at a given point in time, is that those characteristics
themselves may be the outcomes of discrimination earlier on in life. For example,
women with discriminatory lower wage offers at young ages may respond by reducing
their participation in the labour market (Gronau, 1988). In turn, time spent out of
the labour market may lower their productivity (leaving aside the measurement issues
discussed in section 6.2) and future pay. Oaxaca (1973) acknowledged this limitation
of the decomposition method for quantifying discrimination:
Another difficulty with the residual approach is that it does not take into
account the effects of the feedback from labor market discrimination on
male-female differences in the selected individual characteristics. The dif-
ferences could reflect the adaptation of women to the biases of the labor
market; yet under the residual approach all differences in the characteristics
contribute to a reduction of the wage differential attributable to discrimi-
nation. The problem becomes one of how much of the observed differences
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in individual characteristics would exist in the absence of discrimination.
These very difficult problems have not been dealt with in this study, but
they are clearly important in terms of policy prescriptions for narrowing the
male-female wage differential.
6.4 Estimates of unequal treatment in the British labour
market over four decades
A large number of studies have used decomposition methods to analyse gender dif-
ferentials in pay. Here, I summarise the empirical estimates from studies using British
national datasets over the last forty years. I consider the evidence on changes in unequal
treatment in the British labour market over time and changes in unequal treatment over
the life-cycle.
The results from ten studies are summarised in table 6.1. Comparing estimates from
surveys for different years over the period 1974-2000, the decrease in the raw gender
pay gap over time is clear. This also came out clearly from the evidence discussed in
chapter 3 (e.g. Blundell et al., 2007) and the cross-cohort trends presented in chapter
4.
Also apparent is a decrease in the unexplained log gap X¯f (βˆm − βˆf ) which is an
estimate of ln(D + 1). For example, comparing the estimate for the 1980 Women
and Employment Survey (Wright and Ermisch, 1991) to the estimate for the 1991
survey of the 1958 cohort (Joshi and Paci, 1998, table 5.5) for all women and men,
the unexplained log gap fell from 0.229 to 0.244. Looking at the trends for full-time
employees from General Household Survey cross-sections, Harkness (1996) estimated
an unexplained log differential of around 0.34 in 1974, falling to 0.24 in 1983 and again
to 0.20 in 1992-93.
From the results summarised in table 6.1, estimates of unequal treatment appear to
be sensitive to three related factors:
1. The estimate is sensitive to the inclusion of employment experience as a control
variable and is smaller when this is included (e.g. compare rows 3 and 6, 16 and
17 or rows 18 and 19 of table 6.1);
2. The estimate is sensitive to the inclusion of part-time employees in the sample
and tends to be larger if part-time employees are included (e.g. compare rows 9
and 10 or 16 and 18 of table 6.1); and
164
3. The estimates differ across different age groups and tend to be larger for older
employees (e.g. compare rows 13 and 20 for a comparison of same cohort at
different ages, or rows 20 and 21 for a comparison of different cohorts in same
year - table 6.1).
On the first of these issues, there is further evidence to suggest that gender dif-
ferences in employment experience are empirically important in accounting for gender
gaps in pay. Myck and Paull (2004) found that differences in average levels of expe-
rience across women and men accounted for nearly two-fifths of the difference in their
average hourly earnings in the UK (using cross-sectional data from the Family Expen-
diture Survey) and in the US (using cross-sectional data from the Current Population
Survey). Using labour market history data from the British Household Panel Study
over the period 1991-97, Swaffield (2007) compared a set of estimates that controlled
for potential years in the labour market to another set of estimates that controlled for
actual labour market participation. She found that gender differences in actual experi-
ence were a critical factor and reduced the unexplained pay gap by around 40 per cent
(see rows 18-21 of table 6.1)). Manning and Swaffield (2008) also found that gender
differences in employment experience contributed to around a quarter of the gender
difference in wage growth over the first ten years in the labour market after leaving
full-time education.
On the second of these issues, the smaller estimates of unequal treatment for full-
time employees is consistent with the evidence of lower returns to all characteristics
for part-time employees (Ermisch and Wright, 1993). It is also consistent with the
longitudinal evidence on decreases in relative pay associated with changes in employer
and occupation that often accompany a move from full-time to part-time working hours
(Connolly and Gregory, 2008; Connolly and Gregory, 2009).
On the third of these issues, the larger estimates of unequal treatment for older
employees are consistent with the more limited evidence on this. Joshi et al. (2007)
found that estimated unequal treatment increased across women and men from the 1958
cohort between the ages of 33 and 42, comparing the full-time working populations at
each age. They also estimated an increase in unequal treatment for the sub-sample of
women (989 women) who were working full-time at both ages.
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6.5 Discussion
This chapter has set out the conventional economic approach to quantifying discrimina-
tion in the labour market. The decomposition method proposed by Oaxaca (1973) and
Blinder (1973) is still widely used. This is based on a decomposition of the gender pay
gap into an explained fraction, which is associated with gender differences in observed
characteristics, and an unexplained fraction that is associated with gender differences
in the wage returns to those characteristics. Typically, the explained fraction is inter-
preted as the productivity-related pay gap and the unexplained fraction is interpreted
as the discriminatory pay gap.
The chapter has considered the linkages between alternative measurement strategies
and theoretical models of labour market discrimination. The critical issue of measuring
productivity has been discussed. The selection of individual characteristics to measure
productivity and to contribute to the explained (non-discriminatory) fraction of the pay
gap, and the theoretical stance implied by different selections, has been discussed. In
particular, from the perspective that job search and asymmetric information are impor-
tant factors in the labour market, the goodness of employment experience as a measure
of productivity within wage decompositions is debatable. The theoretical assumptions
that form the basis of other measurement decisions have also been discussed, including
decisions about how to estimate trends in unequal treatment over time.
The empirical evidence for Britain over the last four decades has been surveyed. The
results suggest a decrease in the unequal treatment of women and men in the British
labour market between 1974 and 2000. They also suggest variation in unequal treatment
by part-time status and age. Finally, the results confirm the empirical importance
of employment experience in accounting for a large part of the gender pay gap and,
consequently, the sensitivity of estimates of unequal treatment to different assumptions
about the goodness (or badness) of employment experience as a measure of individual
productivity.
The next chapter estimates trends in unequal treatment across the three birth co-
horts. Standard decomposition methods, and semi-parametric versions of these, are
used to estimate unequal treatment for the cross-sections of cohort members in employ-
ment at each of the surveys. No statistical methods have been used to try and directly
estimate and correct for bias arising from unobserved selectivity into employment or
from the likely endogeneity of employment experience. Instead, some investigation has
been carried out into these problems associated with comparing the pay of women and
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men with similar employment histories. Further, a second exercise exploits the longitu-
dinal aspect of the data to estimate within-cohort trends in pay for matched sub-samples
of women and men with similar qualifications and employment patterns. In comparing
across cohorts, early attempts to compare individuals with similar observed character-
istics were discarded on the basis that these were likely to be polluted by selectivity
bias and measurement error, apart from any theoretical concerns about the validity of
this comparison.
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Chapter 7
Analysis II: Trends in the
unequal treatment of women and
men in the labour market
This chapter investigates cross-cohort and life-cycle trends in the unequal treatment
of women and men in the labour market, using evidence on differences in pay not
accounted for by differences in qualifications and employment experience. There is a
large existing literature on this subject and the analysis presented here makes two main
contributions:
1. New estimates of unequal treatment add to the existing evidence for the cohort
studies (e.g. Joshi and Paci, 1998; Joshi et al., 2007). Data from the 1989 survey
of the 1946 cohort and the 2004 survey of the 1970 cohort have not previously
been used to investigate gender differentials in pay.
2. Life-cycle trends in the pay gap are explored for similarly-qualified women and
men using longitudinal samples of those employed and with an observed wage at
each survey. The earnings data have not previously been used longitudinally to
look at gender differentials. This contributes to the existing evidence on gender
gaps in wage growth over the life-cycle (e.g. Manning and Petrongolo, 2008;
Brewer and Paull, 2006).
The main results suggest that unequal treatment has reduced since the introduction of
anti-discrimination legislation in the 1970s, but had not disappeared for the youngest
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cohort by the age of 34 (in 2004). Further, unequal treatment increases over the life-
cycle for women who spend periods out of work and in part-time work to raise children,
even if they later return to full-time employment.
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section described trends in ed-
ucation, patterns of full-time and part-time working and employment experience across
the three cohorts. The second section presents a set of estimates of the unexplained
pay gap, after accounting for the impact of gender differences in education, experience,
length of job service, childhood maths and reading ability and region of residence. These
are estimated on cross-section samples of employees from each survey and add to the
estimates summarised in table 6.1 in the previous chapter. Variation in estimates across
samples of all employees and restricted samples of full-time employees are investigated.
The sensitivity of estimates to different weights and methods is also explored. The
third section investigates trends in the relative pay of similarly-qualified women and
men over the life-cycle, using the longitudinal aspect of the data. Wage trends are also
estimated for longitudinal samples of women who have worked full-time at each survey
age and for women who have not had children by the most recent survey, comparing
these to trends for men with similar qualifications.
7.1 Description of trends in education and employment
experience
Figure 7.1 shows the percentages of women and men with no or low qualifications (NVQ
level 1 or below), with O-level qualifications (NVQ level 2), A-level qualifications (NVQ
level 3) and diploma or degree-level qualifications (NVQ level 4 and above).1 The
percentages shown are based on the highest qualification attained by cohort members
by age 26 for the 1946 cohort, by age 33 for the 1958 cohort and by age 30 for the 1970
cohort. Percentages are estimated for the samples participating the the study at these
ages and the 1946 cohort figures are weighted to account for the stratification of the
sample.
Gender differences in educational attainment were marked for the 1946 cohort, but
had disappeared for the 1970 cohort by the time they had completed their education.
Also striking is the cross-generational increase in the proportion of both women and men
who gained formal qualifications of any kind and also in the proportion who gained a
1For the wage regression and probit model, the top category is split into two, with separate dummy
variables for holding a diploma-level and a degree-level qualifications. See chapter 4 for more details.
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diploma or degree-level qualification. For the 1946 cohort, nearly 60 per cent of women
and over half of men had no formal or low (below O-level) qualifications. Only 9 per
cent of women and a fifth of men had diploma or degree-level qualifications. For the
1970 cohort by age thirty, around a fifth of women and men had no or low qualifications,
whilst nearly a third of both women and men held diploma or degree-level qualifications.
Figure 7.1: Highest qualification attained, percentages by cohort and gender
Women’s attachment to the labour force also increased across the cohorts. Figure
7.2 shows the cross-cohort increase in the proportion of women in work when in their
twenties and thirties and also the increase in the proportion of women in full-time work
at these ages.
Despite the increase in women’s employment, there is a gender gap in experience in
each cohort. By their early thirties, a substantial gender gap in length of employment
experience had emerged for the 1970 cohort. The majority of men had near-continuous
employment records, whilst women had more diverse employment patterns. Table 7.1
shows the average number of years spent in work up to each survey age for women
and men in each of the three cohorts. For the 1946 cohort, these figures represent the
average number of years spent in paid employment since the age of twenty-five. This
limits comparisons with the two later cohorts, which cover the average number of years
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Figure 7.2: % women in full-time and part-time work, by age and cohort
in employment since the age of sixteen (see chapter 4 for a full discussion).
Table 7.1: Mean number of years in work (including self-employment) at each survey,
by cohort and gender
Total exp. Full-time exp. Part-time exp.
Women Men Diff. Women Men Diff. Women Men Diff.
1946 cohort
Age 31 3.4 5.8 -2.4 2.8 5.8 -3.0 0.6 - +0.6
Age 43 12.2 17.2 -5.0 7.7 17.1 -9.4 4.5 0.2 +4.3
1958 cohort
Age 23 4.7 5.5 -0.8 4.5 5.5 -1.0 0.1 - +0.1
Age 33 10.3 13.4 -3.1 8.9 13.4 -4.5 1.7 0.1 +1.6
Age 42 16.6 21.1 -4.5 12.1 20.9 -8.8 4.5 0.2 +4.3
1970 cohort
Age 26 5.7 5.1 +0.6 5.1 5.0 +0.1 0.5 0.1 +0.4
Age 30 9.3 10.6 -1.3 7.9 10.4 -2.5 1.3 0.2 +1.1
Age 34 12.5 14.6 -2.1 10.1 14.3 -4.2 2.5 0.3 +2.2
Part-time working has remained an important feature of women’s working careers
in each of the three cohorts. A substantial fraction of women’s employment experience
was gained in part-time jobs rather than in full-time jobs (table 7.1). The apparent
decrease in part-time working across the cohorts (figure 7.3) should be interpreted with
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some caution. The figure for the 1970 cohort by age 34 is unlikely to represent the
full, future role that part-time working will play in the working lives of this cohort. On
the other hand, the figure may also be slightly understated for the 1946 cohort, since
it misses out part-time working before the age of 25 (if this was followed by full-time
working from age 25 to 43).
Figure 7.3: % women who have worked part-time up to most recent survey (1)
(1) The most recent surveys used in the analysis are the 1989 survey of the 1946 cohort (age 43), the
2000 survey of the 1958 cohort (age 42) and the 2004 survey of the 1970 cohort (age 34).
Gender differences in job tenure (see tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4) follow a similar life-cycle
pattern to gender differences in employment experience. Employed women are likely to
have been in their current job for fewer years than employed men in each survey and
the gender difference increases with age. Unlike employment experience though, there
has not been a marked cross-cohort decrease in the gender gap in job tenure.
174
7.2 Estimates of unequal treatment for cross-section sam-
ples of employees
The effects of unequal labour market treatment of women and men on their relative
pay are quantified here as differences in log pay, not accounted for by differences in
qualifications and experience. This differential d = ln(wm) − ln(wf ) is an estimate of
ln(D + 1) (see chapter 6). The estimates of the unexplained gap have been left in
log form in order to permit comparisons with estimates of unequal treatment reviewed
in the last chapter. Note that gender comparisons based on the difference in mean
log wages (the exponent corresponds to the geometric mean of wages) differ slightly
from comparisons based on relative median wages, which were the focus of chapter 5).
However, the statistics are quite close and both place less weight on the extremes of the
distribution than arithmetic means.
This section presents estimates from samples of employees at each survey, using the
data in a cross-sectional rather than a longitudinal way. The effects of unequal treat-
ment on pay are estimated separately for the whole sample of employeees at each survey
and for restricted samples of full-time employees. The sensitivity of these estimates to:
1) the method used to estimate individual counterfactual non-discriminatory wages
(wage regression vs. propensity-score matching); and 2) differences in the reference
sample used to weight and aggregate these.
7.2.1 Methods and data
Standard decomposition methods and matching methods have been used to construct
alternative sets of counterfactual wages. In the standard decomposition method, the
counterfactual wage for each individual is their predicted wage from a log-linear wage
model estimated for the opposite sex. The predicted wage is intended to represent the
wage that they would be paid if their characteristics were remunerated at the same rate
as someone of the opposite sex.
For propensity score matching, the counterfactual wage for each individual is the ac-
tual observed wage of another individual of the opposite sex who has a similar propensity
score. The propensity score is a scalar representing gender differences in characteris-
tics, estimated from a probit model. Each characteristic is weighted in the score by
how strongly it discriminates between the female and male samples.2 For a detailed
2The values of individual covariates are multiplied by the marginal effect of these on the propensity
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description of propensity score matching, see chapter 5.
Both models were estimated using Stata. The Stata program ‘oaxaca’ (Jann, 2008)
was used to calculate standard errors associated with the decomposition estimates of
unexplained log gap in pay. The program ‘psmatch2’ (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003) was
used for propensity-score matching. For both sets of estimates, standard errors were
calculated analytically using the assumption that the regressors (covariates) are fixed.3
The sensitivity of estimates of unequal treatment to the reference sample selected
as the basis for comparison was explored. In the decomposition models, the different
estimates come from using different reference group means to weight gender differences
in wage model parameters. In the matching models, the different estimates come from
weighting observed individual wages to match the distribution of propensity scores in
the reference (treatment) group.4
Estimates for samples of all women and men employees were compared to those
for restricted samples of full-time employees only. For the employee samples, estimates
were adjusted for gender differences in length of employment experience, but not for
whether this experience was gained in full-time or part-time jobs. For the full-time
employee samples, the estimates were adjusted for differences in full-time and part-
time experience. Consequently, comparing across the employee and full-time employee
samples for the same set of weights (i.e. the same reference sample) gives an idea of the
combined effects of: a) differences in parameters in wage models for full-time women
vs. all employed women; and b) the importance of distinguishing the effects of full-time
experience and part-time experience on pay for women and men.
7.2.2 Cross-section samples
The data used for the analysis in this chapter come from the same samples used for
the analysis in chapter 5. The cross-section samples include all women and men who
responded to a given survey. The distribution of women and men across economic
activity categories at each survey were shown in tables 5.1 and 5.2 of chapter 5.
score (estimated by probit regression). Note that tables 7.7 show the probit coefficients, rather than
the marginal effect.
3Jann (2008) has pointed out that sthis assumption reduces the standard error less for the unex-
plained term (i.e. the estimate of unequal treatment which forms the focus of the present analysis)
than the explained component of the raw log differential.
4In the matching literature, this is referred to as the average treatment effect on the treated group
(ATT). Variation in estimates by across different reference samples (weightings) gives an idea of how
much unequal treatment of women and men varies by labour market position and skills.
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Table 7.2 shows the means of variables for the core samples. These samples include
all individuals who responded to a given survey, excluding only those for whom either
educational or employment experience variables were missing, or who had a missing
wage if they were employed.5 The change in the means of reading and maths scores
(taken at age 11) across the adult surveys is a useful indicator of the effects of at-
trition and survey non-response on sample representativeness. The small increase in
the average scores with age is evidence of a small deterioration of representativeness,
with higher attrition amongst individuals with low childhood ability scores. The higher
means for the 1996 survey of the 1970 cohort also signal the non-random response to
the postal survey conducted at this age. See chapter 4 for a full discussion of the effects
of survey non-response, attrition and missing data on sample representativeness.
Table 7.3 shows the means of these variables for the cross-section samples of em-
ployees at each survey. The difference between these and the sample means for the
whole samples (including non-employees) show the effects of non-random selection into
employment amongst women, which was explored in chapter 5.
Table 7.4 shows the means of the variables used for the cross-section samples of full-
time employees at each survey. Women who work full-time in their twenties or thirties
tend to have higher maths and reading scores and to be more highly qualified and
experienced than women in part-time work (who are included in the employee sample)
and women not in work (who are included in the whole sample). Nearly all employed
men work full-time and the differences in variable means across the male employee and
male full-time employee samples are negligible.
5The analyses were run on samples including predicted values for employees with missing wages and
the results were unchanged.
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7.2.3 Results from log-linear wage models
Table 7.5 shows the partial linear correlations between log wages and selected charac-
teristics, estimated by least squares for the cross-sections of women and men employees
at each survey.
Men’s predicted pay is systematically higher than women’s for each of the three
cohorts at each survey age. Most of this higher pay is captured in the higher constant
term in the wage equations. The wage returns to employment experience are also higher
for men than for women in the 1946 cohort at age 26 and the 1958 cohort at age 23.
Gender differences in the patterns of estimated coefficients suggest larger differences
in pay between unqualified women and men than between qualified women and men i.e
the coefficients on qualifications are larger in the female wage equations than in male
wage equations. Amongst both unqualified and qualified employees though, women’s
predicted wage is lower than men’s once the constant term in each wage equation is
added.
The wage returns to holding qualifications above O-level increase with age for both
women and men. This coincides with the increasing dispersion of wages with age for
both genders (see figures 5.9 and 5.10 in the appendix to chapter 5).
Table 7.6 shows the OLS estimated wage models for full-time employees at each
survey. The pattern of returns for for women working full-time is closer to that for
men than it is to the pattern estimated for all working women (including part-time
employees). The constant term in the female wage equation estimated for full-time
employees is higher than that for all female employees. In turn, the relative returns
to having qualifications above O-level tend to be lower for female full-time employees
than for all female employees. Years in employment are separated into full-time and
part-time experience This reveals a pattern of positive returns to full-time experience,
but non-significant or negative returns to part-time experience.
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7.2.4 Results from probit models for propensity-score matching
All employees
The probit models summarised in table 7.7 show the differences in the characteristics of
women and men employees at each survey. The negative coefficients on years in work
show that women are likely to have less employment experience than men at each survey.
The other coefficients should be interpreted with some caution. For example, for the
1970 cohort at age 34, the raw difference in the proportion of female and male employees
with a degree level qualification is negligible, but the estimated probit parameter is
negative and significant owing to the strong positive association between labour market
attachment and education for women. The pseudo R2 for each model gives a crude
indicator of the extent to which women and men employees differ across the selected
characteristics. This shows that women and men become more different with age, owing
to the widening gender gap in employment experience.
Table 7.8 shows the standardised differences in the means of each covariate across the
unmatched and matched samples. This provides an indication of how well propensity-
score matching balances covariates across the matched sample. If there were no sys-
tematic differences after matching, we would expect to see standardised differences
(t-statistics) of less than 1.96. Where we see standardised differences larger than this
across the matched samples, it is a sign that certain covariates are not balanced by
the matching exercise. Only individuals with a propensity-score outside the range es-
timated for the opposite gender are excluded from the analysis i.e. common support
restrictions are imposed.
We find that the weighted sample of male employees that is matched to female
employees is systematically less likely to have a degree for the two later cohorts. The
interpretation of this is that men with low levels of employment experience relative to
other men, but close to levels held by female employees, tend to be less qualified. This
effect also comes through in lower reading and maths scores in some of the samples. The
consequence of this is that the estimate of unequal treatment may be biased downward,
since we are comparing the pay of women to that of less qualified men.
We find that the weighted sample of female employees that is matched to male
employees (the second matched sample) is systematically more likely to have a degree
in four out of the nine samples and to have higher maths and reading scores in two
of the 1946 cohort samples. The consequence of this is again that, in these cases, the
estimate of unequal treatment is likely to be biased downward.
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Full-time employees
The probit models summarised in table summarised in 7.9 show the divergence in
women’s and men’s employment patterns for full-time employees - with women having
spent less time in full-time work and more time in part-time work than men at each
survey. The summary of differences in covariates (table 7.10) shows that systematic
differences in levels of full-time and part-time experience remain across the matched
samples of female and male full-time employees. Consequently, the estimates of unequal
treatment from these models may be biased upward, since differences may in part be
attributable to these differences in employment experience.
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7.2.5 Estimates of unequal treatment
All employees
The different estimators are summarised in table 7.11. Table 7.12 shows the set of
estimates. All estimates are positive and statistically different from zero, suggesting
that unequal treatment of women and men has impacts on pay for all three birth
cohorts. Systematic patterns of cross and within-cohort differences are also revealed:
1. The unexplained gap is higher for the 1946 cohort at ages twenty-six and thirty-
one than for the two later cohorts in their twenties and thirties.
2. The unexplained gap is higher for the 1958 cohort at ages twenty-three and thirty-
three than for the 1970 cohort at ages twenty-six, thirty and thirty-four.
3. The unexplained gap is not higher for the 1946 cohort at age forty-three (in 1989)
than for the 1958 cohort at age forty-two (in 2000).
4. The unexplained gap increases with age for the 1958 and 1970 cohorts.
Table 7.11: Summary of different estimators of unexplained log differential
Method Estimator
(1) Decomposition (weights = male employees) X¯ ′m,s=1(βˆm − βˆf )
(2) Decomposition (weights = female employees) X¯ ′f,s=1(βˆm − βˆf )
(3) Decomposition (weights = all employees) X¯m,s=1(βˆm − βˆ∗) + X¯f,s=1(βˆ∗ − βˆf )
(4) Decomposition (weights = all women) X¯ ′f (βˆm − βˆf )
(5) Propensity-score matching (weights = male em-
ployees)
1
Nm
∑
i∈m,s=1 ln(wmi) − 1Nm
∑
i∈m,s=1
ˆln(wmi)
(6) Propensity-score matching (weights = female em-
ployees)
1
Nf
∑
i∈f,s=1
ˆln(wfi) − 1Nf
∑
i∈f,s=1 ln(wfi)
Notes: In (3) βˆ∗ is the vector of estimated parameters from a pooled model including a dummy for
gender. In (5) ˆln(wmi) is the counterfactual (female) estimated wage for male individual, i. In (6)
ˆln(wfi) is the counterfactual (male) estimated wage for female individual, i.
Looking first at cross-cohort trends, there is evidence of a decrease in unequal treat-
ment at younger ages. For the 1946 cohort, the estimates of the unexplained gap for
women and men at age twenty-six and thirty-one range from 0.23 log points to 0.43 log
points. For the 1958 cohort at ages twenty-three and thirty-three, the range is 0.18-0.26
log points, and for the 1970 cohort at ages twenty-six, thirty and thirty-four, the range
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Table 7.12: Estimates of unexplained log difference in pay for women and men employees
using different estimators, by survey
1946 cohort 1958 cohort 1970 cohort
Age at survey 26 31 43 23 33 42 26 30 34
(1) 0.33
(0.02)
0.31
(0.02)
0.33
(0.04)
0.18
(0.01)
0.21
(0.01)
0.26
(0.01)
0.10
(0.01)
0.14
(0.01)
0.17
(0.01)
(2) 0.33
(0.02)
0.39
(0.04)
0.32
(0.08)
0.15
(0.01)
0.27
(0.01)
0.30
(0.01)
0.10
(0.01)
0.14
(0.01)
0.18
(0.01)
(3) 0.34
(0.02)
0.36
(0.02)
0.34
(0.03)
0.16
(0.01)
0.23
(0.01)
0.28
(0.01)
0.10
(0.01)
0.14
(0.01)
0.18
(0.01)
(4) 0.24
(0.05)
0.43
(0.06)
0.32
(0.09)
0.16
(0.01)
0.31
(0.01)
0.32
(0.01)
0.10
(0.01)
0.16
(0.01)
0.21
(0.01)
(5) 0.28
(0.03)
0.23
(0.04)
0.28
(0.06)
0.17
(0.01)
0.17
(0.02)
0.26
(0.02)
0.11
(0.02)
0.13
(0.02)
0.19
(0.02)
(6) 0.32
(0.03)
0.39
(0.04)
0.36
(0.13)
0.16
(0.01)
0.26
(0.02)
0.32
(0.02)
0.09
(0.02)
0.14
(0.02)
0.19
(0.02)
Raw log gap 0.38 0.44 0.53 0.17 0.35 0.40 0.11 0.17 0.22
N (women) 692 514 836 3,514 3,128 3,998 2,841 3,894 3,004
N (men) 1,385 974 902 4,263 3,672 3,957 2,375 4,166 3,289
Notes: see table 7.11 for description of each of the 6 estimators. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses.
is 0.09-0.21. Comparing within estimator, the estimates are in each case higher for the
1946 cohort than for the two later cohorts, and higher for the 1958 cohort than for
the 1970 cohort. In contrast, there is no evidence of a decrease in the unexplained gap
across the 1946 cohort at age forty-two (in 1989) and the 1958 cohort at age forty-three
(in 2000).
Looking at within-cohort trends, there is evidence of an increase in unequal treat-
ment with age in the two more recent cohorts.6 This is clear to see in figure 7.5, which
graphs the estimates shown in table 7.12 for the 1958 and 1970 cohorts. Within the
1958 cohort, there is a marked increase in the unexplained log gap between the ages
of twenty-three and forty-two. The timing and extent of this increase appears to vary
across different groups of women and men, as evidenced by the variation in patterns
across the different estimators:
• Using female employees as the reference sample (estimators (2) and (6)) suggests
6The standard errors associated with the 1946 cohort estimates are to wide, and the variation in
estimates across estimators is too great, to get an informative picture of within-cohort change.
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that the unexplained gap in pay increases early on for women who have weaker
labour market attachment and lower levels of education.
• Using men as reference sample (estimators (1) and (5)) suggests that the unex-
plained gap in increases less and later on for women with stronger labour market
attachment i.e. those who share average characteristics with men.
Within the 1970 cohort, the unexplained gap increased from around 0.1 log points at
age twenty-six to around 0.2 log points by age thirty-four. In contrast to the 1958
cohort, the pattern of increase is consistent across estimators.
Figure 7.4: Estimates of unexplained log pay gap for the 1958 and 1970 cohort, by
method.
The lighter, dashed lines show the 95% confidence intervals.
Investigation into the variation in the estimates across estimators revealed two main
sources of sensitivity. A first source of variation comes from different weightings of
returns to employment experience. For example:
• Using estimator (4), which weights the coefficients by the mean characteristics of
the whole female population, rather than by those of employees, gender differences
in returns to employment experience are less heavily weighted. The point estimate
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for the 1946 cohort at age twenty-six is smaller (0.24) using estimator (4), since the
male advantage in returns to experience is weighted less in the estimate. However,
the 95% confidence interval is wide (0.14, 0.34), reflecting the uncertainty with
which the return to experiences are estimated for the 1946 cohort.7
• Using estimator (1) or (5), which uses the mean characteristics of male employees
as the reference group, gender differences in returns to experience are more heavily
weighted. For the 1958 cohort at age thirty-three, the unexplained log gap is
smaller using estimators (1) or (5), giving more weight to the higher (relative)
female return to work experience.
One interpretation of this pattern is that women with stronger labour market are less
unequally paid, relative to their male counterparts, than women with weaker labour
market attachment. However, table 7.8 revealed that women who have equal levels of
employment experience to men are likely to be more highly qualified (more likely to
have a degree) than their matched male counterparts. There is evidence then that the
estimate of unequal treatment based on matching is downward biased for this group.
The second source of sensitivity is the weighting of job tenure. For the 1946 cohort
at age thirty-one and the 1958 cohort at age thirty-three, using estimator (4) places a
lower weight on the female advantage in returns to job tenure. Non-employed women
(who feature in the reference sample) have been assigned a zero for job tenure. Since the
model parameters were estimated for employees with varying levels of job tenure, the
appropriateness of these weights, and the validity of resulting estimates, is questionable.
Full-time employees
Turning to the estimates for the restricted sample of full-time employees (table 7.13), we
again see a clear cross-cohort decrease in estimates of unequal treatment. The estimates
are also smaller than those for all employees (including part-time employees) at older
ages. This suggests that higher levels of estimated unequal treatment in the thirties
and forties may be owing to less equal treatment of part-time workers in the labour
market.
Across four of the six estimators, there are also signs of a decrease in unequal
treatment for full-time employees in the 1946 cohort between 1972 and 1977, over which
period the Equal Pay Act came into force. Joshi and Newell (1987) found a decrease in
7This is likely ot be owing to some measurement error in the 1946 cohort experience variables (see
chapter 4) as well as to smaller sample sizes.
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Table 7.13: Estimates of unexplained log difference in pay for women and men full-time
employees using different estimators, by survey
1946 cohort 1958 cohort 1970 cohort
Age at survey 26 31 43 23 33 42 26 30 34
(1) 0.30
(0.02)
0.23
(0.03)
0.28
(0.04)
0.17
(0.01)
0.13
(0.01)
0.19
(0.01)
0.09
(0.01)
0.10
(0.01)
0.09
(0.02)
(2) 0.28
(0.02)
0.24
(0.03)
0.32
(0.08)
0.15
(0.01)
0.16
(0.01)
0.20
(0.02)
0.08
(0.01)
0.10
(0.01)
0.09
(0.02)
(3) 0.29
(0.02)
0.24
(0.03)
0.27
(0.04)
0.16
(0.01)
0.14
(0.01)
0.20
(0.01)
0.08
(0.01)
0.10
(0.01)
0.10
(0.01)
(4) 0.12
(0.06)
0.28
(0.06)
0.41
(0.13)
0.14
(0.01)
0.20
(0.02)
0.22
(0.04)
0.09
(0.01)
0.08
(0.01)
0.06
(0.02)
(5) 0.26
(0.03)
0.18
(0.05)
0.29
(0.07)
0.17
(0.01)
0.14
(0.02)
0.19
(0.02)
0.08
(0.02)
0.10
(0.02)
0.12
(0.02)
(6) 0.24
(0.02)
0.30
(0.04)
0.19
(0.13)
0.16
(0.01)
0.17
(0.02)
0.19
(0.05)
0.07
(0.02)
0.09
(0.02)
0.12
(0.03)
raw log gap 0.29 0.25 0.39 0.16 0.17 0.30 0.08 0.09 0.10
N (women) 526 243 450 2,813 1,673 2,277 2,419 2,736 1,773
N (men) 1,383 974 890 3,651 3,584 3,879 2,334 4,120 3,223
Notes: see table 7.11 for description of each of the 6 estimators. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses.
unequal treatment for full-time employees over this period. The two estimators which
do not show this pattern are estimator (4), which weights the parameter difference by
the mean characteristics of the female population, and estimator (6), which compares
women’s mean full-time wage to the mean full-time wage for a weighted sample of men
(with a similar distribution of propensity scores to women in full-time work). Arguably,
less emphasis should be placed on the results from estimator (4), as discussed in the
previous section, since the estimates are affected by the the arbitrary underweighting
of the female advantage in returns to job tenure at age thirty-one, biasing the estimate
upward. The result using estimator (4) though weakens this evidence of a decrease in
unequal treatment within this cohort.
There is no clear pattern of change in unequal treatment with age from the trends for
full-time employees. However, the interpretation of within-cohort trends is complicated
by the fact that different groups of women are in full-time work at different ages. For the
1958 cohort, most of the estimates suggest either a decrease or no change in unequal
treatment for full-time employees between the ages of twenty-three and thirty-three
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Figure 7.5: Estimates of unexplained log pay gap for full-time employees in the 1958
and 1970 cohort, by method.
The lighter, dashed lines show the 95% confidence intervals.
and an increase in unequal treatment between the ages of thirty-three and forty-two.
However, the estimates weighted by the sample of all women’s characteristics (not just
those of full-time employees) show an increase in unequal treatment between the ages
of twenty-three and thirty-three, but not between the ages of 33 and 42. It may be that
women who have characteristics that attract unequal treatment are more likely to be out
of work or in part-time work at age 33 and to have returned to full-time work by the age
of 42. This interpretation is supported running models for a restricted sample of women
and men who were in full-time work at both ages 33 and 42. For this restricted sample,
there is no evidence of an increase in unequal treatment between the ages of thirty-three
and forty-two (result not shown). Joshi et al. (2007) found the opposite result: they
found an increase in estimated unequal treatment for the sample of 989 women who
were in full-time work at both ages. One difference between the method they used and
the method used here is that they estimated the OLS model using the whole cross-
section samples of full-time employees at each age and used the parameters from these
models (based on complete samples) to calculate indices of unequal treatment for the
sub-sample of women in full-time work at both points, changing only the weighting of
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the parameters. In contrast, I restricted the sample to those working full-time at both
ages thirty-three and forty-two for the purposes of estimating the OLS model (which
has a considerably higher constant term when estimated for the restricted sample) and
for the purpose of weighting the predicted wages.
Conclusions
There are several conclusions that are robust to different methods of measuring unequal
treatment for the cross-section samples:
1. There has been an decrease in unequal treatment across the three cohorts in their
twenties and thirties.
2. Unequal treatment persists for the 1970 cohort.
3. Unequal treatment is higher for all employees (including part-time employees)
than for full-time employees in their thirties and forties.
The last of these results suggests that it is part-time working at older ages, rather
than age per se, that attracts greater unequal treatment. Consistent with this, previous
spells in part-time work have a negligible or negative impact on full-time pay, in con-
trast to consistent positive returns to full-time experience (table 7.5). An alternative
interpretation is that women who choose to work part-time are less productive and
motivated than other employees, in ways not captured by the characteristics included
in the model. As Gregory and Connolly (2008) have pointed out, this second account
is weakened by the fact that such a large fraction of women work part-time, including
younger cohorts with high levels of education.
A limitation of the results based on cross-sections of employees at each survey is
that within-cohort trends may arise from compositional effects (changes in the sample),
induced by selection into and out of work, and full-time work, rather than changes in
the relative pay of the same individuals over time. The majority of female employees
were working full-time in their twenties, but only between 40 and 60 per cent by the
their thirties. The next section of this chapter looks at estimates from longitudinally
matched samples. This makes it possible to look directly at wage trajectories and to
avoid some of the bias related to compositional effects. However, the samples are much
smaller and women who are strongly attached to the labour market are over-represented
in these samples. So, although the estimates are likely to be more internally valid, they
may be less precise and less generalisable.
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7.3 Gender differentials in pay for longitudinal matched
samples
A second exercise involved comparing life-cycle trends in employment and pay for longi-
tudinal samples of women and men who started their working lives with similar charac-
teristics and levels of education. The focus of this exercise is on life-cycle trends, rather
than cross-cohort trends. The reason for restricting the sample is to look at differences
in wage growth of women and men, rather than the combined effects of changes in
relative wages and changes in workforce composition. The estimates of unequal pay are
simple differences in mean log wages for the same group of women and men at different
ages. The longitudinal samples were out of necessity restricted to women and men who
had been in work at each survey. As a consequence, the samples represent a select
group of women with higher qualifications and stronger labour market attachment than
average.
Trends in pay gaps were estimated for three longitudinal samples:
1. women and men who were in work at each survey;
2. women and men who were in full-time work at each survey; and
3. women who did not have children by the most recent survey and men with similar
educational characteristics (but who may or may not have had children).
Table 7.14 shows the sample sizes for the three longitudinal samples. The samples
include all women who meet the specified inclusion criteria and a sub-sample of men
with similar qualifications and childhood backgrounds, matched one-to-one, without
replacement.
Individuals were matched on the propensity score estimated from a probit model
including maths and reading ability scores, childhood characteristics and highest qual-
fication attained by age 23 or 26. Table 7.15 summarises the probit models used to
estimate propensity scores. It is qualifications achieved by the early twenties that does
the work in these models. The substantial minority of women who are in work at each
survey age represent a relatively highly qualified group and are more likely than men to
have diploma or degree level qualifications. Using the estimated propensity score, a sub-
sample of men who met the inclusion criteria (i.e. in work at each survey/in full-time
work at each survey) were selected. The selection was on the basis of nearest-neighbour
matching on the propensity score, without replacement. The resulting samples contain
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equal numbers of men and women. The results from matching with replacement, us-
ing a full weighted sample of male employees as the comparison group, gave the same
results (with slightly smaller standard errors).
Table 7.14: Sample sizes for matched longitudinal samples, by cohort
1958 cohort 1970 cohort
Men (N) Women (N) Men (N) Women (N)
Sample 1
Women: Employed at each survey 1,392 1,392 1,451 1,451
Men: Employed at each survey and have a
similar distribution of qualifications to female
sample
Sample 2
Women: Employed full-time at each survey 596 596 853 853
Men: Employed full-time at each survey and
have a similar distribution of qualifications to
female full-time sample
Sample 3
Women: Employed at each survey and not
had children by most recent survey
422 422 669 669
Men: Employed at each survey and have a
similar distribution of qualifications to female
childless sample
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All employees
Figures 7.6 shows an increase in the gender log pay gap with age for both the cohorts
over their twenties and thirties. The increase in the gap is statistically significant.
However, there is quite a lot of variation in wage trajectories across different women
and men. Figure 7.7 shows the distribution of gender differences in wage growth across
individual matched pairs (of women and men). Although the median male advantage
in wage growth is positive (and statistically significant), there a substantial fraction (up
to 40%) of cases in which women’s wages increase more than those of similarly qualified
(matched) men. However, for this group, women started out with considerably lower
wages in their twenties. The analysis here misses out early-career inequalities in wage
growth, which Manning and Petrongolo (2008) found to be important.
Figure 7.6: Log pay gap for longitudinal matched samples of employees in the 1958 and
1970 cohort
The shaded areas show the 95% confidence intervals.
Women with lower wage growth than their matched, male counterparts are more
likely to have switched to part-time hours than those with similar or higher wage growth.
In the 1958 cohort, more than two fifths of women who saw a lower increase in their
log wages between the ages of 23 and 33 switched from full into part-time work and
7 per cent were in part-time work at both ages. In contrast, more than 70 per cent
of women who saw similar or higher wage growth were in full-time work at both ages.
In the 1970 cohort, around 60 per cent of women with lower wage growth remained in
full-time work at both points, compared to 66 per cent of women with similar or higher
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Figure 7.7: Distribution of gender differences in wage growth (1)
(1) Wage growth is defined as the change in log wages with age. The gender difference = (male change)
- (female change). The central horizontal line shows the median difference. The box shows the 25th
and 75th percentiles.
wage growth.
Full-time employees
For the samples who were in full-time work at all three survey ages, there is no increase in
the average gender gap with age for either the 1958 or the 1970 cohort. The unexplained
gap in log pay is positive and statistically significant at each age, but there is no widening
of the gap at all for the 1958 cohort between the ages of 23 and 42. For the 1970 cohort,
the slight male advantage in wage growth between the ages of 26 and 34 for the 1970
cohort is not statistically significant at the 5% level. The same pattern is observed for
the sample restricted to women without children (which is largely overlapping with the
longitudinal sample of full-time employees).
Again, it should be emphasised that the ages at which wages are shown for the
cohorts do not cover the period straight after labour market entry and Manning and
Petrongolo (2008) show evidence that the gender gap in pay, including for full-time
employees and childless women, emerges over the first ten years in the labour market.
The evidence presented here shows significant unexplained pay gaps by the ages of 23
and 26 and is consistent with their finding.
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7.4 Conclusions
There are several important findings that emerge from the analysis of pay gaps within
and across the cohorts. First, the estimates suggest that unequal treatment persisted
for the 1970 birth cohort by the age of 34 (in 2004). Women in this cohort who had
worked full-time and not had children by the age of 34 were paid systematically less
than similarly qualified men. Although some of this unexplained gap may be owing
to differences in women’s and men’s job and occupation choices, this in itself raises
a question about why women should systematically choose jobs that pay less or, on
the flip side, why the jobs that many women do, are paid less than those done by
similarly-qualified men. Given that nearly a third of women in the cohort had not had
children by this age and many are likely to remain childless (Kneale and Joshi, 2008),
it is not plausible to attribute all of this unexplained gap to the fertility intentions and
associated employment choices.
Second, the estimates presented in this chapter provide evidence of a substantial
decrease in unequal treatment across the three birth cohorts. The unexplained gap in
pay has reduced across the cohorts when in their twenties and thirties. This finding
is robust to a range of different ways of measuring unequal treatment, for the samples
including all employees and the restricted sample of full-time employees. The cross-
cohort change in the wage effects of part-time working is much harder to assess. The
majority of women in each cohort (just over half in the 1970 cohort) have worked part-
time at some point in their life. However, the composition of the part-time workforce
changes with age and the extent and patterns of part-time working have changed con-
siderably across the three cohorts. The increase in mother’s employment rates have
mostly been through an increase in part-time working. To quantify the changes in the
impact of part-time working for each of the cohorts, it would be important to adjust
for compositional effects. This would be a separate and substantial piece of work.
Third, the analysis of wage patterns for longitudinal samples of the 1958 and 1970
cohorts show that the gender pay gap widened over their twenties and thirties. The de-
crease in women’s relative pay was linked to having children and switching to part-time
work. Women who worked full-time for most of their careers were paid systematically
less than similarly-qualified men, but did not face a decrease in their relative pay over
their twenties and thirties. In contrast, women who switched to part-time hours faced
significantly lower growth in their hourly earnings. The evidence from wage models for
the cross-sections of women working full-time in their forties also showed that part-time
working has long-term negative effects on pay.
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Chapter 8
Summary and conclusions
This thesis opened with the questions of how unequal labour market opportunities affect
women’s and men’s relative pay over their working lives and with how inequalities have
changed across three British generations since the 1970s. It has presented new evidence
on changes in women’s and men’s relative pay opportunities across three British birth
cohorts. It has also contributed new estimates of unequal treatment to the existing
body of evidence for these cohorts. Finally, it has used the longitudinal aspect of the
cohort earnings data for the first time to look at how gender inequalities cumulate
over the life-cycle. This concluding chapter draws together the research findings from
chapters 5 and 7 and reflects upon what is added to the existing quantitative literature
on gender inequalities. The final parts of the chapter consider prospects for the future
and the role for policy in shaping future trends.
8.1 Trends in women’s and men’s pay opportunities
The first analysis focused on a broad measure of women’s and men’s unequal pay
opportunities. The question addressed was how women’s relative pay opportunities,
including those of non-workers, had changed across the three cohorts. The motivation
for this investigation was the simultaneous change in women’s rates of pay and rates of
employment, and the concern that, by looking only at wages of employees, we may get
a partial and distorted picture of pay opportunities.
Blundell et al. (2007) addressed this question using cross-section data from the
Family Expenditure Survey (FES) for 1978 and 1998. They investigated the effects
of changes in workforce composition, induced by changes in patterns of employment,
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on gender differentials and also on the picture of wage inequality overall and on edu-
cational differentials. They used a variety of different assumptions about the relative
potential wages of non-workers and workers to estimate upper and lower bounds on
differentials in median potential pay. Two assumptions were critical to their findings
on gender differentials: first, that the median wages of workers were likely to be higher
than those of non-workers for a fixed age and level of education (a weak form of pos-
itive selection); and second, that changes in out-of-work benefits entitlements affected
employment participation but not pay (an exclusion restriction). They concluded that
changes in workforce composition masked some of the improvement in women’s labour
market position between 1978 and 1998 for younger, less educated workers. This ques-
tion has not been examined before using the British birth cohort data. This provided
the opportunity to look at trends over a longer period, from before the Equal Pay Act
came into force up to 2004. The detailed information on childbearing and job histories
also made it possible to avoid the assumption of positive selection into work.
Across the 1946 and 1970 cohorts, women’s median hourly pay rose from around
60% of men’s to around 80% of men’s, when in their early thirties. Simultaneously, the
proportion of women in paid employment rose from around a half to three-quarters.
The working hypothesis was that low pay offers were more likely to be rejected and
that the extent of unequal pay opportunities for women in the two earlier cohorts
could be partly masked by lower rates of employment. This was the essence of the
result in Blundell et al. (2007) and from work by Blau and Kahn (2006a) for the US.
However, another hypothesis suggested by the literature for the US was that changes
in women’s patterns of employment participation meant that improvements in women’s
labour market opportunities were overstated, not understated, in wage trends (Mulligan
and Rubinstein, 2008).
The cohort datasets contain detailed information on employment and childbearing
histories, but little information that would lend itself to suitable exclusion restrictions.
On this basis, I took the approach of imputing potential wages for non-employed women
and men based on the actual wages of similar, but employed, women and men of the
same cohort and age and with similar employment and family histories (up to that
point). It was not necessary to make assumptions of positive selection into work. It was
necessary, though, to make the assumption of ‘selection on observables’. In other words,
it was assumed that individuals with the same characteristics shared the same potential
wage, whether or not they were actually in work. This assumption was considered to
be reasonable in light of the detailed information on qualifications, employment and
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childbearing histories and childhood maths and reading ability. Possible bias arising
from unobserved selectivity was also investigated using the data on maths and reading
ability and, for the 1958 cohort, on wages in a first job. On balance, the evidence
supported the assumption, but with some evidence that the estimated composition
effects could be overstated owing to some negative unobserved selectivity bias in the
estimates for the 1946 and 1958 cohorts at younger ages, and the reverse (positive
selection) for the 1958 and 1970 cohorts at older ages.
It also became clear from the analysis of the cohort data, that composition effects are
linked to variation in the timing of childbirth and patterns of return to work amongst
mothers. For women in the 1946 cohort, around 80% had become mothers by their late
twenties and nearly all mothers spent several years out of the workforce. At the ages
of 26 and 31, around half of women were in work, but these were different groups of
women. Changes in composition came mainly from social and educational differences in
the timing of childbirth over a relatively short number of years, and less from variation
amongst mothers in patterns of return to work. For women in the 1958 and 1970
cohorts, women tended to have children later and more mothers returned to work more
quickly after having children. Childbearing years were more spread out and variation
in both the timing of childbirth and patterns of return to work increased. However,
composition effects on wages were not so important in the later cohorts simply because
the majority of women were in work at each age.
The broad picture was of an improvement in women’s position in the labour market
in Britain since the 1970s, including an improvement in their underlying pay opportu-
nities relative to men’s. The main finding was that the cross-cohort improvement in
women’s labour market opportunities was, if anything, understated in the increase in
average pay for employed cohort members at younger ages. This result is consistent
with Blundell et al. (2007).
8.2 Trends in unequal pay for equally qualified women and
men
Turning to the question of unequal remuneration of women’s and men’s skills in the
labour market, the second piece of work was based directly on previous work on the
birth cohorts by Joshi and Newell (1989), Joshi and Paci (1998), Makepeace et al.
(1999) and Joshi et al. (2007). Previously, evidence had been found of systematic
unexplained gender differences in pay in each of the three cohorts, not accounted for by
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gender differences in education or labour market experience. Further, previous results
suggested a marked decrease in unequal treatment across the three cohorts.
Following Joshi and Paci (1998), I used standard decomposition methods to estimate
unexplained gender differentials in log pay. I used as yet unused surveys of the 1946 and
1970 cohorts, at ages 43 (in 1989) and 34 (in 2004) respectively to make new estimates of
unequal treatment for the cohorts at these ages. I also used propensity-score matching
models to test the sensitivity of the results to different ways of estimating counterfactual
‘non-discriminatory’ wages for individuals. I analysed gender differentials separately
for the whole samples of employees (including part-time employees) and for restricted
samples of full-time employees.
For each of the cohorts at every age, I found a statistically significant difference in the
average (log) pay of women and men with similar levels of education and employment
experience. Even for the 1970 birth cohort, in which women and men have similar levels
of education, there was a 10 per cent unexplained difference in average pay by the age
of 26. In this cohort, women who were working full-time at the age of thirty-four (in
2004) were also paid 10 to 12 per cent less than men with similar levels of education
and experience. This is in line with previous estimates for this cohort at age 30 (Joshi
et al., 2007).
I also found strong evidence of a cross-cohort decrease in the unexplained gender pay
gap. The log differential in pay between women and men for similar levels of education
and experience fell from around 0.3 for the 1946 birth cohort at age 31 to around 0.2
for the 1958 birth cohort at age 33 to around 0.1 for the 1970 birth cohort at age 30.
Comparing the relative pay just for full-time employees also shows a cross-generational
decrease in unequal treatment. Again, this finding is in line with previous results for
the cohorts (Joshi and Paci, 1998; Makepeace et al., 1999; Joshi et al., 2007).
Comparing estimates for all employees to estimates for full-time employees revealed
that lower pay associated with part-time working. However, the cross-cohort change
in the wage effects of part-time working are not clear from the present analysis. The
majority of women in each cohort (just over half in the 1970 cohort) worked part-time
at some point over the course of their working lives. However, patterns of part-time
working have changed considerably across the three cohorts. Many women in part-time
work around childbearing ages in the 1970 cohort simply would not have been in work
in the 1946 cohort. To quantify the changes in the impact of part-time working for each
of the cohorts, adjusting for compositional effects, would be a separate and substantial
piece of work.
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The snapshots based on wages of cross-sections of employed cohort members sug-
gested a widening of the unexplained pay gap with age for the 1958 and 1970 cohorts.
A limitation of the results based on cross-sections of employees at each survey is that
within-cohort trends may arise from compositional effects (changes in the sample), in-
duced by selection into and out of full-time work, rather than changes in the relative
pay of the same individuals over time. The way in which these compositional issues are
handled affects the estimate of unequal treatment and I obtained different results from
Joshi et al. (2007) as a consequence. They estimated an increase in unequal treatment
for full-time workers in the 1958 cohort between the ages of 33 and 42, whereas I did not.
Although they restricted their sample to the 989 women in full-time work at both ages,
the wage model parameters were estimated on the complete cross-sections in full-time
work. In contrast, my results were based on the restricted sample for both purposes.
The important point is that there are lower paid workers who return to full-time work
in their forties from either part-time work or non-employment. The way that these
workers feature in estimates makes a difference to the assessment of unequal treatment.
8.3 Life-cycle trends in unequal pay
The third area of investigation was life-cycle trends in gender pay differentials. For this,
I started from work by Manning and Petrongolo (2008) on gender differences in wage
growth early on in the career and by Brewer and Paull (2006) and Connolly and Gregory
(2009) on the longitudinal wage effects of motherhood and part-time working. I used
hourly wages collected from the 1958 and 1970 cohorts in their twenties and thirties
and, for the 1958 cohort, in their early forties. Most cohort members had been in work
for several years by their early to mid twenties (up to a decade for the 1970 cohort by
age 26) so my analysis covers a later period of the life-cycle to Manning and Petrongolo
(2008) and also goes back a decade earlier (to 1981). The focus on longitudinal trends
increases the internal validity of the results, but at the cost of generalisability, since
women who are strongly attached to the labour market, who are over-represented in
the sample, are a select and more highly-qualfied group.
I used the longitudinal aspect of the cohort datasets to investigate changes in the
gender diferential for the same group over time. The cohort studies allow the possibility
of selecting large samples of the same age and tracking their wages at several points
in time. However, such a small minority of women in the 1946 cohort were employed
at each age that no informative changes could be estimated for this cohort. For the
210
1958 and 1970 cohorts, around a third of women were in paid work at all three survey
ages. Within both cohorts, there was a substantial and significant widening of the
gender gap in pay over the life-cycle for women and men who started with similar
qualifications and family backgrounds. However, there was variation in wage growth
and women experienced lower or negative rates of wage growth were much more likely
to have switched to part-time work between their twenties and thirties. The effects of
this switch persisted into their forties for the 1958 cohort, at which age a substantial
number had returned to full-time work. This finding is consistent with other evidence
of lower pay in part-time jobs (Manning and Swaffield, 2008) and of long-term negative
effects of part-time working on occupational mobility and wages (Connolly and Gregory,
2009).
Women who were in full-time employment at all three survey ages, and women
without children by the most recent survey, were paid systematically less than similarly
qualified men. However, they did not experience the same decrease in relative pay with
age. Given that these are small and highly-qualified samples, it is harder to generalise
about the protective benefits of remaining in full-time work on women’s relative pay.
One interpretation of this difference in results is it is part-time working at older
ages, rather than age per se, that attracts greater unequal treatment. Consistent with
this, previous spells in part-time work have a negligible or negative impact on full-time
pay, in contrast to consistent positive returns to full-time experience. An alternative
interpretation is that women who work part-time reap benefits other than pay from
their jobs and/or that they do less demanding work.
An interesting future piece of work could be done modelling wage patterns for larger
samples, including individuals with some non-employment and missing wage data. This
would require some fairly complex models of missingness and some strong assumptions
about selection into and out of work.
8.4 Prospects for a more equal society
The persistence of systematic differences in the pay of equally qualified and experienced
women and men is strong evidence of unequal treatment in the British labour market.
Particularly powerful is the evidence from the 1970 birth cohort, in which women and
men with equal levels of education and similar employment histories are still paid dif-
ferently. Further, the increase in the gender pay gap between the ages of 26 and 34
suggests that unequal pay will not disappear as a matter of course, but rather that cur-
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rent generations of young women and men are likely to face more, not less, inequality
as they grow older.
The interpretation offered here of what are historically small gender differences in
pay remains disputed though. Brewer and Paull (2006) find a differential of 11 per
cent between men’s and women’s hourly wages prior to having children and controlling
for family background, work characteristics, employment experience and occupation,
similar to the estimate for the 1970 cohort presented in this study. However, rather
than viewing this as important evidence of gender discrimination, the authors suggest
that small, pre-children gender pay differences represent ‘anticipatory effects of the
impact of children’ or that are driven by factors of less relevance than the much larger
effects of raising children on pay (Brewer and Paull, 2006, p.3). Joshi and Paci (1998)
conclude rather differently: ‘Neither taking maternity leave nor remaining childless
permit women to escape the financial penalty of being female’ (p.137).
Another way to think about small gender differences is in terms of their cumulative
impacts. Becker (1991) has argued that small initial differences in women’s and men’s
capacity to care for children contributes to their specialisation in ‘home’ or ‘market’
work. The same logic could be applied to arguments about discrimination. Under this
view, small discriminatory differences in women’s and men’s pay and treatment in the
labour market provide financial incentives and influence cultural norms about who cares
for children, also with cumulative life-cycle impacts.
On the positive side, the cross-generational increase in women’s pay opportunities
and the decrease in unequal pay for women and men with similar levels of skill shows
that unequal pay is not immutable. Arguably, the reduction in gender discrimination
in the British labour market following the implementation of the Equal Pay Act had
cumulative positive effects both on women’s pay and employment and also on the in-
vestment behaviour of subsequent generations of women. Joshi et al. (1985), Neuburger
(1984), Joshi and Newell (1987) and Manning (1996) have also drawn attention to the
increase in women’s pay and employment, following the introduction of the Equal Pay
Act. The fact that women’s pay, their rates of employment, education and relative pay
for the same levels of education have increased together is more supportive of a view
that institutional and market reductions in inequality are mutually reinforcing than of
a view that markets adjust in an automatic or negative way to policy interventions.
The change in attitudes to women’s employment since 1946, when the first cohort
was born, is striking. The long term effects of equal pay legislation on social norms
and attitudes about women’s work may also be important. In her submission to the
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Royal Commission on Equal Pay in 1946, three decades before the implementation of
any equal pay legislation, Barbara Wootton wrote,
Absence of discrimination between male and female wages might be an im-
portant secondary influence in undermining the convention of female infe-
riority. Lower pay is an obvious badge of inferiority and without this label
candidates for jobs might be more likely to be considered on personal merits.
The word ‘secondary’ in this context should, however, be stressed. Equali-
sation of pay will not itself induce a different attitude towards the place of
women in society: its significance would be that it might reinforce a half-
formed belief that the present method of discrimination is unscientific, and
out of keeping with modern standards.
Royal Commission on Equal Pay, 1946, p.194
There is the real prospect that policy can affect not just behaviour in the short-term
but can shape attitudes in the long term, such that job-sharing, flexible working and
reasonable minimum rates of pay could become norms in the workplace rather than
being perceived as atypical, costly or inconvenient.
8.5 Policy for a more equal society
Three areas of policy are important for the position of women and men in work. The
first area is direct anti-discrimination legislation. The evidence from the present study
is supportive of the view that the anti-discrimination laws introduced in 1975 have
had significant and lasting impacts on women’s pay opportunities and treatment in the
workplace. This legislation was bold, compulsory for employers and implemented largely
via collective bargaining structures. The Equality Bill was published on 27th April 2009
and includes measures aimed at promoting transparency in relation to pay, including
requiring large employers (with more than 250 employees) to publish information about
the gender pay gap. There is continued debate about the likely practical impact of these
measures.
A second important area is that of policy on parental leave and policies to support
flexible working. The evidence from the cohorts is that periods out of work and in part-
time work damage women’s long-term pay prospects. What remains unclear though
from the evidence presented here is how far the decline in relative pay associated with
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breaks in work and part-time working is owing to loss of skills and decisions to seek
less demanding and responsible positions on a return to work and how far it is owing to
less favourable treatment and opportunities. Connolly and Gregory (2008) have drawn
attention to the importance of job changes and occupational downgrading as routes
through which women’s pay is damaged upon a move from full-time to part-time hours.
The implication of this is that strengthened rights to parental leave, strengthened rights
to reinstatement and to return to work part-time with the same employer would help to
sustain women’s levels of pay. On the other hand, strengthening rights for mothers and
not fathers may lead to more employer discrimination against women of childbearing
ages (Ruhm, 1998), as well as preventing fathers from taking a fuller role in raising
children. In a report for the Department of Work and Pensions, Brewer and Paull
(2006) concluded that encouraging mothers to return to paid work between births, not
raising maternity pay and supporting the provision of in-work childcare are the right
ways to tackle the gender pay gap. Joshi (2002) has pointed out that parental work
also requires public support and that a rebalancing of parental responsibilities amongst
fathers and mothers is possible in other ways than through the shift of childcare into
the sphere of paid work.
The final important area of policy is that of broader interventions affecting labour
market institutions, public sector pay and wage structures. With a recession underway,
employers are likely to fall back on short-termist and traditional working practices
and employees are less likely to make pay or other demands for fear of losing their
jobs. Action in three policy areas could make a real difference. The rate at which
the National Minimum Wage is set disproportionately affects women’s pay. If low pay
is viewed partly as the result of a discriminatory or monopsonistic labour market, a
view supported by the evidence in this thesis, the implication is that an increase in the
minimum wage does not necessarily reduce employment. Further, better pay in sectors
such as care work could contribute to their professionalization. Policy on public sector
employment and pay matters, with a third of women employees working in the public
sector, and nearly 17 per cent of the male workforce (Labour Force Survey Historical
Quarterly Supplement, Q2 2009). Policies that affect bonuses and high pay matter,
with only a tiny minority of women working in the most highly-paid jobs. Policies that
tend to make the workplace more equal overall tend to make it more equal for women
and men.
As argued at the start of this thesis, pay is a marker of status, skill, responsibility
and power in the workplace. As women’s pay has increased across three British genera-
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tions, their attachment to the labour market has increased and so have the educational
aspirations and attainments of girls in successive generations. Taken together, the ev-
idence from the birth cohorts suggests that the effects of decreases in labour market
inequality are cumulative and self-reinforcing. The significant and lasting shift toward
more equal pay following the introduction of the 1970 Equal Pay Act is compelling
evidence of the effectiveness and importance of legislation in reducing inequality.
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